THE

LIFE OF SOCIETY

A GENERAL VIEW

By EDMUND WOODWARD BROWN

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TO

MY WIFE AND MY MOTHER,

IN REMEMBRANCE OF SYMPATHY AND HELP.

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INTRODUCTION.

WHILE social science is interested in all manner of social facts it also values and classifies those which, though in form and influence they have varied immensely according to people and age, are yet in their essence universal. In the working of society past and present the universal part has a system which the mind can abstract. It is pleasant, and should be profitable, to see this order in the life of the many men and bodies of men, the many parts of society and bodies of parts, the many movements and groups of movements; to see the continuance and co-existence of the parts; to see the working and co-working and interworking of the forces.

So great is the complexity of social phenomena, and so common has been the idea that society is merely a field of capricious will, that not so much attention has been paid here as elsewhere to regularity, order, and science. The possibility of social science is denied; its work and nature are hazy in the minds of even well informed persons, while many have thought it but a cloudland, worthless and valueless. Yet for generations a science of society has been emerging, though many thinkers have been unconscious of the fact, many indifferent to it, and still others opposed to it, imagining it to be against theological or other truth. There is, however, of late years, an increasing tendency to study society with care and accuracy.

In this work I have attempted a systematic, but not an exhaustive study of society; for it is impossible for one person to follow out so inexhaustible a subject in all its bearings. He cannot even study to advantage the de-

tail of a single department—the political or the material, the intellectual or the religious. In the detail demanded by modern civilization, political economy, for example, is too vast for more than a general view by one person and must have its specialties. But for the study of special departments of social life a previous general view may be desirable. It may even be well at first to escape from details and confine ourselves to generals. The lesser matters of society may be left out of consideration for awhile, as disturbing elements, and the attention be profitably confined to the greater matters. I am not intending to treat of anything but the barest general causes, characteristics, and spheres of society. In so doing it is difficult to get down into particulars, as well as undesirable, for the outline masses would then be lost. Though the subject be immense and each part can have a treatise by itself, yet a general treatment in a single volume is possible. As we can briefly go over the general outlines of a mountain range or a continent, or the general geography of the earth, so we can do with society. We may discriminate between the general and the particular elements of society; between those which are universal and those which are local; between the points that are common to all people and those that are peculiar to certain people.

My object is to obtain as deep and adequate a general conception of society as possible, the society of any township or any country of the world to-day or the whole world of society in the past. I wish to find an explanation of society that will suit wherever society is in any country or has been in any country or age. I want to get a general view of the constant part of every society. I want to evidence and illustrate this by social and historic facts, drawn from the wide range of society in the past and the present.

Our study has its difficulties. It is difficult to generalize about the ten thousand facts of social life. It is diffi-

cult to analyze the causes of given social conditions or events. It is impossible to analyze them fully, either as to quantity or quality. Further, our difficulties are increased by the fact that our study is not only a study of what is, but is also a study of what ought to be, and of what may be made to be.

I have gone through the subject as fully and correctly as I could, at many points not following out the thought into detail or adding illustrations. Some may dissent from my statements, and some from my methods of treatment. Perhaps in some cases I should have amplified, in others interpolated something, and in others transposed. Still, in general, I hope that I have shown the real foundation of social science, though doubtless there are deficiencies. I fear, too, that I may be dry and tedious, but I have said only what it seemed necessary to say in order thoroughly to state the subject. In writing, I have been under obligation to every book and article that would help me. Whatever I have required, and could find in others, I have borrowed, and elaborated after my own fashion, grateful to those from whom I have taken.

Many historians, statisticians, and philosophers have been engaged more or less directly upon the scientific study of human society. Essays in this line have been made for two centuries among the Italians, French, Germans, and English. Some speculative minds have found a great fascination in this particular branch of study and have pursued it with the most ardent love. Minds of the highest order have turned their attention in this direction. For example, Guizot has more or less successfully analyzed Christian European society into its causes and stages. De Tocqueville has made analyses of the same kind in certain specific American and French society.

The science of social life will doubtless be more clearly and more fully known; others shall come who both in general and in particular will develop better and more

perfect results. The study can benefit by the researches of many. Others can take up and develop more fully each department and carry out still further its application. While each may not understand more or less of what he studies, still if he be full of the scientific spirit he may make valuable suggestions, and his mistakes can be overlooked or corrected. It is desirable that there ever be new-comers to these fields, who, even while beginners, may take up and make studies of some of the many special points, one by one.

THE LIFE OF SOCIETY.

A GENERAL VIEW OF THE EFFECTIVE CAUSES ACTING UPON SOCIETY.

THE ancient classic people beheld behind all their gods a formidable fate; a something which affected men, and which neither men nor gods could affect in turn. What that classic world beheld was really the working of the great causes that create and shape men and society. Karl Hillebrand, in his "German Thought," says substantially, "General causes, circumstances, are only another name for fate. At every turn in our life we meet with limits. Our intelligence has frontiers which it cannot pass; our senses can embrace only an infinitely small part of nature. Few of our wishes can be fulfilled. Privation and suffering await us every moment. Everything cries to us that we must resign ourselves. The laws of nature and moral laws must be accepted as the limits of our actions and desires."

To know society we must study cause and characteristic and part as we study them in the anatomy and physiology of the body. As causes are the real beginnings I shall consider them first. Their study is very natural. We are engaged in such study all the while. All men continually seek to know the reason of whatever occurs that is a little out of the common, as why a bell is ringing, or why a man is crossing the fields. The study of causes in the life of society, logically and more or less naturally, begins the study of that life. It inquires how society came to be; how it is affected; what makes it worse; what makes it better; what are the causes that

produce what is; what are the causes which have produced each great condition or event in industry, government, art, or morals; what the causes, political, social, physical, moral, and other, which have contributed to the rise, growth, and overthrow of governments and religions.

One may more or less distinctly distinguish and separate the causes of the Reformation into a reaction against the doctrine and a reaction against the supremacy of the Roman Church; the one a religious and the other a political cause; the one a question of individual conscience and the other a question of national independence; the one more powerful in Germany and the other in England. Or we may follow into detail the political cause, finding that forces increasing in power for nearly four hundred years had tended to develop and consolidate the separate nations of Europe each by itself, and had logically worked out a social and political revolt against the papacy: such forces as the revival of commerce, the growth of a mercantile class and a free peasantry, the growth of towns and of representative government, the growth of nations and of a national literature.

Or take the contrasted course of freedom in England and in France. One may study the causes of this contrast in the difference in each in national character, geographical position, earlier history, or in happy thought or happy enactment. So too the terrible crisis of 1789 in France was not a mere outbreak of barbarism, a mere frenzy of the populace. Certain social, political, moral, and other causes produced it. Says De Tocqueville of the French Revolution in one of his letters: "I wish to show how this great event advanced, what was its true character, what were the preparatory causes which led it in one direction rather than in another, which drove it on, which turned it aside, which stopped it." We can also ask how far did circumstances and how far did the man himself make the career of Napoleon?

So we can go through history, assigning causes so far as we can discern them. We can study out the causes which produced and favored the steady progress of the early Christian faith, as Gibbon has done, as Dr. Uhlhorn has done. We can study the general causes of the long-continued greatness of Rome, and the causes of its decline and fall, as Montesquieu and others have done. We can study the causes of the rise and spread of the commercial spirit in the middle ages of Europe, as Lecky has done. We can study the general causes of European progress from the fifth to the fifteenth century, as Robertson and others have done; the general causes of the modern social and political organization and condition of Europe, as Edward A. Freeman and others have done.

So numerous and so very complex are the causes of affairs, so secret are some and so long in acting are some, so difficult is it to distinguish between what is only apparent cause and what is real, that the study of cause is a difficult one.

Causes, many and of all kinds and complicated, produce each great event or condition. The causes of the various changes, revolutions, and social states are generally so complex that we can have no exhaustive quantitative analysis, we can neither tell the exact number of causes nor the exact amount of each cause. For the same reason we can have no exhaustive qualitative analysis. The exact measurement of social causes is impracticable, either way. Our sources of information are too defective, both in fulness and correctness. In some cases we seem to be able to assign most of the causes. To the French Revolution we can assign somewhat the whole body of cause and the degree of intensity with which each cause acted, the exact part it played. Yet our analysis in the clearest cases is more or less defective.

Causes may act indirectly. Some causes act by contraries, by repulsion. Great religious strictness on the part of the father, great enmity to some party or denom-

ination, sometimes leads the children to the opposite side. Children who have suffered from a vice in a parent sometimes, instead of being drawn into the vice, have a lifelong repugnance to it. These repulsions are apparent in history. Buddhism is a reaction from Brahmanism, Arminianism from Calvinism. Often where the church has allied itself with wicked politics, or with oppressive government, the people have come to repel and hate it. So was it, for example, after the Bourbon restoration in France in the earlier part of this century.

It takes great causes to produce great effects. Those great results which seemingly are from temporary and accidental causes are not so really. Some accident simply makes more manifest the effect of real causes often remote, deep, hidden, and complex. The Roman Empire did not spring from an accident, but was the necessary result of a long preceding history. I know that we can suppose a kind of accident which appears to change the course of history, as, for example, the death in his cradle of the founder of the Buddhistic religion. And here we are correct, but really we here remove a man of a giant mind, a great initial force, a force which, once at work, no little matter is going to stop it. Notwithstanding accidental or temporary and irregular causes with their effect, the great regular and prolonged causes have done the great work of society and history.

A drinking bout in the city of Sparta of three young men from the city of Athens occasioned, but by no means caused, the Peloponnesian war. Sparta and Athens were so circumstanced that a collision was sure to come speedily. Sparta had an absolute aristocracy, Athens an absolute democracy. The Spartan aristocracy was of the sternest sort, the Athenian democracy was of the most radical order. The two sets would naturally hate one another, and war would easily break out, but that which started it might be but an accident. The conflict between Tetzel and Luther occasioned, but by no means

caused, the Reformation. It is probable that the Reformation would have come had Luther died in his cradle. Had Gustavus Adolphus lived and become German Emperor there would have been a vast change at the time, but it is doubtful whether the situation in Europe today would have been any different in its main features. The Dutch striking a medal with a legend insolently triumphing over the kings of Europe occasioned, but by no means caused, war between Holland and France in the days of Louis XIV. That war would have come any way, sooner or later.

The number of causes is so great that to grasp even the leading ones would be hopeless could we not classify. Causes are accidental and temporary, or regularly recurring and permanent. In finding the causes which have produced this war or revolution or that new nation we are, first, to pick out such as are accidental, temporary, personal, and arbitrary. There are many such local, isolated, incidental causes; single events, general peculiarities, particular enactments, causes which do not appear to be amenable to science, because apparently irregular, sporadic, and unaccountable. I am not saying that chance has the main sway, that chance produced the universe, that under chance it has gone aimlessly on and is still going aimlessly on. I am only saying that in the nature of things, both in the universe and in man, what we call chance has had play in great matters and small. The chapter of seeming chances is a long one. "The race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong, but time and chance happeneth to all."

In a multitude of lesser matters both existence and form are matters of indifference. Accidental and temporary causes are perpetually at work in very many little actions and words and things. It is indifferent which stocking one puts on first in the morning; or whether one talk a little more or a little less in a given hour; and so on with a large fraction of personal and social matters.

Still, in Darwin's law of natural selection accidental and temporary causes give an accidental and temporary superiority, which it is asserted becomes permanent and very influential. A casual meeting, or some other apparently light and trifling matter, has greatly affected one's lot in life. In the world, seeming chance has kept the good cause from prevailing; has given the evil cause a push forward. Chance apparently killed Gustavus Adolphus. A storm destroyed the Spanish Armada. Each instance was a crisis in history.

Says Goldwin Smith, in his essay entitled "Falkland and the Puritans": "Let us philosophize about general causes as we will, untoward accidents occur. The loss of Pym and Hampden in the early part of the revolution and the loss of Cromwell at its close may be fairly reckoned as accidents, and they were untoward in the highest degree. Had Cromwell lived ten years longer, or had his marshals been true to his successor, to his cause, and to their own fortunes, there would have been an end of the struggle against Stuart prerogative. The spirit of Laud would have been laid forever; the temporal power of ecclesiastics would have troubled no more; the union with Scotland and Ireland would have remained unbroken; and the general representation of the people embodied in the instrument of government would have continued to exist in the place of rotten boroughs, the sources of oligarchy and corruption, of class government and class wars."

These special causes exert a considerable fraction of the whole influence exerted upon history. Only in one way can science get hold of them, and that is where we take time and space enough to get so many of them that they balance and neutralize each other. The effect then is naught, and can be counted out. But it seems as though a longer than the historic period would be required to balance all causes of one kind by opposite causes of another kind.

Men have tried to turn the fate of a movement by a murder outright or through forms of law. Of the former kind was the assassination of a Cæsar to get liberty; of the latter kind was the crucifixion of Jesus Christ; was the vain killing of Thomas à Becket to get rid of ecclesiastical power; was the burning of John Huss to stop the movement he was leading. As a rule, the death of a leader will not stop a movement. And yet accidents are an influential cause. Strong are the "gods of circumstance."

Leaving such causes out of account as not calculable, we have the general causes, those that are widespread, uniform, and do not vary for many years. Such causes are comparatively few, but like those few chemical substances which are the foundation of the human body, they combine in a thousand ways. Montesquieu made physical causes almost explain history. Others have followed, notably Buckle. The French socialists, St. Simon, Fourier, and others, have made very prominent the influence of the constitution of society upon man and his destiny. Political historians have showed the influence of prominent persons in shaping history. Certain church historians have made much of divine intervention. But the great causes and factors which make general and special history are not one or two. And when we have spelled out all the general causes, physical, social, religious, and other, the work is still to be done of going into society here and there or at large and studying out their application. That work is indeed a hard one. Every philosophical writer of history has, however, to engage in it. The causes influentially operating on a living body or part of a living body are many in the detail and are much mixed, while in the life of society there is much existing or going on that is both cause and effect. The whole of society and its environment are largely both cause and effect; one cause helps toward a thousand effects, a thousand causes help toward one effect. And

as John Stuart Mill says in his "Logic": "To add to the embarrassment, most of the inquiries in political science relate to the production of effects of a most comprehensive description, such as the public wealth, public security, public morality, and the like; results liable to be affected directly or indirectly, either in plus or in minus, by nearly every fact which exists or event which occurs in human society."

As a rule, general causes do not in society and history work singly and nakedly, but more or less together, through which the action of each is continually modified by the action of others. The causes usually work, too, through a body like the family or the state, or through civil, social, or industrial institutions; through science, art, and literature; through systems like polytheism, Judaism, or Christianity. General causes operated in the struggle of the Netherlands against the crown of Spain; operated in the two English revolutions, in the American war of independence, and in the first French revolution. Complex general causes operated in such concrete facts as the revival of learning in Europe, that of art in Italy in the sixteenth century, that of philosophy in Germany in the last hundred years; also in the critical and the scientific movements of Christendom within the same period. Powerful and constant causes have worked in every great fact and change of history.

It is because of general causes that we can come somewhat to understand the past and the present of our own land and of other lands, and indeed of the whole world. It is because of general causes that we can have a philosophy of society; that we perceive how passions, opinions, and circumstances have combined to make a conquest, to create a revolution, to shape growth a certain way; that we get at the rise or decline of a nation, a religion, a civilization; that we somewhat understand any great situation or movement in social or political or other life.

General causes in the philosophic story they tell relieve the world from the imputation of littleness, deformity, disorder, and change; give it importance, beauty, and stability; habituate the mind to truer and worthier notions of its greatness and power. We have worthier conceptions of human affairs; we are more interested in all parts, in some that have been overlooked, and in many that are not relieved by any especial attraction of their own. Human life and work do not appear insignificant, but grand, as swayed by great causes and moving on to great ends.

In proceeding now to speak of each of a number of general causes by itself, I do so to make its existence and nature clear. But each characteristic of society is a cause and each part of society is a cause, is a living, palpitating portion, affecting the other parts and the whole; and the whole of society is a cause, affecting each part. It is the power of general causes in every department of life that makes it very important to direct our attention to them. They are the great formative powers of man, of society, of history. It is they that do so much to help certain special efforts and to neutralize other special efforts.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE BODY IN SOCIETY.

So far as we know, men have always lived in society. They have not by effort formed society, they have not voted it into being. Men never created society by contract. We find no evidence, no survival of an older condition than the social. There is not a locality so rude but the sick are assisted at least to food, but some division of labor takes place, but the results of labor are divided or exchanged. Always the youth, when he begins to observe, finds himself one of a household or a tribe or a city or a larger community, and he is led by the cravings of his nature and the necessities of his situ-

ation to remain there. Yet in a certain sense we can say that man has created society. Partly by his nature and partly by his will society has come into being. Man's nature is the active constituting force. Man desiring, thinking, feeling, willing, and acting creates society in its life and forms and phases. Living men are the cells of the living social body. Living men are the springs of social life. The nature and characteristics of those who make society are closely connected with the nature and history of society. In part because man is what he is we have the structure of society, the visible and invisible social movements; we have growth and improvement and deterioration. The science of human nature is the indispensable foundation of the science of society.

The very important question, What is man? has been discussed from the beginning of thought; has been discussed by theology, by metaphysics, and of late by physical science. It is a question of great significance, and is of fundamental importance in our study. Its full answer demands the knowledge of a variety of sciences—physiology, psychology, anthropology, social science, metaphysics, and theology.

In studying man, let us begin with the body, the humblest part of us, and we shall find we are beginning wisely. As there is a place for the body and its office in the philosophy of human nature so there is a place for it in the philosophy of human society. We must by no means underrate the part which it plays here. Man will carry the body, or rather it will carry him, through all his march in time. No saint so saintly, no perfection of society so perfect, but the body is there. Troublesome or helpful it is there, and to stay. Bodily need, bodily pleasure or pain, have much to do with us. We live steeped in sense.

The ground is the basis of the body. Every creature on earth is "formed of the dust of the ground," and is maintained by that of which he is made. Says John G.

Wilkinson: "Every part and every faculty of every being inhabiting the planet must be duly clothed and ballasted with stuff derived from the earth, or it would have no operation in the body or upon the body, much less upon the external world." As the ground is the basis of the body so the body is the basis of human life. The body enables us to visibly enter the outward world. The body seems to awaken us to life, our own and much life about us. If the body cease among men, then of course the human race perishes out of the world. If the body even get tired, as it does by every evening, then the human race must go to bed and sleep, leaving the earth at rest and unenlivened. It is because of the body that we need food, clothing, shelter, fire, and conveyance; that we study soil and air and water, climate and season. The feeding of the world is the first question for its settlement, it is a necessity which must be complied with before anything else can be done. The world, be it army or church or farmer or artisan or professional man, must first have its breakfast, its dinner, and its supper; no fighting, no working, no playing, no talking, on an empty stomach. Because of the body we have to struggle with the elements, with the other animals, and with our fellows, for the veriest subsistence and protection.

On earth all physical forces have continued, quiescent or active; all vegetable nature has lived and died its thousand seasons; all animated nature has appeared and passed away in its periods. Man has been among it all, to fit and accommodate himself to his environment; he has had to keep himself alive and make himself comfortable; he has had to learn of the ways and laws of nature, of her various forces, mechanical, chemical, electrical.

Originally man found himself naked and houseless; with the sun and the summer hot; with the night and the winter cold; with no woven cloths of cotton or wool; with the ground far from bringing forth food; with infancy and

youth to be cared for; want and exposure and disease staring him in the face. He found himself in much the situation of the animals, but he has, as they have not, aptitude, invention, and various ability. Not only can he resist adverse material circumstances and survive, but also he can triumph over nature and become very comfortable; he can dress the earth and keep it, and be lord of it and what lies or lives upon it. We look out and down as from a cloud upon the men of the early time, and through the rift we see the earth. Here, families and tribes follow with the season the growing grass of the plains with flocks and herds, and there they cultivate vegetables and grains and fruits. Shelters and tents are constructed, houses are built, furniture is made, domestic utensils are created, animals are tamed for use, the ground is cleared and worked and planted for food. The hills are bored for iron and copper. Paths and roads are made. There began, as there has continued, that simple daily epic, "Man goeth forth unto his work and unto his labor until the evening." From that beginning until now there has been the same pressure from nature of heat and cold and wet and want of food. The body has caused a world of work, a world whose toil cannot dim the vision of its life and beauty and various use to us.

But passing from this world of industry in which we live, and which we should neither despise nor dislike, but honor and love—passing from this world of which the body is the ideal king, we may enter the wonderful world of sex. From the beginning to the end and the world over society is divided into the woman and the man. This fact has brought into the world whole creations of sorrow and of joy. It has had an under-world of sorrow in the condition of woman. It has had an under-world, sad, and wicked too, in the slime in which it has made man to live. It has also had an upper-world of myriads of happy couples. One sex goes out and on in one way, another in another. One sex bears the chil-

dren, has the more powerful influence in raising them, does generally the indoor work, while the other sex does generally the outdoor work, and, as a rule, has heretofore done all the political and specially intellectual work of the world, and the fighting. Woman has, however, changed political events by her influence on the actors in them.

Another sphere of the body's life is that of age, that where the body is considered as the subject of growth, maturity, and decay. As men travel and migrate rather along the lines of latitude on the earth so do we travel along lines of latitude in time. There are in each class of every community circles of persons of the same age. The power of age in society is also seen in that we leave out the greater portion of society from severer activity as too young, and a fair portion retire as more or less too old.

Another field in which the body works upon society is that of temperament. The genius of temperament has been one of the controlling powers of history. The temperaments with their various blending have affected the character of society and history; have had an influence in all the vast discussion and battle of society of old and to-day, in lands many and in every place, even the smallest.

Sickness is an influence in society: it has created a very prominent calling among men; it has modified character; it has affected property; it has affected some especially leading person in society; it has shaped the thought or cut short the career of many a man of power; it has increased to pestilence, and all these effects have been correspondingly increased. Society and its history is full of the influence of bodily disease.

What a power also has been bodily vice, what an influence for degradation. The story is long as history and broad as society.

Further, bodily sense with the mind and heart makes

music; sense with the mind and heart makes painting; sense with human affection makes human life with all its poetry, its nobility, and its happiness. Let one because he has a body touch the earth often and he will find no detriment, but rather a help to the higher part of his life. The body belongs to us, neither servant nor ruler, and not enemy but friend. It even seems folly and an offence to discuss its right and place and ministry.

THE INFLUENCE OF MAN'S INTELLECT IN SOCIETY.

Another factor in society and civilization and history is the intellect. The mind spoken of as a whole, or in the sense of the soul, is one and indissoluble. It is not split into fragments, one being intellect, another will, and a third sensibility. These are but its qualities, and they have no real and independent existence whatever, thought and will and sensibility being all called into play more or less whenever the mind is active in any of these directions. Thought has more or less of accompanying will and sensibility, and sensibility has more or less accompanying thought and will. Hence the power of any one quality of the mind is accompanied more or less by the power of the other qualities. The power of intellect is along the same lines and in the same instances as the power of sensibility or of will. Yet as there is a distinct view of the soul as thinking, as willing, and as sensitive, so there is a distinct view of its influence in each of these directions.

Through consciousness we pass into sight and hearing and feeling, into perception and imagination and memory. We become veritable seers; we apprehend the universe. Without consciousness anywhere, the earth, the sun, the universe of matter is dead, and being dead, is as nothing. Without hearing or seeing or thinking, without sense or perception, without mind, all might as well not be as

be. Mind is the king of things in that it alone has knowledge of them. Mind is king of being.

Let us proceed to examine the influence of the intellect. Man in the intellect perceives, observes, remembers, recalls, reflects, imagines, systematizes, and in so doing has been a powerful influence in human society.

We have ideas, ideas of the true, the beautiful, and the good; ideas of time and eternity; ideas of right and wrong; ideas of God; all the ideas belonging to philosophy, science, morals, and religion, and so we are able to have philosophy and art and morality and religion.

We have ideals, and these too are a power in our life in society. We set up a goal at the end of the course, we create a standard. We have a frame of thought to which we try to bring the reality. We could not work unless we knew what we wanted to be doing. We could not develop art without an artistic ideal, or character without a moral ideal. This is one of the wonders of the mind, that by it we have the vision and the pattern of things which we wish to shape when we work. We seek to live or to do "after the pattern seen in the mount." Not only do the poet and the painter do it, the young man does it when he goes out into life; does it when he seeks a wife and a home. The hard-working man does it as he strives for a support or a competence. The sun of the ideal shines through the dust and there is a glory beyond it.

Then what is the love of fame but an ideal, great in itself and glorified by the imagination, the vision and the hope of memory and an approval after one is dead. It dwells in the parent in regard to the children; it dwells in the teacher, the workman; it dwells in the founder and the builder of whatever sort. And sometimes it is but the appealing from a worse present to a better future judgment of those who know us. It is a patient and stern appeal to a better judge, one without illusions, and made more sympathetic it may be. It is good to many

a person to have his work tried by a judge that will not spare the criminal or the idle or the foolish. A colonel of engineers, who had superintended the building a section of the fortifications about Washington in our civil war, said in my hearing, "I wish the Rebs *would* attack them." William E. Gladstone remarks of fame: "It seems as though this purging power, following at the heels of man and trying his work, were a witness and a harbinger upon earth of the great and final act."

We have imagination, and it is a mighty agent in our life. It is universal, vast, prolific, and unfailing. Its coloring has been thrown around all. It has created a world all about this world, a life all through this life. It has been now like the sunshine and now like the night. Its influence has been great upon individuals and society and history. It has exerted an influence on domestic, on social, on political life, on philosophy, on art, on religion. It is the world's enchanter. We look at things as through a colored glass. We imagine form in the formless, color in the colorless, and we put life into that which has no life. We have put into life a poetry beyond conception. Our sufferings are deepened by imagination, our aspirations are heightened. We put about the limited the illimitable, all around the earth the heavens. By our imagining power what a world have we made of it—of fears and hopes and loves and joys and sorrows. We have the talismanic power to turn what we touch into what we will. Ours is the potency to see what is about us in a glow of our own making; to see about us sometimes a light, a splendor, and a beauty, whether real or unreal we cannot tell. It is on a figure, a scene, a spot which is faded and dim and gone. It is in the trance of memory.

Imagination idealizes persons. It puts a glamour about certain elders whom we knew in childhood. It makes impressive the mementoes and remembrances of a loved one who has passed through the stern, sad, last change.

It always idealizes in love. It creates in a school a legend about some teacher; in a congregation a cult, a worship of some minister; in a church an enthusiasm for the great body in its history and its forms; in a political party devotion to some statesman like Clay, or Gladstone, or Bismarck. In literature it makes a rage for some poet, as was the rage for Byron. In a people at large we have the Napoleon legend, the Washington legend. We have the real Napoleon and the reputed one; the real Washington, Jefferson, Clay, and the reputed. How does imagination travel up and down history and make some persons shine as golden! the Christian fathers, the martyrs of the church, the leaders and heroes of wars, the founders of empires, a Cæsar, a Gregory VII.! We have the grand legend of Charlemagne, of Alfred, of each of the great kings. How do we deepen and broaden the influence of prophets, saints, heroes, great men!

Imagination idealizes certain historic enterprizes. In religion we have the Huguenot story and the Puritan story. We have the stately church sailing on her voyage over the seas of the earth's history; we have the grand old mother church of the ages caring for her millions. In politics how do we make glorious the Greek democrats, the strife of Roman plebs! How do we thrill at the pomp and pride of chivalry, with its glare of armor and its blare of trumpet!

Imagination idealizes periods. In after life it often puts a glamour on the period of childhood. We recall our childhood's home—in the country it may have been. We recall the early wild flowers, the ploughlands, the fields of blossomed clover, the long, still summer day, with the farm steeped in heat. We recall the sports, and even the schools. And how do historic epochs shine afar for some—the Protestant reformation, the American revolution, the French revolution!

Imagination idealizes places. To the boy or girl gone from home to school or work, how the old home beams

upon the inward eye! How with many an exile is the face at times sad as in thought he sees the old trees, or the river, or the lake, or the desert, or the mountains! How to the Jewish prophet Ezekiel in exile did the hills of the old country continually recur to him—"the Mountains of Israel"!

Imagination idealizes bodies. It circles the home with a halo, and in the mind's light we dwell there; we see none in it as they are. The husband sees the wife, the child sees the father other than outwardly. Then how grandly does the imagination cause to appear certain great historic bodies—the Roman empire, the holy Catholic church. How do we invest with majesty and dignity the Christian church in her vastness, her spiritual unity, her continuity, her zeal, her really close cohesion from the top to the bottom and across the world.

Imagination upholds government. We take some poor mortal like ourselves, we set him in the chair of state, we empower him with authority, and straightway imagination sees behind him all the state, embodied and beautiful and strong; sees behind him eternal Justice herself; and we reverence him, crowned or uncrowned as vice-gerent with power, of that virtue which rules the race.

Imagination is that breath in which all enduring literature lives and moves and has its being. We have every people's own romance and their version of the strangely universal legends of the world. We have mediæval Europe aglow with imagination from base to summit, from peasant to prince. We have folk song and epic song and story. We have legend of saint and legend of hero.

Imagination has touched religion. It has created the mythologies of the world; the gods in their fortunate fields, calm and peaceful and "irradiated with poetic splendors"; those "cities of jewels and amber" of the Persian; those classic islands of the blest, fanned with soft airs and sprinkled with brilliant flowers; the gar-

dens and joys of sense of the Turk and the Arab; those heavens of the departed Christian, rich with form and color and sight and sound and thought and emotion.

Besides imagination we have observation and reflection, as a powerful influence in the life of society. Man has power to perceive much that will improve his condition; has power to combine what he has learned, and what a large number of persons have learned. Men study nature, study society, study at the problems of comfort, of education, of government, and of morals, and the result is knowledge, wisdom. This knowledge passes from one to another, becomes a common fund, and is passed down from generation to generation. The more any given person studies thus, the better, and the more persons there are engaged in such studies, the better. The more that men have engaged in this pursuit of practical knowledge, the more, other things being equal, has society advanced in every department.

How can we do without intellect. We may or we may not fail by it to understand all things. It may never reveal to us a world so wide but there will be a vast unknown world of knowledge still all about it. But it certainly can help us to get knowledge, and especially the knowledge of wisdom, the knowledge for each person and each society how to live wisely. The different religions of the world and some of its philosophies tell us, each in its own way, what is the plain meaning of things, and lead us to infer what, in the circumstances, is the best method by which to live. Those who are believers in Christianity, who have a vital belief in its theology, find a satisfactory answer in the Bible to the main questions about living wisely; they find there a plain solution to many of the problems of morality and of policy; a better solution, they think, than can be found in religion or philosophy elsewhere. But there still remains much to be done by ourselves before we can know the details of the law and commandment of life in its various

spheres; we have to study the Bible, and history, and our own situation, in order to know our duty and policy. None will deny that when, by one means or another, we have learned ourselves and our condition then we can best learn what is the best course of life for us to lead as persons, as families, as nations, and as a world; then only we shall have wisdom—religious wisdom, moral wisdom, political, social, and industrial wisdom.

In a certain sense there is a mental life behind all life, a mental movement behind all movement, a mental activity as the formal cause of all other activity. Opinions more or less underlie our social and civil life, our morals and religion. Ideas run parallel with all human activities. Intelligence makes a progress ever parallel with all other progress. There is thought behind industrial, political, and religious movements. Principles assert their power in men's convictions, and then, if of importance, embody themselves in institutions, parties, states, and by this means the conflict of ideas may sooner or later become the conflict of institutions, or parties, or states. The growth of a certain idea may be represented in the growth of a certain party, or institution, or state, and the waning of an idea may be represented in a dying party, a crumbling institution, or a falling state. The feudal idea rises and falls in feudalism; the monarchical idea in political monarchy; the republican idea in living republics; the Roman Catholic idea of the Christian religion rises and falls in the Roman Catholic church. Changes in idea often result in changes in life. The change in astronomical knowledge by the discoveries of Copernicus, of Galileo, Kepler, and others; also Magellan's voyage round the world, indisputably proving the earth to be round; these had a very decided effect in overthrowing certain theological, philosophic, and scientific errors of the Roman Catholic church, and so far in breaking the power of that church in the more intelligent parts of Europe. Says Bernard in his "Lectures

on Diplomacy": "For higher morality, for wiser justice, more enlightened government, for better laws, for an improved condition of society, for the advance of all good and the conquest over all evil, we all look mainly to the progress of opinion, though not all agreed as to the course we wish it to take, the means by which it is best elevated and purified, or the forces which arm it to the chief strength."

Such is a suggestion of the power of the intellect in human life, society, and history. There could be no life without the intellect. In proportion to the amount of life is the amount of intellect. The whole world-life is permeated through and through with the thoughts of men. And when in a person or a community the life rises in worth and value, rises in activity, intensity, variety, and harmony, rises in nobleness of end, then the intelligence as a part of the life rises with it and keeps its own place and influence.

THE INFLUENCE OF MAN'S WILL IN SOCIETY.

There is no doubt that one of the fundamental facts of the universe is necessity. There is a necessity of chance, a mechanical necessity. There is a necessity of law, of laws physical, chemical, biological, mental, moral, and social. There is a necessity of constitution. Given the existence of mathematics there is a mathematical necessity; two and two must make four. Given the existence of animal life there is a physiological necessity. An animal must take nourishment, must breathe, must throw off waste. Given the mind, there is the necessity of thinking under the laws of the mind. If we would prosper socially we shall be compelled to obey social laws. Because of this necessity of law and constitution every person is more or less determined by power beyond his choice. One's very being once existing deter-

mines forever his place in creation. If born a man he remains a man. His natural peculiarities,—his color, his size, his character of mind,—are made for him. He may develop and cultivate what he is by birth, but he cannot fundamentally change it. His lot in life, take the world around, is for the most part something which his hands cannot alter. He cannot radically change his quality and quantity of mind, and this has to do with determining his lot. He cannot affect the circumstances amidst which he is brought up, and these go far in the world at large to determine his lot. Because of this necessity of law and constitution, human life and society at large are more or less determined. Life in any land is conditioned by certain constitutional facts of body, mind, and heart, also by certain constitutional facts of geography and of society. Life in a heathen land is determined by a heathen family and state and religion; in a Moslem land is determined by the Moslem family and state and religion. Life in a Christian land is touched in a thousand points, and takes a large shape, by the Christian family and state and church and scriptures.

So far as under such necessity we are in the realm of nature. There, things have no power of will, no self-action in the true sense of the term; they only act as they are acted upon. There, if outside influences make one wise, he is wise; if they make him ignorant, he is ignorant; if they make him good, he is good; if they make him bad, he is bad. To an extent each is the correlative of his physical, mental, and moral environment, past and present. To an extent one is shaped by his surroundings.

But man is far more than a powerless mechanical phenomenon; he is in part a self-made and self-directing power. His character and culture are not wholly a matter of environment in its various kinds, an affair of drill from without, but are in part a matter of his own active self. Things cannot mould us into just the forms that

they naturally should. We are more than pawns on a chess-board moved by fate.

Man is a self-changing being. The ego does not exactly fall into the physical chain of cause and effect, but is to some extent a foreign cause. This may be measurably true even of animals, but it seems to be much more true of men. Man has an energy of himself, to think, to feel, and to act; is self-centred, self-determined, self-moved; is in a certain sense his own maker; has a land of his own, an independent kingdom. That which really and actually moves a person is not some influence from without or some influence from within him, some instinct, some emotion, some desire, some habit. All these must wait until he chooses to will or to act. Such influences as these may be so powerful as to render him, as we say, morally unable to resist them, but they cannot make him really unable. He moves himself. Under the influence of such and such motives he causes his own action. He need not will at all, or he can will otherwise than he does will. He is his own master. He has the power to act contrary to any desire or motive; not but that desire may be too strong to be resisted, and the will then cease to be free and be in slavery. Though a person may never act without a motive, yet he naturally has the power to receive or reject the motive. A man does not go here or go there as he is mechanically compelled to by motives, but as he chooses to, choosing between motives.

No shadow of doubt exists in a child's mind as to his power to act this way or that; no human language but testifies by certain words that a man has the power to act this way or that. One brands a bad man as bad,—not simply as noxious like a wild beast, but as bad,—because of an opinion that he has some choice in the matter of what he does. One feels indignant at unjust or cruel action only because of an opinion that it might have been avoided. One is expected to try to control

his evil propensities because he is thought to have freedom in the matter. Men have died for civil liberty, for Liberty has had her martyrs. Men have died for liberty of thought, for Thought has had its martyrs. Men have died for their religion, for many a religion has had its martyrs. Was it beyond their control that made these men choose to die rather than sacrifice their principles? Were they irresistibly compelled so to choose? or rather, had they not power, in almost every instance, to choose either way? What is this but will-power, but the Me asserting itself, but a great essential cause at work, a force as much a force as is the force of cohesion or of crystallization or of chemical affinity?

The power to will is a power equal in extent to the other influences which affect society. It is a potent factor in our lives. It is an awful power for weal or woe. It is in the original power of will to make men masters of forces of nature and circumstance and desire, to make men rise above that which would submerge them—their evil tempers, their difficulties, their hardships, to make men able to stand out against evil. The actual man may be more than he is, may do more than he does to overcome bent and passion within and evil influence without. He has all glad and blessed possibility; he has all sad and cursed possibility. He may become an inhabitant of a world of light and life or of a world of darkness and death. He has a wealth of opportunity in character, life, and culture, and he has opportunity of a far different sort. Sometimes he tries to conquer evil nature and circumstance. He rises as though he too could do something, and with this resolution there are times when and places where he can do much. He does much more than he would have done if he had not tried; much more towards getting out of difficulties, towards getting a living or an education, or getting on peaceably with certain others. The will is a fresh and original force, and may be thrown upon one side or the other of the

influences affecting for good or evil. You can, if you choose, fight the forces which are working against you; the forces of an evil natural disposition; the forces of physical nature, of hereditary influence, of the family, of society, of education. These may work against you and upon you, but you can also work against them; among the rest, you yourself also are a power. You are a power among powers.

In proportion as the will is weakened is there irresolution and suspense or vacillation, is there want of energy and spirit in work and enterprise. Look at the indolent and dreamy Brahmans and Buddhists. They are Pantheists; they feel lost in "the contemplation of the vast pressure and sweeping cycles of life which move like gigantic wheels, apparently as well without as with individual effort."

The influence of will in society is seen in all choices, determinations, and elections, in all direct repudiations and rejections, in all purposes and habits, in all resolution and constancy, in all pluck and self-reliance, in all active pursuits and enterprises. The will of man is behind much of the life of man. The great manifestation of human will is ordinary human life.

The influence of will in society is also conspicuous in the decisions, the energy and perseverance of most all who attain to much in this life, not but that other qualities are necessary. The force is sometimes called decision of character.

The influence of direct choice on society and history is sometimes great if that choice be exercised by a great man. Julius Cæsar and Mohammed, Cromwell and Napoleon, made choices, and upon these choices depended great historic changes. Influences, hereditary, social, and geographical, affected these men; the spirit of their times influenced them, but yet each himself was a great force to create changes.

Look at the influence of will in the state, and first as

illustrating the power of a strong man's choice. One of the Normans, William the Conqueror, decided of his own will to make an attempt to conquer England, and he succeeded, and thus influenced permanently the English speech and constitution and general history. All came from William's personal choice to make a descent upon England.

In a necessitarian theory the social and intellectual state of France in the reign of Philip Le Bel would make his taking absolute power to be a necessity which he himself did not bring about, which no one brought about or could prevent, and hence no blame could be attached to any one for the action. Such a theory is false; Philip Le Bel's personal choice had much to do with monarchy's becoming absolute in France. General causes doubtless concurred. Philip himself was doubtless despotic by nature, and so hereditary influence had something to do; and yet his own will had something to do with the matter. And this last is also true of the kings of France from the eleventh to the thirteenth century, who did something of their own will to create absolute monarchy there.

Often have a people chosen thus or so in some war, some alliance, some line of domestic policy. The ancient Greek republics chose not to incorporate the people they conquered, or that came to them, and, as a consequence, the people at large were far from having a large interest in the state, and so in its time of extremity they did not rally to it as they otherwise would have done. On the other hand, the Roman republic chose to incorporate people of the states conquered, and in consequence Rome belonged not to its few original citizens, but to the world it conquered, and that world therefore upheld it as its own. So any land, with regard to its colonies, its conquests, and its immigration, may take the policy of the Greek or the policy of the Roman, and either of two different results will follow.

At the time of the Reformation a portion of the German people struggled for, and in a measure obtained, religious liberty. This they chose to do. Might they not, also, had they so chosen, have struggled for the civil liberty of the serfs; might not the intelligent classes have heard the cries and answered the calls of the serfs in their uprisings at that time? The condition and the uprisings of the peasantry suggested and loudly called for reform; it lay with the leaders of the religious reformation to take sides for or against such reformation, or to remain neutral. It lay with these religious leaders whether or not to conceive great measures of political and social reform, and to make society and the state just in Germany for many succeeding generations. Yet doubtless the age was far more ripe for a religious than for a political and social reform.

Again, China has shut herself out from the world, to her great harm; Great Britain has opened herself to the world, to her great gain. A certain generation introduced African slavery upon the American continent, with all the evils that have thence resulted. Another generation formed the constitution of the United States and gave the benefit it has been.

Look at the influence of will in industry. By his energy of will man has overcome grave difficulties in his material lot and made himself more or less comfortable. By the energy of his will he has faced nature, overcome her opposition to him, and made her his help. By the energy of his will he has been inventive and enterprising. He has grown roots and plants, grains and grasses, fruits and animals. He has dug and melted and wrought the metals. He has manufactured for himself of wood and of wool and cotton. He has exchanged one thing for another.

Look at the influence of will upon morals and religion. One can make himself felt on the side of all that is good in him, that is good in the community about him; he

can do a great deal towards ennobling himself, and through his example and direct influence he can do something towards ennobling others. The truth is that one is free to be and to do good. Men, by their own choosing, have exerted an influence against wickedness, an influence for justice, for temperance, truth, honesty, and other virtues. We have a proof and illustration of this fact in the long line of eminent characters whose genius for study or for work was sanctified to the glory of God—Ignatius, Justin Martyr, Origen, Irenæus, Tertullian, Ambrose, Augustine, Chrysostom, Patrick, the apostle of the Irish, Gallus, the apostle of Switzerland, Boniface, the apostle of the Germans, Anschar, the apostle of the north. These men, by their strong and impressive personality, were naturally powers in the world, and they chose, in addition, to be powers of good in the world.

Many evils might have been corrected had men so willed. Much of tyranny, and slavery, and various immorality need not have existed had men so willed. The crimes of history have been the result of human wills, and, even if resulting in good, no man should excuse them, no historian should gloze them over. No historian of his own country should attempt to condone its faults, no enthusiastic philosopher should teach that evils are in themselves a good. The world might have been much stronger, wiser, better, and happier but for the evil course men, of their own free wills, have chosen to take. The fault is in part with us, the men on this earth, that things have been as they have.

THE INFLUENCE OF HABIT AND USAGE IN SOCIETY.

We make or allow ourselves to do a particular thing, to desire a certain thing, to feel a certain way, and presently it all comes without much effort, and after awhile quite naturally and spontaneously. We choose or allow a feel-

ing, a way of thinking, a way of talking, a way of acting, and presently it is natural and spontaneous. A hundred little matters that at first have to be acquired become habitual and instinctive, become involuntary and mechanical. There is no action from motives, no choosing and acting from the choice; there is no perpetual conscious energy. All takes place outside of any particular choosing, or of any particular thinking. It is a wonder that such free, spontaneous, flexible beings as we are should have this power of habit, but such is the case. Habit saves reflection and deliberation, determination and emotion; and if the habit be good, the easier it is the better. What a helpful thing is habit to the hard working, to those situated unpleasantly. What a comfortable thing is habit to the aged. How much thought, energy, and friction does custom save.

Habit has the quality of fixedness; it is not a visitor who comes and then goes. It has a tendency to stay, often so much so, that if we know a person's habits we can tell somewhat of his future. Habit also has growth of a certain kind. In the earlier stages we can readily break a habit. Later we can still break the habit, though now at the cost of much effort. But later still the habit is sometimes quite beyond our power. The strong binding of the mind, the will, and the heart may be done so gradually as to be for long almost imperceptible to the person himself. On the other hand, because of this fact of growth, one can deliberately form a habit; he can create a permanent disposition to know, feel, and will, in a way which was uncongenial to him, in a way which was contrary to his constitutional and acquired dispositions. He can discipline and educate himself to new directions of thought, feeling, and action. He can acquire patience, command of temper, gentleness. He can greatly increase the strength of his feelings and his will in certain desirable directions, and can attain a degree in good qualities far above what is natural. Of such growths are we all

capable. The bent of the learner, his interest in the matter, is the great help to progress. The next help is habit. It is a power of education.

And this brings us to the power of habit. The habits which we have freely made tend, in turn, to make us. They take in hand the very motives which govern us and instruct and enforce them. Each habit influences those motives which it would naturally favor. The habit of the avaricious or the ambitious man creates in each case a disposition, which in turn creates its own, its peculiar thought, feeling, and sympathies. Or take the habits which we form consciously and deliberately, the habits of our occupation for instance,—habits of feeling, sympathy, and action,—these create a sort of nature, which in turn creates its own peculiar thought, and feeling, and sympathies; creates a little world of life of its own. A habit gives a peculiar strength to the motives which it naturally favors. One really decides as his habits have determined beforehand that he would do. Here is foreordination of a real, even if it be of a peculiar kind. We choose what tree we shall set out, but it blossoms and fruits of itself, and according to its nature. We choose what we shall sow, but not what we shall reap. Our choosing determines that. Our works make our judgment. We receive in habits a measure of our reward or punishment.

The evil and the good from the power of habit may be illustrated in the domain of work in all its directions, material, educational, artistic, or in the domain of business, of recreation, of manners. But let me illustrate from the domain of morals. In the power of evil habit a person can blind himself in matters of policy, or of morals, or of piety. He can get into and remain in a prejudiced condition, and yet his views seem to him natural and reasonable. He lowers the standard and gets to believe the lower standard the true one. He resists the evidence of moral and religious truth, he blunts his perception of it.

He ceases to see somewhat of his obligations and duties, and he is the more ready to receive any contrary influence from himself or from within the world or from without the world that may act upon him. Then, a person through evil habit has the power to enslave himself, to become, through habit, indolent or shiftless or petulant or quick-tempered or ugly. Nature does something, but nature in the beginning can be overcome. Here are cases where, instead of this, nature has been strengthened by habit. Here is the powerlessness, oftentimes, of good influence. It strikes upon those who have habits which ward it off. How much does the habit of excusing one's self from moral or religious duty thwart preaching and counsel and example? How many are they who have formed the habit of resisting good influence? How many they whom the habit of sin often brings below knowledge and consciousness of sin? This explains the confirmed rejection of some plain obligation; this explains confirmed vice. The will weakened, the man finds himself a slave. Complete functional derangement has taken place. The mere forces of mechanical nature have come in and asserted their power. The man that ideally is above mechanical badness, and should be really, has fallen under it, is ruled by it, is a Samson with his eyes out, grinding in the mills of the Philistines.

Thus the process of degradation comes to work as a machine works. Evil habits having got into control work mechanically, and sooner or later with a power practically irresistible. At this point the person is not to blame, but there is blame, and it lies in letting such a power get such a headway; the power of a mechanism which will move on of itself with ever increasing and dangerous speed. The sin is in the fact that the person dropped the reins upon the dashboard and allowed the horses to run at their will. The despotism of an evil habit may become terrible. In drunkenness or the use of opium there is sometimes a seemingly unquenchable fire.

The victim is nothing; he is helpless, and in himself utterly hopeless. Of course there are who believe in an Almighty God who has influences that can illuminate and regenerate and heal and sanctify every praying penitent soul.

But the glory of habit is on the side of good. Having once learned the art of being good in any of its forms, we can be good and act correctly or rightly or generously with almost the ease of instinct or impulse. It will be like the beating of the pulse or the seeing of the eye. What we have gained in character, in skill, in power, is permanent gain. So we can explain, in part, order, neatness, punctuality, confirmed truthfulness or honesty, self-control, and a spirit patient or gentle or grateful. So we hopefully labor to cultivate in ourselves and others that sympathy which goes out in desire and word, in action and prayer; that sympathy which is a very habit of the soul. So we labor in ourselves and others for the increase of that profound and beautiful trait of character called reverence; reverence for everything according to its worth; reverence for the holy in name, in place, in time, and in person; reverence for the true, the beautiful, and the good. And all becomes spontaneous; has the freshness, the beauty, the interest of nature, of that new nature which habit has formed within us. What a grand gain is this! How the beneficence of habit shines forth! Ease in goodness, readiness in doing the right, and the advantage lasting the life, and in Christian hope outlasting it.

Thus the work of habit is a tremendous one. If it result mainly in evil, it is a terrible work; if mainly in good, a splendid work.

The social and historic influence of habit is seen in part in the influence of rule and routine and fashion, the influence of usage and custom. Habit enables a people and all classes of a people to work with the smallest amount of friction. It makes the work of society to be

much more easily done. Also, while usage is made by us, it turns and helps make us. Made by society, it turns and helps make society; it affects our views of wisdom, polity, and propriety, our views of domestic, political, moral, and religious duty. Our wont is a power in our ways.

Usage is a great conservative influence. It is strong to keep the old in the state and the law, in industry, in science, art, and literature, in morals and religion. People do not easily leave the accustomed. This is true thoughout all their wide life. As they have been, so they tend to continue. What is customary seems right, proper, sensible, helpful. What is not customary is doubtful, suspicious, and probably unsafe.

One social and historic influence of usage is to support evil. Usage has helped maintain what is outgrown or was never defensible, some bad system of land tenure and inheritance, or of civil or criminal procedure; some slavery to a master, a state, or a church. The old ways, privileges, and interests have held men, and so in part the old idols have stood above their altars, the old despots have passed empire and throne safely to their descendants, the old monopolies of religion, of power, of land, of opportunity, have continued. In part, through usage, the claims of justice, reason, and utility are not seen, and, when urged, are stoutly resisted. To disturb what is, seems like disturbing the order of nature.

Another social and historical result of usage is to support good; is to uphold order—social, civil, industrial, and moral order; is to support progress; is to help make growth and improvement permanent. Usage has caused the new to lose its strangeness, and has made its work to be more easily done. It has helped maintain all the social, political, and moral improvements amid the numbers of mankind. Such is that old, needful, mighty, and permanent force we call usage.

THE INFLUENCE OF DISPOSITION AND FEELING.

Disposition is a marked fact in human nature, life, and history, a broad and deep influence. Each disposition of a person has with it a world of feelings, thoughts, choices, and actions, a whole life of its own kind. Each disposition is a tree with trunk and branches and innumerable leaves. Each disposition is a source of inclination, desire, and activity. By it resolve and action are re-enforced, and what we do is more easily done. The great body of persons produces a great effect through each of the common dispositions—the kind, the generous, the cross, the impatient. The common dispositions are powers—powers of help or hindrance, of good or evil, of happiness or unhappiness. One strong disposition of a person frequently more or less dominates him and gives him character. The dispositions play a part in society—they have played a part in history. Aside from the great body of effect produced in common life we have a great body of effect produced in public life.

We have a passive and an active disposition. The passive people yield; they endure rather than struggle; they acquiesce and submit. The active are those who struggle to overcome evil, struggle to shape circumstance; are those who desire to accomplish something more or something new for themselves or for others, or for both. They venture in work, in business, in politics, in thought. It is they who always inaugurate the improvement in human affairs. Among the Asiatics the unenterprising temperament has been excessively predominant; among the Europeans the enterprising spirit has, comparatively speaking, borne rule.

Again, pages might be occupied with the long discussion, and even struggle, in various lands, between the conservative and the radical. More particularly has it come

out in the freer lands of the earth. England's history is full of it.

So, too, we find those opposites, the Epicurean and the Stoic. Each has made the world know of its presence in systems of philosophy, of morals, and even of theology.

We also see the great influence in society and history of the disposition to disbelieve in religion and the disposition to believe in religion. We have the old struggle of the Sadducee and Pharisee in the Jewish church. We have the man of the Renaissance and the Puritan, each behind a great movement in Christendom.

Very prominent, also, in society and history have been those famous opposites, the bad and the good disposition. They are in each man. They are in each community. Very great has been the influence of each of the two dispositions upon the world. We see as active and of constant influence good-nature, friendliness, courtesy, gentleness, cheerfulness, reverence, patience; and we see as active and of constant influence ill-nature, peevishness, bitterness, and hatred. Daily and hourly is it all manifest throughout the world. These have been profound social and historic causes. Then mightily manifest have been the bad and the good disposition religiously, the bad and the good heart as regards God. Here is the bottom of personal character, and personal character is the great power of society.

We pass next to the influence of feeling in society. A great deal of our personal life, of the life of those we see, of the life of the whole world, is in the region of sensibility, is in the exercise of our appetites, desires, passions, affections, and sympathies. Here are the springs of human life and satisfaction. Here are the driving powers, here the rulers of man. We desire property, knowledge, friends; we long for rest, company, reading; We have fear or hatred, or love or hope. Much of life is made up of these continually coming phases of feeling,

and it is to our worth that we are not wood and stone, but flesh and blood and sensitive nerve. Our feelings take hold of places, of communities, of the country at large, of the particular church, of the church in general. Our feelings take hold of symbols like the flag, take hold of rites like that of marriage. We have the sensibilities of taste, we enjoy the beautiful, the sublime in nature and in the arts. We esteem people, we are all the while treating persons with deference. We suffer grief, now one family, now another, all the while, a certain proportion of families; and grief affects life and character. It hardens, it softens; it is doing its work all over the world.

We have a power in family feeling; we have all its activity throughout the earth, all its influence on happiness, on industry, on morals. The family affections charm and cheer and magnify life. In them is a decided measure of our joy, and in them, alas! a decided measure of our sorrow.

We have a social factor in the feeling of justice. This feeling enters into all criminal law, though the main purpose there is to secure the public safety. This feeling goes through a people upon some sense of injury, and war follows.

Like and dislike have had a great social and historic effect. We like a doctor, minister, lawyer, or grocer, and our feelings affect our action. Much do our likes and dislikes affect our views of a person, of a project, of a new opinion, a theory, a system of theology, a foreign people; affect our views of matters as true or beautiful, or good or useful. In the case of a great man such a fact has an influence so far as he has influence. A great man's temperament, sensibility, excitement of feeling by something that he has seen or that has happened, has influenced the views he has put forth and endeavored to enforce. Jonathan Swift, a man of great sensibility, received disappointments that biassed his whole literary

activity. Edmund Burke was so shocked by the excesses of the French Revolution as to have his whole opinion of that event biassed. History is full of the influence of the dislike of a conquered people for their conquerors, an influence that has continued often in spite of good government. The Hindoos to-day have this feeling toward the English. There is a natural dislike to have foreigners rule over us, a dislike intensified by their political, and in a sense by their social superiority; also by their superior advantages for making money. The feeling gets to be, rightly or wrongly, that they are eating us up.

We have a social and historic factor in the feeling of sympathy, the sympathy, in ten thousand instances in rural districts, of neighbor with neighbor;, the reciprocation of good offices between, the assistance in sickness. We have the sympathies of our calling, be it law or medicine or farming or housework. Such sympathy is one great source of human happiness. In society at large we have the sympathy of certain interests—the aristocratic, the democratic, the literary, the scientific. We have the sympathy of race. We have Slavonic sympathies, and Russia fighting in part because of them. We have the sympathy of religion. Ties of spiritual sympathy, of Christian with Christian; ties of doctrinal and ecclesiastical sympathy, of Presbyterian with Presbyterian, Methodist with Methodist. Through such sympathies we have the Crusades, and the frequent appearance since of European religious powers in the Holy Land—Russia for the Greek church, France for the Roman Catholic church.

Through various of the ties of sympathy and ties of interest a people get together under one government, or even a nation is formed. The English colonies that formed the American Union gradually drew together. At first they were far apart locally, they had no sympathy with each other. They were at times even un-

friendly to each other, but as time went on a tendency toward colonial fellowship manifested itself and increased. The colonies were drawn together by ties of blood, of religion, of learning and letters, of political union with the English government, by a common peril from the Indians and the French, and finally from the home government; and so a centralizing life became manifest, and the germ of the future nation appeared.

Oftentimes in the world have the passions and sympathies of a people held together some old system of religious doctrine or of church organization. Tumble the old house about their heads, the house of their fathers, they never would. By a certain system they have lived and breathed and worshipped and practised, and to say it has in it error and wrong and suffering, to say that it has that which has been made by the man of one generation to suit his needs and ought to be unmade by the man of another generation to suit his needs, is to irritate. Men with all their heart will fight for the wood, hay, and stubble as they fight for the gold, silver, and precious stones; will attach as much importance and sanctity to the conventional as to the real. Men get to love the very barnacles, timber-worms, and ship-rats. They get to love the very foul air and smells of their habitation. History is full of it.

We have also a social and historic factor in the reverse of sympathy—in ill-will or bitterness or hatred. Great has been the part which these feelings have played in common and in public life up and down the world. A people may have more or less ill-will toward a government; may have resentment for injuries done, for insults given; may have a score made, an account laid up to settle; and with deliberate purpose, or through some accident, a sudden enthusiasm may pass through the people and they rise in revolution, as the English, the Americans, the French, the Irish, the Hungarians have done.

Then we have the influence of sentiment. In senti-

ment there is a play of imagination and a play of sensibility. What is that which puts about mouldering castle walls a mist like the glory which fills the early wood? It is sentiment. Why is it that the country on some anniversary day gives honor due to her defenders fallen? It is sentiment. What a sway has personal loyalty had among men. Here is the secret of kingship and lordship. Only, in the ranks of lords and kings have been found too many base-born abusers of this native and touching sentiment of the people.

The power of the love of country is seen in gleam and glint of steel, in battle-flags and rising, rolling dust of columns moving, pressing forward for fatherland. Look at the pleasure taken in all that the flag symbolizes—the whole people, their life and history. The feeling may be weak with a part of the people, but it is there; it may be dormant at times, but it lives; it may manifest itself in different ways, but it is strong. Strong enough is it to bind men of different geographical sections, as in the United States; men of different languages and religions, as in Switzerland; men of different history, as in Italy. It may divide the human heart with other sentiments, but it has been imperious enough to raise a whole people as one man to resent an aggression, or even an insult. The sentiment has been a power to unite many in a common band of good-will and sympathy, a power to keep safe and to develop a people's life. In the early part of this century the German philosopher Fichte and others appealed to this sentiment in the German people, and they rose as one man against the French. Time and again has the sentiment led a people to make upon itself a levy en masse to repel in-marching armies.

Such is the large operation of the human feelings, their deep impression upon human character and life, human society and history.

THE INFLUENCE OF RACE.

Race has a marked influence in society, an influence deserving, in the opinion of some, a higher appreciation and a more careful study than it has yet received. The race influence is one of the most important and all-pervading of those influences which together shape society and history.

Some eminent writers, Max Müller, Pictet, and others, have rated this influence very high, and have attributed to it most of the distinctive peculiarities of government, literature, art, and religion. On the contrary, three English thinkers upon social and historic philosophy have each underrated this influence—John Stuart Mill, Buckle, and Herbert Spencer. John Stuart Mill has, however, expressed two opposite opinions. In one place he says: "Of all vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of the effect of social and moral influences on the human mind, the most vulgar is that of attributing the diversities of conduct and character to inherent natural differences." And yet in another place he writes: "But of the great influence of race in the formation of national character no reasonable inquirer can now doubt." Mr. Buckle has paid no attention to this influence. He would explain the phenomena of history without it. He would understand Spanish and Scotch history without going back to ineradicable national traits. Mr. Herbert Spencer, while recognizing the diversities of race, has but imperfectly appreciated the nature of the significance. He believes that natural environment has created all such divergencies and distinctions, and that they may be modified or entirely effaced by circumstances.

But race is a social and historic factor. Among the ancients each people thought much of its blood, and of the superiority this gave. It was the basis of the rights

of the sovereign, of the rights of nobility, priestly or military; it was the basis of personal liberty or slavery. It was owing to the greater capacity of the Mongol as compared with the Negro that the former was reached by Hindoo culture, while the latter was never reached by Egyptian. The Greeks and Romans produced a powerful effect upon the civilization of their conquered lands —gave new ideas, inventions, and methods of thinking; while the Mongol conquerors of Asia and Europe left no civilizing influence behind, no better faith, no new philosophy, no art—gave nothing new, and, except in Hungary, have received nothing new. Tartar or Turk, they have remained gross, coarse, and ignorant barbarians, with only a few redeeming qualities, such as courage, faith, and cleanliness.

No history of civilization in Europe can fail to take account of the results produced by the conquests and colonizations of the classic, the Celtic, and the Teutonic races. The peculiar character of the Romanic race of southern Europe helped in the middle ages shape the history of Europe when that race was dominant. The peculiar character of the Teutonic race has helped shape the history of the north and the west of Europe since that race reasserted itself. It naturally inclines to the fundamental principles of Protestantism; it has always hated Rome, and inclined to personal independence. In Spain, while the underlying Iberian element in the national character has had its effect, so also has the Moorish element. It has had something to do with "the sternness, bigotry, and even ferocity of a really noble people;" it is a partial explanation of such dark deeds as the establishment of the Inquisition, the conquests of Mexico and Peru, and the fatal enslavement of native tribes.

It is race which has made English-speaking people create the spinning jenny, the cotton gin, vulcanized India-rubber, and improved printing presses. It is race

which has made the difference between the English and French in political and social characteristics, with the resulting difference in institutions.

THE INFLUENCE OF IMITATION.

In much throughout the whole life of society we go by the example set. We take in most of the lessons of childhood so; our language, its diction, and its grammar; our manners, our morals, our goodness or badness in religious matters. People at large tend to go by the bulk, rolling in a mass like grain in a ship. By imitation they are to-day dead weight; not one in a hundred moves. By imitation they are to-morrow all alive for a political or a moral reform. There is a fashion in dress, in house, in furniture, a fashion in manners or in literature, a fashion even in science, philosophy, and theology. Theories, methods, and ways are received and have their day, and the event proves them largely but a fashion or a style. Things true and false, things of honor and dishonor, are caught by imitation.

Sometimes the influence of this sort is quiet, and sometimes, when the public mind is excited, the influence is active and goes by a sort of contagion of excitement. There is a war fever, or a mania for oil or railroads or land speculations, or there is a great temperance movement or a religious revival. All this explains equally the influence of long established custom and the influence of new modes of thought and feeling.

The great cause of imitation is probably a natural tendency thereto. But men also imitate from a tendency to order and rhythm, and a natural pleasure in these. While also, as in color, the insect resembles the leaf, the fish the bottom, the lion the sand, the Arctic bear the snow, so by a sort of protective mimicry persons seek to become like their surroundings. Conformity causes less social friction, is easier, is safer.

The benefit of this tendency is assimilation and harmony, with a correspondent strengthening of the bonds of society. By this imitativeness every society tends to thinking, feeling, and acting alike on many matters; tends to views which all hold and customs which all observe. We see this in a people's conformity in many of their habits of thinking, feeling, speaking, and acting, and in the permanent spirit which dominates a country, or an age, or a certain rank of society.

But aside from this natural, there has been an artificial imitation.

There has been more or less imitation of civil institutions in name or nature, or other respects. There has been a deliberate framing after a foreign model, more or less, of most of the modern republics—the first republic of France, the republic of the United States, the Spanish American republics. There has been in them a copying of names, as that of Consul in France, that of Senate and Capitol in the United States. There has been throughout the continent of Europe an imitation of the British Parliament in legislative assemblies.

There has been more or less imitation in arts and literature. Rome imitated Greece in both. The Roman epic is modelled upon the Greek, the Roman play upon the Greek. French poetry long followed classic models. The imitation of Pope in English literature was marked for a hundred years. And in English prose how long the turgid model reigned.

There has been more or less imitation by one people of another people's language. Southern Europe thus received much of the Latin. England thus received much of the Norman French.

There has been imitation of foreign manners or of court manners.

There has been imitation by one land of the religion of another. Heathen lands have thus taken the religion of Moslem lands or of Christian lands.

THE INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUALITY.

I am fully aware of the great value of co-operation with others, of the value of conformity and compromise. It is vastly important that we be in states and churches, and have constitution and laws in the state which all must obey, and creeds in the church which all must believe. It is a part of our proper life to be much like others, to agree much with others. There are families and circles and sections and states to which we belong in numbers, and in which we are largely similar. All men like home: I would not be so peculiar as not to like it. All men need the civil government: I would not wish to live out from under it. All men need the church. Great general and particular ends are served by the views and feelings and the conduct which we have in common. A great deal of the work of life is carried on by us through those opinions, those feelings which we hold in common with others. But there is also another side of life, the particular. We have our own bodies and minds and hearts and thoughts and speech and work. While we are in classes we also are single. While in much we and others make a unit, in much each himself is a unit.

I wish to bring out that of us in which we take the initiative, rather than that in which we are imitative. Each of us is particular and individual. The individual is not to be considered as that which is a limited portion of a whole, and which is not the whole. We are not to look at the individual and the particular in this negative manner. We are to look at the individual in the light of that by which it is what it is, and that is some positive inherent force, which force maintains the particular body in being. By virtue of this, its own inward creative spirit, every body is a world in itself. And when a body has not only its own inward creative spirit, but also its own inward creative idea or model after which it is formed, then it

belongs to the class of which that idea is the mark. For the idea or plan of structure creates the class. The plan of structure creates the cherry, the peach, the plum-tree class of fruits. In the case of human beings, each seems to have a plan of structure of his own, and if he does he is a class by himself, has an essentially distinct character, as much so as have the oaks or the pines.

Individuality is not excessive self-consciousness; individuality is not sympathy and action only for self, is not the living alone, and the dying alone in this sense; is not isolation from others, without trust in them, or love to them, or use to them. But individuality means that each of us has a certain and a peculiar spontaneity of thought, feeling, will, and movement, a peculiar outburst of energy; that each is a new and a peculiar force. Each one's life is a tree of its own kind; each one's life is a book of life, his own book. Each one is a king, and has a kingdom. Each one can take and clothe himself with somewhat of that dignity with which kings and heroes are clothed. Each can say, "I, too, am a man." When a child is born it is soon perceived that the little one is a new centre, is an independent being. A new influence exists. Each young man is a new power for good, for bad, a new power in various ways. Influence goes out of him, passively and actively, by example and by effort. Each one of us will find that his aims, perceptions, and reflections, his emotions and choices, belong to himself alone; that he is independent in body, mind, and spirit; that he has his own eyes, his own knowledge, his own understanding of things, his own place among them. He is a new plant in the soil, a new planet in the sky. Civilized governments recognize this individuality, in that there is no criminal code which recognizes any other than individual indictments. That ancient Hindoo law code, "The laws of Manu," makes a formal statement of this individuality. It says: "Single is each man born, single he dies, single he receiveth the reward of his good, and

single the punishment of his evil deeds." So, too, in the New Testament we read, "God will render to every man according to his deeds."

We can hardly tell of the individual whence he came or in what he consists. We can only say that at a certain point of time he is not, and at a certain point he is. He has emerged he knows not how and we know not how. He is somewhat like an angel, he really has no ancestry. Though not self-originated he is largely primitive. He is largely without father or mother, without son or daughter. In the long-continued and widely extended vegetable and animal and human life of the globe, in all the struggle and victory or defeat of such life, each person finds himself one of the human species, the one species among the many which is the crown and glory of the whole, the select company called human beings, each of whom is a prophet, a priest, and a king, the whole of whom is a noble band of such, a noble band of—immortals, may I not say? And in this species each person himself is a sort of new species, is something different in kind from all other persons and from all else. Each one of us finds himself being, seeing, and feeling much, willing and associating much. He finds himself entered into splendid and beautiful and useful and soul-satisfying relations. But still he is himself alone. He is not merely of the great animal type or of the still narrower human type, but he is of a still narrower type, that which consists of but himself. He stands alone, face to face with things, with other persons; he dwells separated from every other soul by a deep and impassable gulf, though it be a narrow one. Each person is an original, indivisible, and separate being, with his own particular endowment of vital force and of faculty; with his own set of organs and powers, his own independent world, his own resources, his own thoughts, feelings, and experiences; he has his own wealth and vision and

fruition. "The heart knoweth his own bitterness, and a stranger intermeddleth not with his joy."

Lavater even said, in speaking of the peculiar correspondence of the parts of any given human body with each other: "Each organized body is so much a whole, that without discord, destruction, or deformity nothing can be added or diminished. Everything in man is progressive, everything congenial—form, stature, complexion, hair, skin, veins, nerves, bones, voice, manner, style, passion, love, hatred; one and the same spirit is manifest in all. He has a terminate sphere in which his powers and sensations are allowed, within which they may be freely exercised, but beyond which he cannot pass."

This individuality means something for the individual. Each is to have his own standard of perfection, even that to which he peculiarly can attain. In seeing, he is only to see that which is the deepest, widest, clearest truth that he can see. In strength, he is only to arrive at that strength of body, of mind, and of will and feeling which he can arrive at. Each one is to be himself in his artistic or his literary work. He is to be finite, limited, human, individual. Only thus can he be natural, true, and happy; only thus can he do his best, most beautiful and useful work. Imitation of nature or of men is to be subordinate. In being filled each person is to receive only to his own capacity. In fine, his perfection will be consistent with his peculiarity of body, mind, and heart. He can but reach here or hereafter the perfection of his own type. "One star differeth from another star in glory." Each person builds up after his own pre-conditioned order. The form of its projection is given with each human unit when its vital principle is given, and the growing of this living thing after that form is as the growing of plant or tree after the order of its species; is in part after the order of the human species, but also in part after an order peculiar to the person himself. Outward conditions or the will of the person

may modify the primitive pattern, but no one works out towards a totally new constitutional form of being. Each individual works out on the lines of his own organic constitution, subject only to certain modifications by himself, by others, and by what else is about him. It is so with his body, so with his mind, so with his heart.

This individuality also means something in the general system of education, physical, mental, and moral, in which we are placed. Each person is to have his own knowledge, his own education, his own method, his own means of reaching perfection and happiness. You are to select what is suitable and natural to you. Certain persons are to be your friends rather than certain other equally good. Certain books you are to read, certain sermons are more valuable to you than others. For you they have especial significance. You are to heed all these. They are nature's call, God's call to you.

Each person is to exert his own influence. Many a person has wronged and injured himself in his attractiveness and usefulness by not acting out himself in all innocent ways; not in little oddities, but in views of politics, manners, and education, of morality and religion. Each person is to be himself an investigator in the Bible and in books and in the world. He is to form and utter opinions. He has his own nature and charm, and here is power. Each person is a source of thought, feeling, action, and influence; is an original cell in the fibre and substance of society. His weight, size, and quality is no other person's weight and size and quality.

Again, we are to remember that those we influence are also individuals. Each has his own vision, feeling, and habits. We are, then, not to think that we can shape and stamp him as the baker shapes and stamps his crackers. Human beings are not in the mass as if they were so much corn or coal. To seek the good of the whole by changes that are social, such as the emancipation of men if they are slaves, or by changes that are merely political,

is generally right enough in itself, but it is not enough. If we would educate, reform, and convert men we must seek persons, dealing with each person as a special case. Jesus, by example and precept, taught us to seek persons, one by one. Christians are right in working largely at persons. It is the character of the atoms which gives the character to the bodies which they compose, and it is persons who make the world.

This individuality means something in morals. Each person has his own particular moral life, his own particular duty to himself and others. He is to set off from the common lot what belongs to him. As we shut ourselves into our houses from all the rest of space, so we must locate our duty and shut ourselves into our own moral sphere. Each one has only that duty which is practicable for him, he has no one else's duty, much less the duty of every one else; but he does have his own duty. If he do it, he has his peculiar worth and value; if he fail, he has his peculiar guilt and does his peculiar injury. If each person has a special mission in the world, has a good work which no other person can do, he ought to see that he does it. With much we have no responsibility; with much we have a partial responsibility; with ourselves we have the whole responsibility. No single soldier has to win the battle, no single Christian has to evangelize the country. Let us be what naturally we should be, do what naturally we should do. If I am to be myself, also, then, it is my duty to let others be themselves, even to help them be themselves so far as they keep innocent. I am to remember to be tolerant and charitable just so far as possible. The minister must remember that his flock may not all feel and think exactly like him; and each of his people is to let the minister maintain his own individuality, is not to expect him to be somebody else, but only himself. If somebody else is wanted don't expect this person to supply that want. So it is between the newspaper and its readers, between the book and its reader,

between neighbor and neighbor, between parent and grown-up children. Individuality is to be respected and allowed for so far as possible.

This individuality means something in religion. Each person is to have his own religious life. And it is to be expected he will see and feel things a little differently from all others. We notice this in the various godly men of scripture. We notice it in the various godly men of religious memory. Each child of the family in his love, trust, and obedience is alike and yet unlike the others. So each Christian in his prayer, praise, and service is alike and yet unlike the others. The unique connection between each of us and God comes from the individuality of each person. He and God are felt to be in a certain sense alone together, and so we speak of the soul and its Maker. So the Scripture saith, "The soul shall return to God who gave it." So Christ bids us, when we pray, go into the closet and shut the door. This individuality may be a ground of special providence on the part of God toward each one. God has made him to be himself, observes him and cares for him as such. This individuality may also be a ground for a vital union of God with each person, and for an inspiration and communication that belongs to each one alone. "I will sup with him and he with me." Each life may be "hid with Christ in God." This individuality may also be a ground for an especial judgment of God upon each one. At times a person may feel "I am alone with God"—I only and God only. I am face to face with my Judge. He has authority; He has the requisite knowledge; He alone can approach me in this relation. He does do it. This individuality may also be a ground for an especial redemption of each person. He may not be redeemed after a general order, but after his own order; redeemed from his own guilt, his own habits of sin, his own infirmities and weaknesses. Such is the glory of individuality.

Says the Rev. Stopford A. Brooke, in one of his sermons: "Christ came to proclaim and to insure the distinct life, the originality of each man. All the principles He laid down, all the teaching of his followers as recorded in the Epistles, tend to produce individuality, rescue men from being mingled up, indistinguishable atoms, with the mass of men; teach them that they possess a distinct character, which it is God's will to educate; distinct gifts, which God the Spirit will inspire and develop; a peculiar work for which each man is elected, and in performing which his personality will become more and more defined."

This individuality is one ground of the influence of persons in society. Men and nations are alike borne forward on the surface of a mighty stream which they are often equally incapable of arresting or directing. So clearly now is the agency of general causes seen, and so powerful do they appear, that we are likely to ascribe too little to individual character. But an important side of social science is the influence of individual men, the influence of persons. Great is personal force. If one becomes master of a portion of this force men will be influenced by him. They cannot help it any more than they can help being influenced by the force of gravitation.

The personal influence of the good is the most potent agency with which to meet the evils of society. How much can be done by each such person fully using those gifts with which he is enriched, and by which he is capable of enriching others. Sometimes we see a man or woman thoroughly devoted to some good institution or cause, and such a person has shown what a person can and will do when the whole heart is touched; he will stand sneers and coldness, heat and fatigue. Now multiply the number of such men and you multiply the force of good in society; power of good that was dormant is brought out, and much begins to be talked about and set forward toward accomplishment that no one had any idea of.

How many a pious woman has there been who has done with her might what her hands found to do in the family or for temperance, for the church and for Jesus. How many a man has been faithful to goodness. Then multiply these persons into churches and we have thousands of local churches, full of labors of kindness to themselves and to others. Then we have the Christian church in general doing wonders of good, edifying herself, and prosecuting her missions at home and abroad. But personal influence is not confined to live good men, it comes out with equal, perhaps with greater power in bad men, or in men indifferent to much that is good. It has come out in men just as they are.

Through this power of persons the multitude of ordinary persons has had much to do in the real life and history of this world. Generally the character of the people has largely determined the character of their religious, social, political, and industrial systems. Great as has been the power of great men, vastly greater has been the power of the many small men,—the ordinary men, the power of the people at large,—in the history of this world. To them it is mainly due that the world has been what it has. They have really been the owners and the masters, and as they have willed so it has been.

THE INFLUENCE OF GREAT MEN.

"Some have concentrated the significance of history in great men as the conspicuous figures, as the prime movers of civilization. Cousin, while admitting other factors, exalts above them the series of various statesmen, poets, artists, thinkers, as the exponents of whole nations and epochs, summing up humanity and managing the world as divine instruments whose title is success, whose reward is glory."

Carlyle and Emerson represent history in like manner, and the biographical form which so many popular histo-

rians assume is but another form of this same view. Such have thought that it is to single men that the people largely owe their social and political, their mental and moral development. While this is going to an extreme, still personal power is a great social and historic factor. This personal power grows stronger and stronger in modifying phenomena as we go along the scale of the sciences, from the simplest to the most complex, from astronomy through physics to physiology, and thence to the science of society.

In speaking of the influence of great men upon history I by no means refer exclusively to that certain class of which history says so much, men who have waged wars and swayed nations, men who have had splendid success and exerted vast power. To make so much of this class as has been made causes us to sympathize with them, reconciles us to their wars and bad government, and leads us to feel no concern for their innumerable victims at home and abroad.

Individual influence is of two sorts: that of persons idealized, and that of persons themselves. The ideal formed from the life and memory has often become an active and present power. The ideal of a sainted friend may be influential through a lifetime. "It is by ideal character, founded, no doubt, in truth, but embellished by the poet in song, ballad, and legend, that a nation's character is somewhat formed. The inventions of the Round Table, the Lancelots, the Tristrams, and Galahads of chivalry produced their echoes in Chevalier Bayard and Sir Philip Sidney, and did much to raise mediæval Europe from the depth of barbarism."

The story of the fathers of a generation, of the founders of a state, in their trials, struggles, and conflicts, in obtaining that which was of great benefit to those who came after, has ever been a stimulus to these, a stimulus to worthy deeds for the country and for posterity. The struggle of the brave for freedom, the sufferings of the

conscientious for religion, are lessons to others of great impressiveness.

As another illustration, we have the strength and purity and nobleness and satisfying nature of the life of Jesus as an ideal, an ideal interesting to the simple and the wise; plain for the plain, lofty for the lofty, heroic for the heroic.

The other form of individual influence is that of persons themselves, and may divide itself, in a general way, into that of the great and that of ordinary people; that of persons exceptional and commanding, persons of extraordinary opportunity, and that of persons of ordinary power and opportunity. And yet strong men grade all along downward from the very great man to the average man. Indeed the distinction of great or strong man is rather incorrect, for all persons are or may become strong in some one matter or another, large or small. The rating of history is quite inaccurate. The ordinary rating of men to-day is quite inaccurate. Many persons are called great, and the rating is notoriously after a merely intellectual standard, and has taken in far too many of the vulgar, the vile, and the criminal. It would seem as though if the world became more righteous it would take down a good many statues. But commonly speaking, we call persons great who administer great affairs of the state or of business, who shine in the church, or at the bar, or in literature, science, or art.

This influence of great men is a very irregular and unreliable influence, great as it is. The appearance of geniuses is much like that of comets, neither can be predicted. Genius, like the diamond product, cannot be increased at liberty.

Society moves under the impulse of great men, their impulse given, not through heredity, not through their descendants, but given at once upon all who can profit by it. There have been many teachers whose disciples have readily received their instruction and inspiration,

many captains who have had but to lead to have their soldiers follow to any enterprise, many writers who have had great power over their readers. It is no wonder there are so many heresies in the world when so many excellent persons have errors and make mistakes, persons imitated by others who love and admire them, but who fail to discriminate in judging of them, and to distinguish the good in them from the bad.

Progress owes much to statesmen who in different ages have labored to develop society; it owes much to great thinkers who have made clear great principles of sound morality, of sound policy and economy. The world has seen an order of geniuses so great that they had power to originate something, something needed by men and something that men would sooner or later receive—a philosophy, a work of art, a new method, an invention. Single persons, or a few together, have originated reformations in religion and morals, have originated revolutions in politics or in industry. Single persons, or a few together, have made the discoveries, have created the inventions, have impelled forward the arts.

If persons are powers, great persons are great powers, and great men have indeed been among the world's great forces. These men have not, however, had the power which some writers claim for them. The people at large, or a few helpers, have frequently done much to make these men what they have been. Take the prominent actors in the tragedy of the first French revolution; call those men great or small, in any measurement they were largely but mouth-pieces of many persons behind them, and without those would quite likely have proved to be ordinary men of talent. Napoleon's marshals are said to have been largely made by him; then had he not been, they had not been so able.

Other great men owe their greatness simply to the times and circumstances; without these, are men of ordinary talent and influence. Fortune placed them at that

post where, by touching a lever, they could control a great machine. They happened to be kings or nobles in a land where the multitude were nobodies. Of this class are the great men of whom political history treats. The most of our history is political, and the most of it is but the history of a few royal or princely families. Go back a hundred years in most countries of continental Europe and you have but little other history, and you begin to think that great men, and of this sort, have made the history of the world. We say, "Constantine the Great," yet De Tocqueville says: "Constantine directed great events without being himself a really great man."

Those great men who have received their greatness from others, those who have received it from circumstances, and those who are great from sheer force of innate genius, have been no mean factors in this world's history. Without good leaders, the organizations, the churches, the cities, nations, and cultures could neither arise nor be maintained.

Look at the influence of persons upon the state and upon one or another phase of political life.

One person has sometimes founded a state, endowed it with constitution and laws, and this has been an active power for centuries. Think, in this regard, of the power of Moses in Jewish history, and through Jewish history upon other nations. Think of the power of Solon in Athenian history. How much does England owe to Alfred, France to Charlemagne, and Spain to Alphonso X.

Certain men have led some great movement for national independence, or for law against absolute power. We recall with admiration and pleasure William of Orange and others in the struggle of the Dutch for independence of the Spanish crown; Washington and his leaders in the struggle of the American colonies for independence of the British crown. We recall the heroes

of various revolutions, in church and state, who fought a good fight for liberty and right. We recall those great Englishmen, Selden, Eliot, Pym, Hampden, Cromwell, who stood up for England in a struggle for law against absolute power. Moreover, Hampden established there the ideal of political liberty, Cromwell of toleration, Milton of liberty of the press, Blake of mastery of the sea. The influence of particular men of action upon human affairs is also seen in late English history in a Pitt, a Burke, a Nelson, or a Wellington.

Look at certain bad men who have been at the head of states; look at Tiberius, Caligula, Nero; at Philip II. of Spain; at Charles IX. and Henry VI. of France; at James I. and James II. of England; at Robespierre and St. Just. Very marked phenomena have such persons been in the politics of the world. A very considerable power have they exercised. A state with one of them is like a person stricken with malignant disease. Such men work harm and great evil in a number of directions, wrongfully cause thousands or hundreds of thousands of their fellow men to die. They defraud their own state of its own property, its rights, its liberties; they defraud or plunder other countries. They set back the cause of improvement, they accelerate the movements of decay.

Great military conquerors afford further illustration and proof of this personal political influence. The Assyrian kings, in their ambition, in their energy to impel and their ability to guide the warlike people whom they led, exerted an influence as far as India on the east, the Caspian on the north, the Nile and the isles of the Ægean on the west. They gathered in the culture of Babylonia and Egypt and the wealth of Phœnicia. They maintained empire for centuries, made dissimilar people teach each other, the less civilized to be open to the influence of the more civilized. They made commerce to be extended, science to be diffused, and the arts to be increased. They made Egypt's knowledge to be carried forward and

joined with Mesopotamia's, to be taken into Media and Persia. See the Assyrian state everywhere stimulate mind by the contact with fresh mind; see the wealth, material and mental, which had been accumulated in isolated places set in circulation, and so at once raised in value, increased in quantity, and made more variously productive. All this is in part the influence of persons upon society.

It was the barbaric pride, the love of rapine, passion of conquest, belonging to one man, Xerxes, which led to Persia's invasion of Greece; so he was the real agent of the political changes which were the consequences of this invasion. We owe to Julius Cæsar the conquest of Gaul, its culture by Rome, and the great part which Gaul's civilization has played in that of modern Europe.

To take a modern instance of the simple power of a single man, a military conqueror, and saying nothing about its good or its evil, we have the first Bonaparte. Says Andrew Bisset: "It has been truly said that the career of Napoleon Bonaparte must be deemed one of the greatest calamities in modern history, and unfortunately it is a calamity which is made greater by the judgment of mankind to worship great force of character, even though combined with unbounded selfishness, arrogance, meanness, and falsehood."

We have the great influence exerted on material civilization by great inventors, such as James Watt, "famous as the improver and almost the inventor of the steam engine," the benefits of which to the human race are immeasurable. We also have George Stephenson and the locomotive, Charles Goodyear and India-rubber goods, with their hundreds of different uses to the world. There is a host of others whose names are well known, each in its own department.

In philosophy, what shall we say of the personal influence of Plato? Though the heir of all the past, he was emphatically a creator of the future. As Fairbairn, in his "Essays on the Philosophy of History," has eloquently

shown, inheriting to the full the tribal ability of the Athenian Greek, he developed a genius peculiarly his own, and with all the metaphysical abstractions of a lofty philosophy, partly inherited and partly his own, he realized some of that divine presence and providence which lived in the old mythical poems; that faith in the likeness and intercourse of the gods and men which inspired Homer and Hesiod; those aspirations after a happy hereafter embodied in the mysteries, the faith too, of the lyric poets and the ethical conceptions of the tragic. He has left the impress of his splendid genius on Christendom's philosophy and theology; he has intellectually helped the world of thought and the world of faith.

One has remarked, "What a power has a man like that 'gigantic system builder,' Spinoza, who has influenced names like Lessing and Goethe, like Schelling and Hegel; and who, more especially in theology, besides leaving his mark so much on Schliermacher, has foreshadowed the naturalistic rationalism of Semler, Eichorn, and Paulus, the mythical theory of Strauss, and the vision hypothesis of Shulten and Renan." Karl Hillebrand says substantially, in his "German Thought": "In general thought France and Europe owed much in the middle of the eighteenth century to Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot. Their ideas were progressive, revolutionary, and beneficial. Germany and all Europe owes much to her leading thinkers of the seventy years from 1760 to 1830. They created a revolution in thought throughout Europe. Winkleman and Lessing opened a new way of looking upon antiquity. Goethe gave the point of view now generally accepted in natural science. Herder, with his ideas of evolution, gave the method employed in the history of theology, law, politics, literature, language, and antiquities for the last hundred years. Kant gave a new departure to philosophy. Schiller gave a new and acceptable theory of art. W. Von Humboldt and Bopp opened up comparative philology."

In the fine arts we have in poetry a poet like Homer or Dante or Chaucer, a poet not only the maker of a poem, but who influences a long course of poetry. We have in architecture the designers of the cathedrals. We have in sculpture a Phidias and in painting a Raphael, creating objects of beauty that have been ideals to form artists and to preserve and develop art for long periods.

In morals, the influence of Confucius has been simply wonderful. John Howard influenced prison reform in Europe, to which work he was led to devote himself by his own experience and observation of the miseries of prison life. William Wilberforce, ably seconded by such eminent philanthropists as Thomas Clarkson and Zachary Macaulay, persisted for twenty years in a struggle to abolish the British slave trade, and finally overcame the prejudice, the ignorance and crudeness, of the nation. Sir Thomas Folwell Buxton was a force in the obtaining in Great Britain slave emancipation. Sir Samuel Romilly inaugurated and led a movement, eventually successful, to ameliorate the great severity of the English criminal law. It is the duty of a man with gifts of heart and head, of fortune and position, to use them thus. He often is, or can be, a person of great power and influence. He can see needs to which society is insensible; he can see remedies of which others are ignorant.

In religious life there have been men of great natures, mind, and heart, men of intellect and wide sympathies, who have raised the standard of piety and morality in a province or throughout a people. Occasionally, among the heathen even, have there been such men; men who in spiritual insight have been far in advance of the multitude; and men with an ability sooner or later to bring a multitude to their way of looking and thinking. These men have elevated the spirit of their times or of the times following. They have met a want, have enkindled an enthusiasm, have found imitators and followers, and by themselves and in their successors

have emancipated many from irreligion and immorality; have made themselves felt by millions and millions, have established among them important religious, moral, and educational ideas.

There have been persons who have founded great religions. It was Buddha who gave life, moral excellence, and missionary success, to Buddhism; who originated a movement that has lasted thousands of years and taken in a large fraction of mankind. It was Confucius who founded what is called Confucianism; his power in China has been simply immeasurable. Zoroaster founded Zoroasterianism. Mohammed founded Mohammedanism.

All through the history of the Old Testament church particular men accomplished reformations, and caused the church to take new departures. And it is because the most of the Old Testament saints were men upon whom turned movements, as on a pivot, that so much is given in detail of the general history of these men. It is because they were the germs of new developments. Men rose up, men equal to a crisis, men to rebuke prevailing iniquity, to revive religion, to encourage the spiritless people, to rescue the nation from an enemy. Each great event had its master spirit, its controlling genius. Israel had its Moses to deliver it from bondage, to bring it under religious laws, to consolidate it into a state, to lead it to the borders of the promised land; had its Joshua to lead it into that land; had its Samuel to revive religious life, to reform morals, to work deliverance from national bondage, to create new institutions, to help maintain piety, and to bring an era of prosperity. Israel had its David to organize more perfectly the church and nation, and to carry them forward to the zenith of prosperity, and Israel had its Daniel, its Ezra, and Nehemiah to restore to their own land their people in captivity.

In like manner, when Jesus wanted to evangelize the world, he sent men. He had power to mould to his pur-

pose the other forces which mould men, but he took by choice this personal force. Knowingly did Jesus make personal proclamation of the gospel its great instrumentality. The personal belief and personal communication of that to others is a force, a force greater than if the gospel truth were merely given through the press.

The great missions of the church owe much to persons. As largely identified with the formal conversion of Ireland we have the man, St. Patrick. In like manner, as identified with the conversion of the Picts in Scotland, we have one man, St. Columban. As identified with the reconversion of England we have St. Augustine, the monk; and with the conversion of the other European heathen lands particular persons: in Southern Germany, Columbanus, St. Gaul, and others; in Northern Germany, St. Boniface and certain that he raised up.

The great reformations of the church also illustrate this power of persons. Wyckliffe was the soul of a powerful anti-papal and evangelical reformation in his day. Similarly John Huss enkindled all Bohemia with the desire for a pure Christianity. Luther was a large element in the inspiration of the original Protestantism. Look at Luther's personality; look at his volcanic force, at the religious and moral influence of the man. It was a contagious power. Melancthon's reasoning is as good as Luther's, Melancthon's learning is as great, but still Melancthon falls short of Luther in personal power.

Such has been the power of great men that even the personal peculiarities of some of them have had power. The peculiar character of an influential statesman, the bent of a particular sovereign, the passions, the very defects, the likes and dislikes of such men as Alexander, Cæsar, Henry VIII., Bonaparte, have helped shape history. Some one has remarked, had Dante been generally happy, or Shakespeare personally wretched, or Voltaire met with no personal misusage, or Byron mar-

ried happily, how different had been their literary influence.

Still it must be remembered that great men are neither simply the mouth-piece of the people,—simply made by them,—nor, on the other hand, simply their makers. There is reciprocal action, as we shall better perceive when we come to the influence of society upon its great men. The great man depends upon others, improves and develops what they have done, and in turn leaves his work to be improved and developed by others. The great captains, the great statesmen, the great inventors even, have often been ably seconded by other men of mark. The work of those able men whose power has been so immense upon the life of mankind is in many instances more or less the work of a number of able men. Therefore, while I speak of the power of great men over their fellows to shape their character and destiny, still, after all, a close student will perceive states and events which these conspicuous men have not had the ordering of; will perceive that history is far more than the series of their actions or than their united biographies. Never was the most influential man's work the sum of the work done. "These select ones have rendered services to humanity in widening its range, in lifting it higher, in multiplying its powers, in giving to it new and permanent realms of truth and beauty, in giving to it in their lives examples of its glorious possibilities of effort and achievement in virtue." But the whole people, in their intellectual, moral, and social qualities, in their religious and æsthetic emotions, have produced the great body of results, the mass of the effort and achievement. History is largely a result of the labors of all.

A GENERAL VIEW OF MAN'S INFLUENCE UPON SOCIETY.

The conscious human being is a higher creature than aught we see above, beneath, or around. He can perceive, understand, and enjoy the visible creatures as they cannot him. He it is who is the author of society.

Nature is one thing, society is another. Nature, morally or scientifically, has not that intrinsic interest which society has. Whatever deep interest nature has for us comes from the circumstance that her uses and beauties are for our benefit. The world of society is in nature, but it rises out of and above nature; is a higher sphere, one to which the causes, the laws, the processes of nature do by no means fully apply. No philosophy founded upon a view of society, as in mere nature, will apply. Men are more than of the earth earthy. Herder's work on the philosophy of history represents man as having no spontaneous will, no personal conscience, no real, moral, and religious nature, but as being a complete creature of nature and circumstance; whereas man's will and personality and spirituality is the key to all his higher social and historic life; is the ground of political and social and æsthetic life; of moral and religious life. A philosophy of nature is not a philosophy of man, of society, and of history. When we arrive at man, nature's history simple has ended. Another being than any of mere nature has entered upon the scene, another order than any of nature has begun; another history has commenced, that of the human family, which, while in large connection with nature, has reason and free will, heart and conscience. Hence we find a different constitution, a different life and history from that of mere nature. We find an order in part of natural being and life, and in part of spiritual being and life; an order adjoining that of nature, but seemingly next above.

In animated nature we find an ascending series of genera, type rising above type. And as we stop at each genus, as upon a plateau, we find that nearest to the edge on which we enter to cross, the genus in its species most resembles the genus below; but as we cross, and are about to go up higher, we find the genus in its species most resembling the genus above. And so when we have reached the genus man we have reached a being clearly related to beings below, and yet not merely a superior animal, but rational and spiritual, the first *person* we have yet found. Along the line of life in general we have heat and light, electricity and all the modes of motion, the domain of physics and physical force; we have next, the domain of chemical force; and next, matter lifted from inorganic to organic, and passed from a dead to a living state—the domain of vegetable force; and next, animal being, and, lastly, human being.

All along the scale of animal being there is a rise; not necessarily a chronological advance, but certainly a logical. From point to point in the vast series of mollusk, reptile, and mammal we see a definite unfolding order of higher and higher life. There is an animal intelligence, will, and sensibility, and there is a human intelligence, will, and sensibility; and these latter are of such a nature as to seem to make man a link of a chain that is of nature and something else. He seems to be more than natural in essence and contents, to be other and higher. He is in spirit detached from material nature. He is not lost in the vast life of nature. He is not swallowed up in any ocean of any kind. Man is a new being on the earth; a being in some respects of an apparently new and higher order; a being capable of society and of history; a being with possibilities of glory and of shame; a being with hopes even of immortality, with all that this implies. Such is the greatness of his estate, such is the beauty and dignity of his nature.

If we say that man is but a thing or a mere animal we

shall miss his personality, and missing his personality we shall miss the full understanding of society and history. Here in personality is especial human life; here is domestic and social life; here are art and philosophy; here are science, morality, and religion. Personality lays in man the basis for religion by giving a religious nature, for ethics by giving moral liberty and responsibility. Personality lays in man the basis for relations of justice, brotherhood, and humanity to others. Personality lays the basis for civil relations, for liberty of person, of thought, of conscience, and for civil liberty. Personality gives creative power in literature, science, and the fine arts. Personality in its individuality also lays the basis for personal property, for mine and thine. Thus is man's personality at the basis of his religion, his morality, his social, civil, and intellectual and industrial life. We are now ready to advance to the study of that society which is made up of such beings, and without carrying with us a simply natural philosophy as a prepossession to influence our judgment.

In coming to the world of human society we have come to a glory and beauty above that of nature; we have come to the greatest work of man, and the noblest work known. In coming to society we have come to a wonderful growth out of men in their intelligence and will, their moral and religious character; we have come to a world that is permeated by intelligence and will, by truth and honesty, by justice, brotherhood, and humanity; a world shining through and through with these, and by them cohering, organic, and growing; by them shaping into families, communities, states, and now of late into a very brotherhood of man. Animals could not form such a society, for they do not have these qualities; just so far as men are deficient in these qualities is society deficient, and just so far as men have them is society all it can be. Only in such a being as man is do we have the vast agitation and action of human life, the vast panorama of history.

Men are to reverence themselves and their lives when they find themselves capable of creating more or less the stupendous, costly, and magnificent structure of society, the earthly home of the race, with all that this means. The universal giving of human life in this direction, so far as it is done, makes the pathetic, the heroic story of man. Biography and chronicle and history, the lives of men, of communities, of nations are in it. It follows the natural order of time. It has a continuous and an accumulating power.

THE EARTH'S INFLUENCE UPON SOCIETY.

The earth goes round, but the important matter is the people on it—how the going round affects them. The great and splendid and powerful life of nature has indeed affected them. Matter and force are too near neighbors not to do so. The sun rises and sets. It is now hot and now cold. It rains or is windy. The streams and rivers flow. The broad earth and the broad seas are here, light or dark. But men are the main thing; with themselves, their families, towns and kingdoms and wars, and differing years and ages. They name the days. They count the years. They make the stars for signs. They cunningly make use of matter and force, and greatly thereby help themselves in their greater and wider life. But nature influences them.

Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient philosophers stated the fact of the earth's influence upon society explicitly and definitely, though without enlargement. Ancient political writers discussed the influence of physical causes, at least in shaping the form of government, as the influence of a harbor in making a town commercial, and so democratic. The first, however, to discuss this influence with particularity was the now celebrated Bodin, a French lawyer and author of

the sixteenth century. Montesquieu made much of the physical influence. Turgot also treated of it, and it is said with greater discrimination than Montesquieu. Herder believed in it. Comte has discussed it. Buckle has made it the controlling historic force. He paid no attention to the more important causes, those of an intellectual and moral sort, which so largely determine political movements, but traced all progress to physical influences merely. Herbert Spencer has treated of this social factor.

Among the geographical speculations which have been offered, some writers have reasoned that there is a sympathy between the earth and man; that the character of a country reflects itself in the character of those who inhabit it; that there is a pre-established harmony between lands and peoples; that different portions of the earth have a necessary connection with different portions of history; that human revolutions have invariably been attended by extraordinary physical appearances. Bodin divided off the people of the world by their latitude, and gave to each set a peculiar set of qualities produced by the climate: to the northern set he gave physical strength and courage; to the southern, intellectual power and culture; and to the middle, more or less both, according to latitude in the temperate zone. Montesquieu, in his "Spirit of the Laws," treats man as a being shaped by climate and legislation, and with this thought in mind he mapped the political world into monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, each a natural product of the climate of its own country. Cousin found three great phases of civilization, each determined by the geography, namely: the infinite phase, or Asiatic civilization; the finite phase, or the Mediterranean culture; and the European phase, which expresses the relation and conjunction of the two. Such views do not bear critical examination, though they carry great names.

Amid the vagueness and dubiousness of our knowl-

edge can anything be regarded as established? Plausible conjectures must not be taken for certainties. How much do we accurately know of the effect of physical agencies upon the life of a people?

The principal physical circumstances by which mankind's character and condition have been affected have been studied in history itself, also in physical geography, political economy, statistics, and the accounts of travellers; and have been studied with a zest which has increased as the means of gratifying it have increased. Hereby we have acquired a vast body of materials, from which we can learn something of the range and influence of natural forces, and perceive how far they affect a people.

The vast continents stand out of the sea with plain and mountain range, while over the continents are the heavens, here clear, there floating the clouds, and there overcast; now the sun shines and now the rain descends. Vegetation and animal and human life lives and perfects its growth. And "while the earth remaineth, seed time and harvest and cold and heat and summer and winter and day and night shall not cease." While throughout, to its extreme length and width, the earth has more or less population, while the great continents from coast line to centre has each its world of human life, it is but natural that this earth should influence these people, that the fertile and beautiful earth, this good place to dwell in, should leave its mark upon its inhabitants.

How would we have lived at all had we had no vegetable and animal life? How would we have lived as we have, had there been no wood, no iron, no other metals, no coal? In certain coral islands, little isolated spots of life on the broad Pacific, there is neither mountain nor hill nor slope above that of the beach, no river nor any stream, no change of season other than change in the prevalence of the rains. One such island is described by Dana as having but one kind of mineral, twenty-nine

kinds of vegetable, and no kind of quadruped. Now in these atolls, as they are called, the inhabitants seem with a change of physical locality to have lost in implements, arts, and language what their ancestors possessed. Such is the effect of nature upon us.

The influence of physical nature is of two kinds, direct and indirect. The direct action is one in which man must be passive; is of a fatalistic character, making man the creature of external influences, and, so far, not responsible for his character, nor able to change his condition. This influence is much the feebler of the two, and is so obscure in its working that we can hardly tell whether it exists. For example, there is a direct influence of climate, geological structure, and other physical facts upon disease. Statistics and medical opinion go to show that in the south-east of England consumption most prevails where the soil is wet. Moreover, in the British Islands it appears that the death rate is influenced by the water supply, not only as to its sufficiency and the amount of organic matter suspended in it, but also as to its relative hardness. Glasgow and Manchester are supplied with soft waters and have high death rates. Birmingham, Bristol, Newcastle, and Warwick have hard waters and low death rates. This illustrates the direct influence of nature on man.

There is also the indirect influence of physical nature, an influence which permits and presupposes action on man's part. For instance, according to the climate, open or indoor life predominates, either of which has in time a great effect upon domestic, social, and religious life; upon manners, customs, and art. Somewhat according to the situation and products of a land are its activities and methods, and, through these, its intelligence, morality, and history. The thrusting into corners such of the defeated in war as were not exterminated has generally been attended by the deterioration of these remnants in their inclement or otherwise unfit regions. For in-

stance, according to Livingstone, the Ba Kalahari are a weaker body of Bechuanas, pushed back into the wilderness to live in a still lower state of civilization. They now inhabit the Kalahari desert, where they can derive no advantage from such agricultural and pastoral acquirements as their ancestors possessed. The most they can now do, as farmers, is to cultivate a garden for melons and pumpkins, and rear a few goats. It is stated that the Digger Indians of North America belong to the Shoshones, and were brought down to a present very low level by the Blackfeet, who took away their hunting-grounds. They have been driven to abandon many useful arts which they possessed in their more fortunate days.

When the earth produces too little food man must migrate. Also when a more fertile land is within reach he wants to migrate, even if he has food enough already, for then he can get it more easily. While, if at liberty, he generally goes toward more productive regions, or those which are more easily made productive, still he migrates also for various other purposes.

As to the physical earth shaping the direction of this migration, it is very evident that man will not cross obstacles like mountains, bodies of water, swamps, or deserts when he can go around them; and his going around them often leads him elsewhere than he would have gone had he been able to go straight. Therefore, influenced by the earth, man will generally migrate towards productive regions parallel to mountain ranges and along river courses. These statements are proven and illustrated in the historic migrations of the Turanian race, the Aryan and the Semite.

Again, this indirect influence of physical nature upon society is seen in the way in which physical boundaries have in the past been made political boundaries. There is no doubt that, to an extent, physical geography determines political geography, though in these days, when

physical barriers are so thoroughly removed, it does not seem likely that Odysse Barot's prophecy will come true; namely, that physical geography will eventually determine all political boundaries.

Let us now consider in detail the influence, partly direct, but mainly indirect, of the whole body of exterior conditions under which man lives. The earth's daily rotation and annual movement affect society. Change in these would produce change in social life. It is an interesting study, to what extent the geographical shape of Asia, Europe, Africa, and America has had an influence upon history. Had the outlines of the continents, of their various bays, peninsulas, and adjoining islands been different, history had been different. Europe, shaped like Africa, would not have had Europe's history. The history of Italy and Greece is due, in part, to their shape. Again, the relative position of the continents, or of their parts, could not be changed without changing history. Greece placed where Denmark is could not have been the Greece it was; nor could India, where Siberia is, have been India. Again, there is the influence of the three great southern European peninsulas, or of the insular position of the British Islands, upon the history of these sections.

Sir Henry Maine, in his "Ancient Law," p. 17, observes that "the physical formation of Asiatic countries had the effect of making individual communities larger and more numerous than in the west; and it is a known social law, that the larger the space over which a particular set of institutions is diffused, the greater is its tenacity and vitality." Hence, in part, the tenacity and vitality of the oriental despotisms, civil and religious.

The elevation of the land affects a people's history. Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, China, and Northern India have been greatly benefited by their very rich river bottoms and the adjoining alluvial plains, and because of them have had a very different history than otherwise.

Or again, take the influence of mountains. Their soil is poor; the people are poor; agriculture is difficult; manufactures and commerce, with their new classes, do not exist; intelligence, and the intercourse born of it, are limited; people do not mingle with each other or with the outside world, and so do not receive foreign influences. While as being in the mountains, all sorts of fugitives are added to the people. Moreover, the mountains favor the freedom of their inhabitants. The mountains of the earth,—the Himalayas, the Caucasus, the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Andes,—have been free as no other portions of it. In many lands the mountaineers alone have retained their independence. Yet while there has been among mountains many a free and independent petty state, the mountains rather possessed the democratic freedom of towns than the civilized freedom of large countries.

The sea has exerted a favorable influence upon political liberty. It has exalted the commercial and manufacturing class, made them rich and politically influential, and the communities have come to be ruled less by the few and more by the many. Such was the case with the Phœnicians and Carthaginians, with the many ancient Greek and Italian republics along the Mediterranean, and with the mediæval maritime republics. Such also has been the case with the Netherlands and Great Britain.

The sea has influenced the whole development of people who have used it. As we have seen, it has favored liberty; it has also favored manliness, adventure, commercial and manufacturing enterprise, and various handicrafts. These callings, while increasing wealth, also quicken intelligence, while also intercourse with foreign lands enlarges knowledge and range of thought. And hence such communities have a good deal of popular intelligence.

The Phœnicians on the Syrian sea-board had a fertile

land and a fruitful sea, both of which stimulated a naturally active people to enterprise. The land being narrow and the sea wide it afforded an outlet for their surplus activities. The coast, too, had safe harbors. The forests of Lebanon could give material for ships. Thus, naturally, the Phœnicians became commercial. Many lands were near enough to be reached. Egypt, Babylon, Assyria were led by their needs to go down to the cities by the sea to buy the wares which the Phœnicians brought from near and far.

The sea-coast of Europe, in proportion to area, is greater than that of Asia, Africa, and America combined, in the proportion of one hundred and sixty-two to one hundred and thirty-seven. This vast sea-articulation has greatly aided the rapid and increasing development of Europe.

Inland lakes and navigable rivers encourage trade and industry, accumulation of wealth, and the rise of the people. May, in his "Democracy of Europe," says: "The lakes and inland navigation of the Netherlands largely contributed to their commercial and industrial prosperity, and to the growth of those remarkable cities which were the seats of municipal sovereignty in the middle ages."

Climate exercises an influence on man. As climate influences both vegetable and animal so it does human life. No animal but must have air and water, and keep within a certain narrow strip on the scale of temperature. As man approaches the lower side of this limit in the frigid zone he dwarfs and dies away; as he approaches the upper side of this limit in the torrid zone he finds extreme heat to have much the same physical and intellectual effect upon him as extreme cold. A hot and humid climate, that of river bottoms and low coast lands in the torrid zone, develops vegetable bodies rapidly, and stimulates them highly; and it does the same to human bodies.

In the United States, among those of English ancestry,

a new bodily type has been developed, and is most marked in the Eastern States, where that life is least mixed; hence it does not come from intermixture, and must come from the climate. The new bodily characteristics are a tendency to leanness, thinness, paleness, excitability, delicacy, and lack of endurance; these last two tendencies being especially apparent in the women. It is "the opinion of Rameau and Quatrefages, confirmed by W. B. Carpenter and Doctors Berthold and Seeman, that in some parts of North America the last arrivals, the European and African races, show in their physiognomy an approach to the aboriginal type of the country."

In the United States, climate affects the physique of northern men at the south, of eastern men at the west, of the Germans and Irish from abroad. The descendants of all such measurably lose the old bodily type, and tend to gain a new bodily type.

Climate directly influences health. In hot and humid localities, from the direct influence of the sun, from the exhalations of the earth and of vegetation, and from other sources, the danger of disease is at its maximum. We all know the influence of malarial sections on health. Some know at what cost of malarial suffering to men, women, and children certain sections of the United States have been settled and opened up. Certain sections and localities are more favorable to the nerves or the blood or the lungs than others. Certain districts are more favorable to young children than others.

Says G. F. Kolb, in his work entitled "The Condition of Nations": "In earliest times a general belief obtained that emigrants acclimatized in foreign lands; that the human body gradually adapted itself to the climate. Thus it was that bodies of troops were sent out to far distant lands and detained there without being relieved, on the supposition that the mortality would decrease the longer the troops remained in the same place. The principle was altogether shattered by statistics, which

proved that the longer the human frame was exposed to the injurious effects of special climates, the greater was the mortality. Thus it came to pass that the administration of the English army, in opposition to its former principles, directed that, as a rule, no troops remained stationed in distant colonies more than three years. The immediate result of the change, suggested by statistics, was that whereas under the former regulation the average mortality of British troops serving abroad was 48·58 in 1000, it is now 24·2, or reduced to one half.

"It is not without practical use that statistics long ago pointed out that certain lands were inappropriate for European colonization; that they were simply graves for the people of north and west Europe. Statistics showed that whereas in France out of 10,000 inhabitants 246 died, out of a like number settled in Algeria 527 died; and this excess occurred in a body of colonists in the prime of manhood, with all the powers of life active and vigorous, and who in the mother country would not give an average of more than 100 deaths in 10,000."

The indirect influence of climate is even greater than the direct. Climate influences our food, clothing, and lodging, our manner of living together at home and abroad; all which in turn influence our domestic, social, and moral character. By nature man is indolent, and, unless compelled, will in the first instance get on as well as he can without work, and with only the provision that nature has made for him. So that in tropical regions, where he can live without labor, where he is not compelled to make provision for the winter, and thus to exercise prudence and forethought, he has in most instances made but small progress. While also those regions, through the lassitude and indolence created, unfit men for that concentrated attention, that careful comparison and close reasoning, that are so necessary for permanent welfare and progress. They affect concentration and judgment. They affect administrative and executive talent. In

short, they affect the general mental development. It would seem as though the climate of Hindostan had had some such effect upon the people of that country. In the torrid zone man can get on without work, and in the frigid zone his work is in vain; but in the temperate zone he must work, and his work is productive. The lands of the temperate zone—namely, the whole of Europe and the greater part of China—are those in which most of progress has been made; are those which have contained the highest and most long continued civilized communities of the world.

Climate has affected philosophy. Among the Hindoos, where an excess of heat enervates and exhausts the body and indisposes men to labor, there is a system of metaphysics which maintains that repose and inactivity, even non-existence, are the beginning and end of all things, and the great objects to be desired; that inaction is the most perfect of all states; and that God is as near this state as possible. This doctrine of laziness, of rest, of passiveness, is favored by the climate.

Climate has also influenced religion, has engendered superstition, has shaped heathen mythology. Still, as yet, not much is accurately known concerning the influence of nature upon religious views.

To some extent, geology has affected persons, society, and history; has affected, for instance, the size, shape, and health of man. Limestone countries tend to produce men big-boned, long-legged, and with large joints and skeletons; as witness in Kentucky and Tennessee, Southern Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Even the soil affects the human type. The mineralogical constituents of the rocks affect the fertility of the soil, and this in turn affects the character of those who own it. Barrenness tends to make men poor and restless; tends to drive and keep away population.

Mr. May, in his "Democracy in Europe," speaking of the character of the soil and its cultivation, says: "When

a country consists of vast pastures, a feudal society of chiefs and dependents has generally been found; large tracts of land being in the hands of a few proprietors, and a scanty population being engaged in tending the flocks and herds, the elements of a free and progressive society are wanting. To which we must add another cause, pointed out by Aristotle, that in such countries war has generally been carried on by cavalry, which is the arm of the rich and not of the poor. Those who defend their country and maintain its independence are supreme in its government, and thus an aristocracy is the natural constitution of a pastoral state."

The minerals of a country have exerted a direct influence upon its history. England's tin, iron, and coal have wrought wonders for her. California's gold and Nevada's silver have made those states. With useful metals and minerals, and an enterprising people, mining and manufacturing go forward, money is made, traffic thrives, roads are created, towns arise, a society is formed independent of agriculture and land aristocracy, a free people is called into existence.

The very cultivation of the soil, and of vegetable and animal life, so changes these as to change their influence upon man. Cultivation improves the climate in wet grounds by diminishing the water, in dry grounds by increasing the water. Also the cultivation of the roots, grasses, grains, fruits, and flowers of the earth has greatly improved them; and thus improved, they have in turn lengthened the life and increased the comfort of man.

Inundations, conflagrations, and tempests have now and then had a marked social effect by sending certain people elsewhere, or by affecting the fate of campaigns. In the *Popular Science Monthly* I read substantially, "A prodigious fall of hail near Chalons, in France, in 1339, inflicted much loss on the army of the invading king, Edward III. In 1719, 1000 Swedes perished in a snow storm while they were on the march to attack Drontheim.

To the wreck of the Spanish Armada, in 1558, following the repulse by Howard and Drake, the fact is doubtless to be ascribed in part that England, instead of Spain, has been the naval power of the world for the centuries which have succeeded."

Even the very appearance of physical nature has, to some extent, affected society. Nature, when very strong, works on certain persons and certain people through the imagination. A long, hard winter has a depressing and weakening effect. Severe cold will affect some with a sort of fear. The volcano of the Sandwich Islands was an object of superstition. A fearful sun tends to put an ignorant and imaginative people into mental and spiritual slavery, from which state it is but a step to social and political slavery. The physical surrounding has appeared again in the architecture of a people, as in the Egyptian and Babylonian architecture, and in the literature of a people, as in that of the Arabs of the desert or in that of the Northern pagans of Europe.

The appearance of physical nature, both general and local, has largely given birth and shape to a goodly portion of the mythology of the world, which mythology has had an influence upon religion, morals, art, and literature. In the old Greek myths of gods and heroes, the scenery of wild, rocky, and hilly Thessaly comes out in combatants hurling rocks and hills, in hill piled on hill and mountain to scale the heavens. In the old Scandinavian and German myths nature likewise continually comes out in the shaping and coloring of the stories.

So, too, nature influences language. In the apparent harmony between the surrounding material world and the mind of man, "nature, in her objects and activities, has furnished us with many symbols and analogies which make a multitude of the nouns and verbs of language." Says Leo Grindon, in his work "Sex in Nature": "Nature has furnished us with a multitude of metaphors, which constitute the substance, the absolute

warp and woof of language, no less than its embroidery. . . . In the pre-established harmony between the mind of man and the material world, nature is an inexhaustible storehouse of images and illustrations of human life and human existence. . . . Man cannot utter a single sentence without drawing upon objective nature."

Thus the character of our material habitation has an influence upon our physical, intellectual, and moral being; but the earth, having done much to shape the phenomena of vegetable and animal life, meets in man with a very different substance to act upon. The plant and the animal are far more the creatures of climatic and geographical influence than is man. Much more than these can he make himself and his world; and the more highly developed he becomes the more he is likely to come out from under the influence of physical nature. These facts of physical influence are only half true, and are practically false if separated from the fact that their influence upon us depends upon our action. Often, if nature harm, it is because man is lacking in mind, in energy, or in moral character. If he have enough of these he can resist all the injurious influences of nature. Man cannot be degraded in form or feature, mind or character, by nature unless he or his fathers consent. If he will, he can even subjugate and govern external nature.

No, physical influence is not all. The same race, with similar traits, has inhabited lands which are very dissimilar. The Turkish race is found in Siberia, in Central Asia, and on the Mediterranean. The Papuan and the Malay, with every kind of difference, have lived for ages side by side in the same tropical regions. Sparta and Athens, with the same material surroundings, differed mentally. The Greeks and the Romans, with similar geographical positions, had essential differences of character. The same land, with the same climate, has been successively inhabited by very different people; as witness the Mesopotamian valley, or the peninsula of

Greece. Their population to-day differs much from that of old. The earth and the sky are the same. Nature is unchanged. If the cause be the same why is not the effect the same? Again, many parts of the earth have each several distinct races, under precisely the same physical influences—Northern Africa has Arabs and Negroes; Western Asia has ever held side by side Semite, Hamite, and Indo-Germanic races; Central Asia has ever held people both of Mongol and of Aryan descent.

Mr. O. A. Bronson, in a review article, wrote: "Is not the geography of Egypt what it was under the Pharaohs? Is its history the same? Is not the geography of Greece what it was in the days of Miltiades, Pericles, Plato, and Alexander? Is there no difference in the facts of the history of modern Greece and those of the history of ancient Greece? Rome sits, as of old, on the Tiber, and Italy lies under the same serene sky and along the same valleys and mountains, is watered by the same seas, and yet where are her Scipios, her Gracchi, her Cæsars? Jerusalem lies as it did in the days of David, Solomon, and Ezra: has no change come over the spirit or the body of its history?"

SUPERNATURAL INFLUENCE AND PURPOSE IN SOCIETY.

I assume the existence of God and pass on to the direct question of supernatural influence upon man and society. The whole question of morality, of piety and religion, brings in this question, a question which has too often been overlooked by political science, by political economy, and by social science in general. Even if chemistry and astronomy have thrown out a supernatural world it does not follow that social science can throw it out. There are in society other than physical, other than psychological phenomena; there are moral and religious phenomena. In acknowledging religion and piety to be forces which act upon society we are brought

face to face with a supernatural world. Natural and Bible religion intimate an influence that religious people assume to be supernatural, though some, like De Wette and Theodore Parker, think it to be general, while others think it to be both general and special. Many writers upon history have dwelt so much upon the influence of physical or psychological agencies on society as entirely to ignore a possible supernatural agency in human affairs. For instance, Montesquieu does not say anything about it, nor does Condorcet. On the other hand, Bossuett, Vico, Edwards, and others have thought that historical facts indicate supernatural influence.

I do not wish to investigate as to a general supernatural influence, an orderly and continuous general manifestation of divine power and wisdom and providence back of all natural and human working, I only wish to investigate as to special supernatural influence in human and social life. I do not wish to discuss what Christian theology calls general providence, but rather what Christian theology calls special providence. I wish to investigate the subject of special supernatural intervention, meaning by this mainly divine intervention, though there may be an influence from good spirits and from bad spirits.

We are not to be shut off by any hypothesis, that for God to interfere would be an arbitrary action, and a violation of his established laws. Some philosophy and some science have recognized in the world an order so directed by unerring thought, so full of harmony in the processes, that no interference occurs in it; a sovereignty that has done all things so well that no interference is needed, and none is allowed or gets in. Some consider it unphilosophical to suppose any action of God on nature, man, and history save in and through laws. God may be the original source of nature, may even be its immediate support, but he never acts from outside in addition. He leaves his machine to its work.

He has no further interest, no surplus power, no additional will. He retains no liberty of this sort. He has tied himself up. What was meant simply to be a bond of order for his works is made also to bind him. The teaching is that he is so perfect in wisdom and power that he has constituted a world which runs without him; to suppose otherwise is to limit him.

But the question is not, could he do so, but has he done so. Granted that he could do so, it is foolish to say he has done so. Maybe he is in a sense at least limited in power; or maybe he has not chosen to construct a world and then never interfere. He may desire to exert a direct influence, as one does upon another, as a parent does upon his family. Does it follow that because the discoveries of natural science have tended to obliterate many apparent exceptions from the reign of material law there are none left? The universality of law without any personal intervention is not yet established. May not the world be regarded less from a mechanical point of view, and more from a personal and family, a social point of view? Is not God best apprehended as a person like ourselves, as free, flexible, coming and going; as exercising a power over society; as acting on its lines of causes, physical, social, and personal, if he chooses, and as choosing to do so for various reasons? May he not deal as a teacher with a school, as a parent with a child, and interfere as often as he pleases? We are in a realm different from that of nature, where it is evident that law largely reigns. Why should it be deemed entirely unlikely for God to intervene, if he should so choose, by direct action; to help matters if they should be going wrong; to intervene even with miraculous revelations, economies, and messengers.

All the evidence of the Bible's truth is evidence of the truth of supernatural intervention in the affairs of earth; that evidence is the strongest we have upon the subject. If that is not true, it is hardly possible to support the

thesis at all. If that is true, it is hardly necessary to support the thesis here.

In view of these facts, faith in the supernatural as a cause in society is not essentially weak, is not childish, but is sensible. There is evidence that power exists above the physical world, above the human being, above human society; power belonging to another world, yet at work in this world. Its influence seems to be a part of the influence by which things go on.

The question also arises, Has there been in society and in history any manifestation more or less of supernatural purpose, of divine purpose I may say?

In ordinary language we speak of the meaning and purpose of facts, but this use of the word "purpose" has no reference to a fore-ordination of the facts, it simply refers to the end they happen to serve. "Purpose," in the philosophical meaning of the word, refers to fore-ordination, to pre-arrangement with an end in view; and is used synonymously with the words design and final cause. Society and history certainly present the action of human purposes, and, it may be, of divine purpose. As we rise in the scale of being and approach beings who will more and more independently, we also approach the region of purpose; and it stands to reason that as we approach God we enter more and more into this region.

In studying in society and history this question of purpose the student leaves strict science and enters philosophy so far as the two can be distinguished; leaves the scientific analysis of society and history for a view of the bearings of the meaning for some end. This is to pass from the scientific or inside sphere over into the philosophic sphere, which embraces both inside and outside. Strict science looks out only for efficient causes, while philosophy may look out also for final causes. The two spheres are not, however, entirely distinguishable in practical study. We study the efficient causes

and we study also seeming ends, though we can learn far more in the strictly scientific than we can in the philosophic sphere. Hence our studies, to be practical, should be rather scientific than strictly philosophic; should in the study of causes be rather a study of efficient than of final causes, for we are very largely at sea in studying these last.

Kant thought that society at large was being so conducted as to finally produce a single perfect state covering the earth. Fichte thought that society was being gradually conducted to the point where the human race will be a united and highly cultivated body. But opinions of metaphysical philosophers are deduced from their general philosophic principles rather than based upon the observation of social and historic facts. Laurent thinks that human society and events are under a divine control and guidance, which in the end will raise the human family to higher states of life. Charles Kingsley represented the wars of the Teutons and Romans as managed by a general in heaven. Schomberg, in his "Theoretic Philosophy of English History," attempts to explain the civil and military events of England as so many providential interpositions in behalf of the English episcopacy. Pennington, in his "God in the Reformation," finds special divine interposition in behalf of the Protestants. Others have looked for divine interposition in behalf of the Roman Catholics; others in behalf of English Presbyterianism. Some writers—for instance, Laurent in his "Studies on the History of Humanity," and Miller, in his "Philosophy of History"—have studied general history mainly to find out its special purposes, mainly to find what is the design of each event or institution.

As to the structure of society: just as we see a bird make her nest beforehand for her coming young so do we seem to find the structure of society shaped for men; the family and the state designed; the producing system designed; the distributive system designed. While so-

ciety created these, still these so serve society that they look like pre-arrangements to secure its proper growth, improvement, and welfare. As to the movement of society: there seems to be in universal history, whether by design or not, a natural progress, and then a supernatural. When the former ceases it seems to receive at times and places supernatural help and impulse. A great interest in the question of purpose in society arises from an interpretation of the Bible, which makes it teach a millennium in this earth, a millennium assured by a divine purpose. Now with the suggestion which this interpretation gives us we may look to see if we can discern evidences of the workings of any such purpose, can discern a tendency that saves out of wickedness and retardation and declension even; a tendency that is working out the evil and working in the good.

Believers in purpose are apt to impose a purpose rather than to find one; for instance, if interested on one side or another of a contest between Protestant and Catholic, German and French, North and South, are apt to consider events favorable to their side as due to God's especial interference. We are apt to make God's purposes agree with ours. In deciding upon the purpose, the personal equation becomes a very large one. We can only reason on probabilities. The best we can do is but to guess the measure of intervention along the scale from most direct to very indirect. We have no inspiration to guide us.

SOCIETY IS FOR MAN.

To one's consciousness, all is silence that was before he was; all is silence that is beyond his sense; all is seemingly silent that will be after he goes. Yet we add to consciousness reason and faith, and we have a vision fair, open, fresh, and free, of land beyond our sight, of skies

beyond the east or west. We realize the human family, past and present.

Of the splendor and glory of human life who can write? This great reality has many sides, lies like the earth under many lights, and its measure reaches beyond the measure of the widest horizon seen from the loftiest mountain. Large tracts of human habitation are still beyond in every direction. With the flight of the bird along this rounding slope of earth there is seen no end until back the thought comes from the other direction. The globe thus surrounded, whose vastness is simply inconceivable, is the seat of a vegetable and an animal life, of whose vastness we have, strictly speaking, no knowledge; but much more is it the seat of a human life which is so vast that of any one of us we may say, we and ours seem to be borne on an open sea whose waves toss far as the eye can reach.

But society is far other than the elemental sea beginning before "ever the earth was," that forever swims about and infinitely beyond the spots of earth; the sea without a bound, without a mark. Human life as we see it ourselves, and as we see it described in history, in fiction, in poetry, is a life great, beautiful, tender, joyous, pathetic. It is so in the vast portions of it we term common, and it is so in the portions we term uncommon.

The word society collects into itself the meanings we attach to the family, to the state, to every human institution, and to almost all of human life. As all streams run into the ocean, so all currents of human life run into society; and as the ocean feeds the streams, so society feeds these currents. The whole strengthens each of the parts; and more, the whole is for one particular part. Society is for man. While doubtless we cannot see the whole of the office of society, we can say that society is for us. We, so far as we know, are the regnant power on this earth. We are masters of society with all its parts and forms. We are real and living; society is a form; a

form which we take, a form which we are virtually compelled to take, but nevertheless a form, not a being, not a person. But when society has bowed to its lord and master, society finds itself lord of all else, finds itself, next to man, the most glorious and important fact on earth. It is man's dwelling-place in a truer sense than is the earth. It is man's great instrumentality of comfort, enjoyment, and culture. It is to him a tree of life. It is his source of meat and drink, his place of birth and nurture, his support in infancy, maturity, and age. It helps sustain, defend, and advance him. It gives him his fullest life and most perfect individuality.

We must get no such notion as that society is mainly valuable in or for itself; as that society is the evolution of some idea or of some substance, or that it is a machine which exists for the sake of itself. The state is not an end, it is only a necessary means. The political party is not an end, the church is not an end. Each of these is only a form which contains, and is not of the things contained. We are not to mistake that which contains for the contents. But the more advanced the civilization the less powerful is the individual; the more he becomes a part of a huge machine the less direct influence has he upon what goes on. In these circumstances, the more powerful over us society becomes the more wise and careful should it be. The more forcible it is, the more active upon us, the more wise and feeling should it be toward us, the more should it look after and help us. It should fight each person's battle against a thousand opposing interests better than he could fight it himself in the most favored circumstances.

The ancient sages said, "One man is no man." Plato pointed out that man's full nature is reached only in society. Every man, if he would retain his warmth, his vigor, and would continue to grow mentally, finds it necessary to have contact with his fellow-men and with the life of the world. He must learn more, acquire new

ideas, review his old opinions, keep up with an altered state of thought and of society. "By observing such maxims," says De Tocqueville in one of his letters, "I have seen men who were ordinary in their youth become agreeable and distinguished in old age. By neglecting them I have seen eminent men fall into a torpor as heavy and unproductive as death." Every person finds society necessary to his happiness. He has found such to be his sympathy that the happiness of others is somewhat necessary to his own. He has found such to be the solidarity of society that the welfare of others is somewhat necessary to his own welfare. Only by society is he drawn out in reason, will, and sensibility. Only here does he use his faculties in all their natural directions and with all their natural strength. Only here does he get the most of his ideas, his powers of thought and feeling and expression in language; does he get the highest degree of comfort, culture, and dignity of which he is capable; does he find himself a more intelligent, a better, and a happier man.

Only by society is it possible for us to emerge from poverty to a competence, is it possible to have security of person and property, is it possible to hand down property or knowledge, skill and methods, from one generation to another. By combining, we secure certain political, industrial, and other ends with the greatest economy of time, labor, and capital. By combining, man has not only left the animal tribes far behind but he has left the rude state far behind. By combining, he has made division of labor possible, and so greatly increased the number and value of inventions; greatly perfected science, handicraft, and language; greatly increased human pleasure, and made these advantages to be ever-increasing. By combining he has discovered his possibilities, his highest mind, his deepest heart. Other things being equal, progress has been in the direct ratio of a close and constant intercourse between people, a close and constant interchange

of helps and ideas ; has been according to the disposition of a people to get valuable truths in religion, in morals, in politics, in political economy, to get valuable discoveries and inventions.

Art in Greece was stimulated by art in Cyprus and Assyria, philosophy in Greece by philosophy in Egypt, and science in Christian lands by science in Moslem lands.

The Greeks caught knowledge from Babylonia, Phœnicia, and Egypt, and culture was the result, their peculiar genius giving them their peculiar culture. The Romans in their wars and travels met with the Greeks, and continually met with them, with the result of receiving much from the Greeks in every domain of purely intellectual life. So, afterwards, various barbarians took in from the Romans something of the worth and value of culture, and forthwith, and slow or fast, set themselves to learn. They saw, they wondered, they aped, they studied and learned; they took in the outside, and more and more of the inside of Roman culture.

China has been big enough and has had variety enough to be somewhat a world in herself; and in part by her constant home intercourse she has attained to much in organization and culture, but she has suffered through want of contact with the larger world. She has suffered because geographically isolated, and because always heretofore meeting in her neighbors with her inferiors in culture. She "has lost fifteen centuries of foreign influence on her education." She has come to be satisfied with herself, with her civil polity, her science, her art, her literature, her manners and morals. She has come even to think herself the great and vastly superior nation of the earth.

In the early feudal societies of Christian Europe the barons isolated each within his own castle, ideas went slowly from one to another, and so Christianity and culture advanced slowly, partly because by private war,

by bad and insecure roads, by comparative want of commerce, families and communities were isolated.

Were society to cease among men, and those impulses to cease which lead to it, there would largely be an end of sympathy, kindness, fellow-feeling, and public opinion. There would be no great division of labor, no raising the standard of comfort, no extensive exchange of ideas, customs, and products. There would be no union against fire or water, conflagration or flood. There would be no common stock of roads, canals, buildings, works to benefit the many; no common stock of schools, of learning, science, literature, and various experience; no accumulation of these things from generation to generation. There would be no expanded idea of justice and of rights, no polish of manners, no urbanity of intercourse, no great culture, no multiplied and accumulating enjoyments.

If people wished it they could go further in this direction, they could go from contact to co-operation; could in the way of co-operation in farming, it is claimed, save in labor, time, and implements, and in house work save in labor, fuel, and utensils. But persons do not make economy their main end. They like to be alone, to be their own masters and to do things in their own way, to have what they want, to gratify their own desires, to indulge their pride or their passion or their love of independence. This is human nature. The economical arguments of Fourier in favor of co-operative farming and co-operative housekeeping fail before human nature; as do the arguments of certain economists who are for public saving in every direction. Men value other things as well as money, and to get them or to keep them are willing to lose money or the chance of making money. Nations hold their honor, their integrity, their independence, higher than their money.

SOCIETY IS PARTICULAR, LOCAL, LIMITED, AND ACTIVE.

We must remember the concrete, the things independent and objective, of which society is really composed, the particular persons, families, communities, and people. Our abstract work is but taking away from these certain qualities, and investing them with independent existence. So then, before I begin with the generalities of society, I wish to realize to myself and to the reader the real society in its particular societies, its localization, its various color, its activity, its joy and sorrow and mystery, its similarity and variety.

Society should be vivid to us even while dealing with its philosophy. Society has the picturesque, the poetic, the dramatic, the epic, the human interest. Yet in the main our thought is not with the many particulars that are of this sort, our thought is with the general, and I believe the general to be poetic, dramatic, epic, and of human interest. But, while so believing, I think we should not forget in our general study the great mass of particulars—each home, each land, with its beauties and its interests; and the more, because in studying society we have to deal so much with what is general, and therefore abstract, rather than with what is concrete, specific, and local.

To begin with, let us notice the particularity of society. The universal is always found in connection with the particular. Society is particular in its bodies. It means individual men, women, and children; means the two great divisions of men and women; means the continual departing of some; means the continual entering of others, for in the city of earth, especially if it be orderly and healthful, the streets are ever full of children. It means particular societies, occupying space and going on in time, each of which is a collection of certain people with a certain life.

Society is particular in its environment. The environment means in general the oceans out of which the continents and islands rise; means the mountain, the valley and the plain, the river and the lake; means in each spot the sky, the clouds, and the outgrowth of the soil, all boundaries and landed property, all fields and houses, all gardens and orchards, all trees and plants and flowers, all horses, cattle, and sheep. Here is a country home; about it a system of tillage and pasturage is pursued; about it are the hoes, ploughs, harrows, mowing and reaping knives, the yard with its trees and shrubbery, the garden with its corn and cabbage. About it are draught animals, cattle, sheep, pigs; fields of grass, clover, wheat, corn, barley, potatoes. As we go up and down the earth how many such country homes there are. The homes in villages and towns have also a particular environment.

Society is particular in its life. Family life is in particular families. Each of the countless homes has its house and various store of household treasure; has its circle and activity; is a complete unit, a life centre, a human congeries. Two hundred million homes exist to-day. Political life is in particular political bodies: the various independent states, in their variety of size and form; the ten thousand past and present subordinate civil communities; some of the bodies large, others mere dots of social life; some advancing in culture, others stationary, others declining. Educational life means the education of particular persons in particular countries.

Society is particular in its events. They are hard, palpable, specific facts. Our outline universal histories give a few of the very prominent ones. Our specific histories give more. Everything is real and circumscribed. There is the making of England, the rise of Russia, the rise of Prussia, the rise of the United States, the constitutional civil development of this country and that.

Thus in our generalities we must not forget the special

existence and features of persons, families, communities, and people, of industry, education, piety, and events.

Society also is local. Generally, every person is but in one place or a few places. Every family has its home, where remain or whence go out the workers, where are the meals each day and the rest at night. Every community is local, it is so far distant from this place and that; the ground even or uneven, fertile more or less, adorned or unadorned with grass and shrubs and trees; having also or not having the birds of the air, and dumb animals of the sort attached to men. Here are ever the landscape, and the sky overhead. Some people have been born here, some have moved here. Here are work and schooling and worship and visiting and children playing. As we pass over the country the scene changes, but it is ever of this sort. Through a thousand and through ten thousand localities it is of this sort. Every people has its locality, has a geographical centre and circumference. Here are the people of America, there are the French, there the Germans. We localize thus all the various people of the earth and all the ethnographic groups.

All the many events are mostly localized. They have occurred upon the continents, the islands, or the sea. The reformation occurred in the Catholic countries of Christendom. We study the civil wars of France, the civil wars of England, the civil war of the United States. We give history its geography. Thus society is local here and everywhere, and such has been society from of old.

Society also is limited. While in some things there is no limitation, as in our ability to be honest, just, and pure, still in much there is limitation. The man cannot be the woman or the woman the man. The young cannot be the old or the old the young. Certain bounds are impassable.

The body is limited. As there is the short tree and

the tall, the young animal and the full-grown, so there are the short, the tall, the growing, and the full-grown persons. There are the white, the black, the yellow races.

The mind is limited. It is constitutionally limited. It must apprehend space and time. It must apprehend cause, quality, and quantity. It must think, feel, and will within certain limits. Each particular person is limited also in his intellectual, emotional, and voluntary power; in his ability to think, to feel, to be resolute; limited to a certain constitutional sphere, beyond which he can no more go than a bird beyond his cage. Every person is constitutionally capable or incapable of certain degrees of thought and feeling. There is he of one talent and he of five, or one is quick, another slow; one cold, another ardent; one has sense and another not; one likes books and another not; one has business talent and another not.

Activity and influence are limited. They are limited by ill fortune and good fortune, by past and by present opportunities.

Yet, notwithstanding natural limitation, each person has a field of endeavor. He can serve to profit, to beauty, to honor, to blessedness. He can be for God, himself, and the world. He can be a vessel of gold of some size and shape.

The home is limited. That which is within is enclosed from all that is without; is enclosed by walls pierced by windows and doors. The Romans had a deity of the door, Janus. He had two faces, one looked within the house, the other without. The doorway marks the boundary of the home. Acquaintances entering, stop there and knock. Acquaintances going, stop there and bid good-by. That is the place whence we go out to what is foreign to us. From the door the child goes to school, the son into life, the traveller out on his journey, the sailor to weigh anchor for the voyage, the soldier for the army, every man for his work, whose results he shall bring back. Yes, our homes have boundaries. The

atmosphere within is one thing, the atmosphere without is another. Within we can appropriate, without it is hands off. Within is generally more cheer than without. Within the four sides is our home, our heart.

So a country is limited. It has its natural situation and features and characteristics of the people. It may be well suited to agriculture or it may not be. It may be well suited to foreign commerce or it may not be. Its people may have political ability and the result be apparent in the government; may have inventiveness and the result be apparent in manufactures; or they may have imagination and the result be apparent in literature and art. On the other hand, the people may lack in these qualities, and the result of that is also apparent.

Society also is active; has more or less of free, vigorous, rapid, and continuous action; has more or less of force, depth, and fulness of life; more or less of that activity, the more of which we possess, other things being equal, the higher and the nobler beings we are. Society is a city; its people are each with head erect, with eye and look, forehead, nose, and mouth, picturing the interior sensations, desires, passions, affections, and will. This world of ours is great and busy, is full of life and movement.

As numerous as the fields we pass in a long railway journey, so numerous are the homes of men! And the people are like the trees of the forest. From circumference to centre on every continent, as we go from plain to valley and mountain ridge, we meet with people, with their social acquaintance and life. There has been and is, an immense and various putting forth of life, a flowing stream of life, a movement which cannot be uttered in a word or a volume or a library.

While in much there is short life and quick death, yet always there is something and something going on. There are men, women, and children, each alive, distinct in appearance, attire, and activity. They are talk-

ing, working, resting, amusing themselves. Ever and throughout the earth "man goeth forth unto his work and to his labor until the evening." We all go in and out, providing for the daily wants of life. There is going on the work of the house, the field, the shop, the office, the school, through towns and villages, great and small, through countrysides innumerable.

With the eye of the mind we can also perceive activity of another sort. Character is making; families are making; property is making or wasting. Society is like a great manufactory, is like the world of nature. There is the incessant rapid activity of particle with particle; the incessant slow activity of mass with mass. Society is making and unmaking and making again. History is making. As the sea has been tossing from near to far away; has been giving and receiving; has been flowing with currents hot and cold; has been shone upon, rained upon, and snowed upon; has been swept over by winds for thousands of years, so has it been with society. It is the grand old life of lives, the human life of human lives; not this dumb vegetative life, not fish life nor fowl life, nor ovine or bovine or leonine life, but human life.

SOCIETY HAS JOY AND SORROW AND MYSTERY.

The pleasure of life is great; the pleasure of bodily activity, bodily rest, bodily vigor. We scarcely realize our satisfaction in refreshing food or drink or air or coolness or warmth, or in the various animate and inanimate ministrations of soothing under which the faintness and the weariness of life slip away. Then there is ever with us the new vigor and hope of the morning, and the one day of rest in seven. Every man has it to live and breathe in this pellucid aerial ocean flowing round the globe. Every man has the clear light of day. No city, no land, but is in the sunshine. We scarcely realize our

satisfaction in simple universal light, mighty and glorious, beautiful and useful. Every man can see herb and tree and bird and beast and land and running water. We take satisfaction in substance, shape, and color in nature, these bring her objects impressively and attractively before us, while our attention once arrested, the grace of her forms gives a new charm. Every person also can enjoy among men and women dignity and beauty of form and feature seen as nowhere else; can enjoy ornamental and choice attire, the pretty door-yard and the life of the street. We take satisfaction in the sight of earth and sky, in the sight of vegetable and animal and human life; satisfaction in the beat and motion and sound of the world, it is all so real, so much the opposite of nothingness.

We have also the pleasure of a means of living, of income and property, of thought and affection. We have the habitual place and occupation, the home, the Sunday, the church, the book, the paper. We have our character, our repute, our friendship and kindred. Then, as we reflect, we perceive all about us a people cheerful, orderly, and social, with a life stirring and beneficial; we perceive man and woman, each attractive to the other; we perceive little groups of persons, each person in sympathy with the others.

Our human satisfaction is greater than many think. As habit often prevents our seeing the beauty of earth and sky, so habit often prevents our perceiving the beauty and interest of this our common life. It is not false and exhausted, it is not a weariness and a misery, it is not a nullity and a vanity, it is the reality of things, and largely pleasant. There are quiet, solidity, beauty and strength and happiness, all about us. Deprive us a little of some of the many things we have, and how soon we find out our satisfaction in them, in health or neatness or order or peace.

But there is also sorrow in life. As there is a dark

side to the earth, so there is a dark side to the soul of man and to the world of man. An acknowledgment of the fact of universal evil has been common to the world at all times. Such acknowledgment is the root of the ancient religions and philosophies of India, and is the very substance of Buddhism, which teaches that because of the evil of the world we are to get rid of the world and out of it. Also in the Jewish scriptures the Book of Ecclesiastes has much to say of the trouble and folly of man, of the vanity of life. Christianity also has recognized the sorrow of the world. Jesus is often presented as a "man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," as a "brother born for adversity," and as bringing good news of help to a world dark, clashing, and craving. Much also of the deepest thought and finest feeling of Christian literature has presented the world in the same light, or rather in the same darkness.

To these views our own observation corresponds. Now and then men are caught and borne down by the destructive forces of nature, by stormy wind on sea or land, by flood or fire, or even by earthquake; so also are they caught and borne down by disease or pestilence, by vice or crime, by persecution or tyranny or war. Yet the great trouble of life is more ordinary and more prevalent. But few who live to middle life escape it.

We have the pain of life, we have the toil that is painful, the fatigue that with so many is inseparable from the evening. We have the pain of wrought will, with its tension of muscle. We have various distress, constant or occasional. We have acute sickness or chronic disease. Some stiffen with age or disease; some are called to drag lame or maimed or deaf or blind through life.

We have the fret of life. Like the swarms of insects, so is this fret of life—the fretfulness of some member of the family, the scolding or the drunkenness; some neighborhood annoyance; we get displeased, mortified, vexed, and more or less it eats like acid into some of us.

We have also the stings of life. Some are cold. We are cut or cut out by others. We are neglected, overlooked, maltreated. There is trickery or meanness. Envy, slander, and malice assail. "The poison of asps is under their tongue."

We have the disappointment of life. Labor is at times in vain; money is lost; friends fail to appreciate, understand, sympathize, or help. We have hope deferred; we break in health; we are unexpectedly called to give up our plans; we are disappointed in our enterprise, or in our children. It is pitiful to see in the face of elderly men, not dulness, but passion, dislike, and stoicism all but heroic in its resolution. How much disappointed have such persons been. And then we think of those who, bowed down, have fallen by the way.

Then there is strife. Sometimes it abounds and fills the air and comes home sorely. We have the "me as against all other mes." There is the struggle where "need is nigh," the struggle for existence, the desperate friction of individuals; the world where the two ends of the year will meet only by close calculation and hard effort; the world where every other man feels it his right to compete with us at our side, to undersell us, to get our chance, our place, our patrons. Worse than this is the tearing asunder the bonds of kindred or neighborhood or brotherhood. And still worse, the tides of men meeting tides of men in battle, the piercing and cleaving, the trembling of the struck, the falling and perishing.

Then in general there is so much going under in rights, comforts, opportunities, and happiness by the many to the few. There are the suffering from error, the suffering from wrong, the suffering from vice, the suffering from faults of character. The man himself plunges into his fault, regrets the act, suffers its consequences, and gets out in the process of kindly time, but more or less to get in again. It does seem that in certain things the Ethiopian cannot change his skin or the leopard his spots.

Thus there is so much that is unfortunate to us, and so much also that comes from a force beyond our altering.

And a great shadow is ever near us, the shadow of death. "The grim grave flesh may not flee," says an old poet. We have the first shudder when we see death passing near us. Now and then we face death for ourselves or those near to us. We have "the no of death to all requests," as Sidney Lanier says. We part with some of those we are living for, and life becomes heavy for a season. We know that we ourselves may be unexpectedly called to die. Quiet grave-yards await us however bustling we may be.

Every aged person goes home like a ship coming into port from a long voyage, bearing tokens of the weather out on that broad sea we call life.

Such is the sorrow of the world. To him that will look, it is terrible. To the seeing eye that has behind it a feeling heart this pain of things that have been and now are not, and of things that now are, is appaling. Where shall the mending of it to them come from? How give back the life to the animals innumerable, dead before their time? How undo the cruelty of the thoughtless or of the thing without thought? There are pangs of pain and sorrow that this world has never yet been without, and on all sides. During thousands of years innumerable persons have lived in what to them has been a world of ceaseless and largely unremunerative labor, a world of painful toil and poverty.

There is, further, the mystery of life, the awful, awful mystery of things. We are in a labyrinth without escape. We see our will limited. We see men often no better by the stern discipline of life. We see much blight of youth, of goodness, of talent, of genius. We see the descent of comparatively innocent natures into guilt and sin. We see a conflict between the real and the ideal, we perceive how much is vain and illusory in this world. We see this whole world of animals, all the purring ones and the

singing ones and the playful, all our pets, cease to be and pass into "everlasting forgetfulness."

At times we have a vivid and painful consciousness of tragedy, of the constant dying of many before their time, and in painful ways. Why do the living, animal or human, die before their time? Why the crashing, stunning blow, the suffocating water that takes away the life? What is taken so often in the case of animals is, we are taught, never given again. The eye has gone out in everlasting darkness. The soul of the animal is forever dead. There is more feeling, and perhaps more wisdom, than we are aware of in oriental philosophic tenderness to all life, and the teaching the possible progress upward of all life. Any way, such thought is a happy conceit. Why will people take so readily what they cannot give again, and what is so valuable to the one? Why is there so much premature death of human beings? The going out of life is sad to the person, and sad to those near to him.

Oftentimes the people at large cannot get on without terrible struggles, attended by much suffering and many deaths. Gain in government, a purer public opinion, a sounder education, a more prosperous industry, a better and happier people, come by steel and blood, by hard crushing blows on sensitive bodies and numbing blows on human heads and hearts. It is all a mystery. "Clouds and darkness are round about thy throne."

There are dark and terrible forces in this world. There are dark forces within our own souls. Deep answereth unto deep, and sometimes we say, "All thy waves and thy billows are gone over me," and what is worse, few of us are capable of making a thorough investigation of these depths of life; we cannot even master these forces in thought, we cannot understand them. We shall move to the end in the mystery. What is this ruin and restoration of the soul? What is this ruin and restoration of the world? What this evil and this good

and this struggle between them? Such is "the strangeness, the pathetic mystery of the world."

Certain thoughtful men feel all this so much that what with natural feeling, with morbid temperament, with imagination, they cannot be much blamed for being pessimists, their minds being concentrated on the dark side of life. So much impressed by this side of life have been some gifted and eloquent men, such as Schopenhauer and Hartmann, that in looking on this dark side they have imagined it was the only side and have concocted a corresponding theory. Such theories, however, seem like the poisonous miasma that arises from a putrid marsh, seem to come from either diseased or disappointed persons. The theories excite interest rather for their strangeness or for their literary form than for their philosophic value; and yet a tendency has arisen in this period of the world, as it has arisen in other periods on the part of some reflective persons, to adopt such theories, and to think that this life is not worth living.

It is natural that in so vast and intricate a thing as human life and society we should fail to understand much. It is natural that every street of the city should run out into an unknown and inaccessible country. With all our knowledge we pass sooner or later in any direction into clouds and darkness. The philosophic surrounding of life is mystery. The æsthetic surrounding is mystery. The religious surrounding of life is mystery.

Why is there so much sickness, so much suffering? We are told that it is profitable to our higher nature, and doubtless sickness and loss are. Doubtless we grow by sacrifice and pain, by a sad, solemn process. Probably the most of thinkers believe, along with any other view they may have, that the world is a training-school for character, a place for the exercise of right resolutions, desires, and feelings; is arranged chiefly to call out our moral and spiritual life.

THE SIMILARITY AND VARIETY IN SOCIETY.

Human nature has its universal and necessary elements. They appear in every individual, and this produces a sameness, that sameness which makes the human body or the human mind a fit subject for science. So society has universal and necessary elements. They appear in every society, and they produce that sameness which makes society a fit subject for science. Though the people change individual by individual, though much in society is continually wasting and being renewed, yet society lives and is much the same. Everywhere and always it has certain characteristics.

It has ever been thus. All persons eat and drink and walk; all see the sky and the earth; all hear human voices; all children cry and laugh and play; all youth step briskly along; all adults get at work. When over society shines the sun and it is day the people are active; when the night comes, activity lessens and finally subsides altogether, and all have retired to rest.

Everywhere and always society has had largely a similar substance and aspect, a similar form and characteristics; has lost the varieties of skeleton, size, color, mental or moral quality in the large portion of matter common to all. The Russians, Servians, Bohemians, and Poles are all Slaves; the Slaves, the Teutons, and the Celts are all Indo-Germans; the Indo-Germans, Mongolians, Negroes, and the rest of the human family are all human beings. Certain common features, faculties, tastes, habits, and tendencies belong to all in all places. One may travel anywhere and he will find a sufficient family likeness to himself. He will find his good-will returned with good-will, his suspicion with suspicion. Whomsoever he meets, their hearing and seeing will be his hearing and seeing, their ideas will be his, their good sense his, their reasoning his. He will find in their country as many simple and as many wise as in

his own country. He will perceive a family resemblance in feeling. They can dissemble, dislike, be conventional. They dislike being laughed at, they fall in love, they drink in prejudice. They can show their hate; they can hide their grief; they know and can respect landmarks; they know and can be loyal to their lords; they know and can fight for their liberties. "As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man."

There have been desires of getting, and of the good opinion of others; there have been counting and ornamentation, religion and government, in one part of the earth and in another, with men of one century and another, with the ancients and the moderns, with savage and with civilized men. Everywhere we meet with families, with industry, property, and contract, with communities and government, with art, morals, and religion. To an extent all these are similar in nature and function, in form and limitation. All people measurably have had similar difficulties and helps, similar enemies and friends. There is ever the heart-beat of hate and of love. When in history are we at a loss for battle ballads or love songs. Their succession is from the beginning. Moreover, men, acquainted, have tended to become alike, this in ways of eating, travelling, or communicating, in ways of dressing and taking comfort.

Like the camel trains of the desert, men in the same order pass in the same tracts of earth. Many a valley of Persia, many a plain of India, has seen its sixty, its hundred generations quite similar. And the whole earth has had its human life quite largely of a type. The great world is much like the sea about it, the broad, deep, and level sea, the permanent and unvarying sea. When we see the world spread out before us, we find throughout all its individuality of race and people, of community and person, the same humanity amid the same outlying nature. We find the same childhood, maturity, and age, the same singing and crying, the same mystery.

But society is also various as well as similar. Various in the particulars, similar in the general; various owing to surrounding and training, similar owing to human nature. We have Chinese and we have French idiosyncracies.

Variety is an excellence. The greater the variety in unity the greater the perfection. The greater the variety of parts and activities in the unity of being the more excellent the being. A stone has little variety or unity or perfection. A plant with its roots and stem, its leaves and flowers, has greater variety and in a greater unity, for it cannot be broken in two, as a stone, and still exist. An animal has greater variety than a plant, and a greater unity. A man has more variety than any mere animal; more variety of perception, of desire and affection, and yet a still greater unity.

As a city, with its streets, its dwellings, shops, and public buildings, its yards, parks, and suburbs, is complex and variegated, so is society. In the animal and vegetable world the individuals of each species seem very similar, though a close study reveals marked differences. So in the human world, along with a general similarity there is individual difference. We see it in the variety of face and figure, of personal disposition and personal ability. One has much, another little, others are even worse off. One never works, another works through life.

As there are features distinctive of each land, each piece of coast, each river and mountain range, so there is variety of buildings and cities, of government and laws, of art and literature. Each country has its peculiarities of custom, of institution, and of character. Each is working out its destiny after its own fashion. People differ in their politics, hence we have comparative politics; differ in their jurisprudence, hence we have comparative jurisprudence. People differ in modes of legislation, modes of administration, and modes of industry. Each religious faith has its peculiarities. One has a philosophical side,

as has Christianity or Brahmanism. One is simply and narrowly practical, and only answers the question, How shall I do my duty to my neighbor? Such is Confucianism. One has a pompous ritual, another a very simple one. One has deities placid and benevolent, another violent and cruel. One fills the imagination with the splendor, nobility, and joy of a heavenly world, another has but a feeble vision of a heavenly world. One has a hierarchy, another none. One has much political influence, another little. One appeals largely to the senses, another speaks mainly to the religious, moral, and intellectual nature. One, like Buddhism, has spread peaceably; another, like Mohammedanism, with fire and sword.

It is in societies as in nature, the more complex the organization the more numerous and various its powers, the more individual and different from others it becomes. Advanced societies, being very complex structures, have great differences.

Not only is there variety in society as between here and there, there is also variety as between now and then. The ever changing aspect of sky or lake or landscape well reflects the difference in life and in society between now and then. Society is perpetually dissolving and reconstructing, more in some countries and less in others. There is a constant action of new persons against those who are already on the stage, of new opinions against those which already exist; a constant revolution goes forward, for "that which is, has in itself no authority to continue." Some structures perish, new ones come to exist, others remain, but have undergone changes, while only a few—as, for instance, the family—remain unaltered.

There is a variety which is undesirable, the variety in degree of attachment to truth, beauty, and goodness. Men in different places and at different times have been very variable in this respect.

This variety is a source of pleasure. Uniformity of houses, block after block, is unpleasant. Uniformity of

form, face, and expression in a body of human beings would be unpleasant. Uniformity in work must be more or less unpleasant. The little variety of life among ruder classes of people is not pleasant to behold. De Tòcqueville says of the Russian agricultural population, "What must be those villages exactly alike, employed in exactly the same way, with minds all equally asleep?"

This variety is beautiful. Beautiful is that endless variety of human souls which comes out in literature, in art, in our families, our social life, our Christian church.

This variety is a source of advantage. The more society allows free scope for the development of every individual germ, in person or people or institution, the richer will be the harvest. The richer all the persons and all the organizations the higher will be the perfection of society. Persons and parts need to be different to meet the various wants of men.

The things that are similar are the cloth of society. The things that are different are the embroidery of that cloth.

SOCIETY HAS A GENERAL NATURE.

To sustain the thought of society as it is, is impossible for man. To perceive the life which rushes and flows in society overpowers the imagination. In our study we shall have to view things in the mass. As in nature we view as a whole and not separable into parts such substances as air, water, and iron, and in industry we speak of cotton, wool, and grain, so we must use in social science words each of which denotes a mass. We must study only the universals of society—its universal life, its universal causes, system, and way. Even then when we work at the generals and overlook the particulars we do not know society as it is. The true form of its beauty, the true height of its dignity, is still concealed from us.

There is identity in mental constitution throughout

the race, and hence more or less a universal element. This element comes out in the family and the state, in industrial and intellectual life, in morals and religion. The constitution of the human mind makes, for example, a similarity of intellectual life; makes logic, grammar, rhetoric universal sciences in themselves and universal arts in their application. The fundamental structure of Chinese and Hindoo, German and English minds being the same makes certain fundamental traits to characterize them all.

Our general study is not with the local and individual, the accidental and the transitory, but with what is essential and permanent in society; is with continuity and co-existence, organization and decay, growth and improvement, restraints and liberties; is with the forms, the institutions, and the spheres of society; is with that which constitutes society; that which is true of this and that society and of every other society; that which is part and parcel of the idea of society; that in the existence of which is the existence of society; that in the development of which is the development of society. Our main study is with elementary and constitutional matters.

We are looking as upon a wide and far landscape. We will only look at objects in their mass, and we will combine the grand features into a common whole. To leave any great part entirely out will injure; to bring in too much of it will detract. Though however far the eye reaches there are space and objects beyond, yet we will confine our thought to this circle within our sight. We will study society only in general, and where things drop from our view beneath the horizon we will look straight into infinite space.

In the study of society we do not in the first place want a complete narrative of the facts; we assume such a narration, we start from it. We do not want all the external history of leading nations, personages, institutions,

and ideas, though work must be done in this line, work of narration, verification, and discovery, work of critical investigation, yet such work properly belongs to simple history. Such work is the most that can be done at present in the earliest periods of history. What we want is to lift the mass of facts into the region of causes, consequences, relations, laws, and system, the region of ideas; is to bring history, apparently confused, into order, and to get at what is coming if possible. The tendency should be away from details to generalization, away from narrative to thought upon it. As a rule, historians have merely narrated events, and accompanied the narration by more or less of a running comment of political or moral reflection; have not acknowledged as they should a necessity for the explanation of events.

In the second place, we must get deeper than the surface. As a rule, we have heretofore had in politics only a description of kings and cabinets, of intrigues at home and negotiations abroad, of camps and campaigns. But we are no longer content in political history with battles and reigns.

In the third place, we seek to consider every historic part. We must not ignore either religious development on the one side or secular development on the other. We do not exhaust the philosophy of universal history when we have dwelt upon the periods when human welfare was best secured, though we may dwell longest upon those times and places which have exerted the deepest influence upon the world in general. There has been more of human welfare in certain sections of the earth than in other sections, and among certain families of mankind than among other families. The history of Aryan people is far brighter in this respect than the history of Mongol people, and the history of the west is brighter in this respect than that of the east. Neither is it philosophical simply to deal with the history of countries and times, only so far as those countries and times directly concern our country and times.

THE CONTINUITY OF SOCIETY: ITS EXISTENCE, NATURE, AND INFLUENCE.

When day closes and is ended, when the week has passed no more to come again, when the season is gone, we think that so everything will sooner or later pass away. But we have the permanent as well as the transient in nature. The skies ever arch over us. The earth ever extends. The lake lies in its quiet and the river runs. The great physical laws go on and ever on with their working.

So also in the society about us, and of which we are a part, we see much that is transient. We depart from a place and come again, and faces there were that are now there no more forever; the children that were there are as children now there no more forever. The young people that were there have changed. So ever about us things become old and pass away and the new takes their place; the son succeeds the father, the daughter her mother. Successors occupy the dwellings, work the farms, and pass on the highways. Time flows on and the very cemeteries grow old. When we look at it on this side our joy is saddened by the ruin of time, the inevitable progress of decay, by a sense of the transitoriness of all things.

But we have the permanent in society. Society itself is permanent. Like the human body, while ever renewing itself it still continues. As the force of nature never dies but to come to life again; as it follows every night with a day, and every winter with a summer as beautiful and glorious as ever; so the force of human life continues, as hour follows hour, day follows day, year follows year, as childhood grows into youth and youth passes into manhood. This force operates many days, and finally many years come and go, until a new people occupy the places of the old, careless as they of the past

and of the future, do the work and enjoy the pleasures of life, but none the less certain to yield to others as animated as they. There has been everywhere a perpetual line of life. Man, woman, and child ever are. School and work and temple ever exist. In the latter ages of Rome the feeling was very general among the cultivated classes that when Rome fell the world would fall. But Christendom succeeded the Roman Empire. The stream of society has been flowing for thousands of years: now certain lands teeming with population, then these lands lonely and desolate, and again life spreading over them; and some lands, like the great Chinese plain, ever populous. Society never dies. Society is a broad and rapid and never-ending river.

We see the wealth of a person or a family passing away, we see a large body of the wealth of society transitory. Every year we eat of grain, fruit, grass, and meat; we wear of wool, cotton, cloth, and leather; we burn of wood and coal. But there is also a permanent material wealth. There are farms and roads and buildings. There are canals and railroads. There are villages existing and cities built. There are museums, galleries, and libraries. There is a permanent political wealth. Many legislative and judical institutions continue long. The old German village lives in the American township. Parliamentary government abides. There have been a thousand years of growing liberty in the English-speaking people.

We have bodies in society which are permanent. Paris exists a thousand years. China remains continuous for four thousand years. A body of Roman law has existed for now fifteen hundred years, through a wider or narrower region, working itself after a season into half the existing codes of Europe, and materially modifying the rest. A body of Greek and Roman literature has stood monumental in the world, and shining as the morning and evening sun of life to generations of scholars.

A body of literature of its own kind, the Bible, remains, but it has new generations of readers.

We have forms which abide while those who use them pass away successively. The lake continues apparently through a man's long life, but the water changes every year. The state is carried on, though there is a succession of chief and subordinate magistrates. The law is administered, though there is a succession of judges. School and college life continues, though professors as well as pupils follow each other. Churches abide but the members change.

We have movements which are permanent. A certain reform movement went on in Europe through the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries with constantly accelerating force; it culminated in the 15th century in the Protestant reformation. Certain tendencies of the 17th century in Europe grew into the unbelief of the 18th century. Movements of thought and action begun in the 18th century have continued in the 19th. Understanding the 18th century movements in Europe we can much better understand the 19th century movements. It has been the movement of a thousand years and more, which has resulted in the present general character and structure of Europe and America.

Let us now pass to the influence of continuity. The kingdom of the past is immense and its power ever felt. It is felt directly and consciously. Certain characters are remembered, certain events noted. There are traditions, there is history. Every region has its remote past and its present. It has had one population, and then successors of these. While localities ordinarily remember but little of the past, still there has been a past, and in many localities a very long past, one that reaches even to a remote antiquity. This influence of the past on the present, in every department of life, deserves, and is receiving, great attention from the student of society. Man and his thoughts are no longer received

as independent units to be studied and explained mainly by themselves. They are now seen to be explained only by the aid of society and its history. Each man and his work are now studied in their organic relations with society in the present and in the past. Also society and its work are now studied in their organic relations in the present and with the past. Much of the life of society has its place in an organic development. The past course of things has done much to shape the present course of the state, the law, and the industrial economy, and even of morals and religion. One cannot in his own case cut away this past from the present; he cannot unmake his ancestry and its influence upon him, and we cannot do it in the case of society. We cannot construct society *de novo* by abstract philosophy, as in fancy Plato, Sir Thomas More, Harrington, and a score of others have done. A very large body of people who are now gone have largely made the people of to-day what they are. As that body constitutes the majority when counted, so does it constitute the more influential body when weighed.

Comte wrote: "We who live are governed by the dead." Another writer says: "There is not a single personal, social, political, or any question of the day that does not run back and root itself in the remotest antiquity of the race." We use the grains and grasses, the discoveries and inventions, the customs and laws of the ages that have gone and that we seem to have done with. As a person inherits a farm so does this generation inherit largely what it has. It has not earned it. It owes it to those who have gone before. They have left it, and we, their heirs, have entered in and taken possession. We find matters much as Israel did in Canaan: "Great and goodly cities which thou buildest not, and houses full of all good things which thou filledst not, and wells digged which thou diggest not, vineyards and olive yards and olive trees which thou plantedst not." In the language of W. E. Gladstone, "We find possessions

available for use, enjoyment, and security in language, laws, institutions, arts, and religion, in what we have and in what we are." We feel the successes and we feel the failures of our predecessors.

Much in the present of Europe is to be found in the character, structure, customs, and laws of the mediæval world, in its monarchy, its aristocracy, its priesthood, its chartered cities; is to be found even further back, and in the ideas and acquisitions of Roman, Greek, and even Oriental civilization. How much does the world to-day owe to certain decisive battles of the past! How much to the intellectual development of Greece, to the political development of Rome, to the founding of the Christian Church! How much will coming times owe to the present great activity of science!

Lieber eloquently says: "Every age has borne its part in the great struggle between good and evil, and not only has each age maintained this struggle on its own account, but whatever advantage it has been able to gain it has transmitted to its successors. The superior vantage ground on which we were born is a gift to us from our forefathers who died upon the territory they themselves had won by conquest. We reap the fruits of their labors and sacrifices." Also in addressing an American audience he exclaimed, "Who art thou, son of to-day, and where wouldst thou be had not Columbus discovered America? had not Portugal passed on? had not Ptolemy erred? had not the Chaldæans observed the stars? What would be thy liberty had not the signers of the Declaration of American Independence been of British descent, and yet familiar with ideas matured by the European? had not thy fathers dethroned the Stuarts? had not the barons extorted the Charter? had not the German tribes revived decaying Europe? What would be thy science and civilization had not the middle ages struggled and speculated, the Arabians not collected, preserved, and kindled, Rome not received,

ripened, conquered, and civilized, Etruria not pioneered and prepared? had Greece not refined and discriminated, colonized and traded, fought, sung, builded, recounted, and meditated? had Egypt not organized, invented, and husbanded, India not contemplated? . . . . Without a mother there is no son, and without a previous generation there is no present one."

The most conspicuous instance of the influence of continuity is seen perhaps in heredity. In it we have the influence of race and family, and of these as they have been affected by environment, by transmission of special characteristics, bodily, mental, and moral. From those before us we receive more or less of physical traits—color, form, and strength, grace of form and movement, power to endure or to recuperate, aptitude at woodcraft, water-craft, or handicraft, liking or disliking for various foods. Then, too, we receive a good constitution, or we receive disease and diseased appetite for opium or ardent spirits. We also receive more or less of mental traits—memory, imagination, taste, and various sensibility. So, too, we receive moral quality; we partake of the moral culture or want of culture of those before us. Somewhat they have endowed us. Somewhat they and we are of a piece. We tell "the tale of the past days." Ever that which is, bears on that which follows.

All this is, whether it be good or evil, whether it ennoble or debase. That blood tells is a fact I have often thought novelists overlook in so often giving a worthless father a most excellent daughter. Like Eneas of old leaving burning Troy with his father Anchises on his back, each of us carries his father on his back. In our genealogy we can read a history of interest to us. The genesis whence, of the person or the family or the particular race or the human race, is a matter of profound moment. Heredity does not, however, in its influence go to the extent of making us, to the extent of fatality.

To-day men are realizing as never before how much they are indebted to the labors and struggles of the past; how much in government and liberty; how much in industry; how much in religion and morals. Men are passing to a reverent appreciation of the work already done, and of its bearing upon what is doing and what remains to be done. People are getting that respect for what has been which is so indispensable to a sound state of society. Men are learning that "all the world is a wiser man than any man in the world." Yet our study of the past is not to make it an object of idolatrous veneration, is not to make it a tyrant, but is to make it help the present. And let us ever remember that we are something new in being and in power, and care not too much, either in our own personal life or in the life of society, for what was long ago or what is recent.

THE CO-EXISTENCE AND CO-OPERATION IN SOCIETY.

Society has co-existence. The facts of society are not isolated, are not independent and complete. They are related to each other, the sphere of religion to the sphere of morals, the prevalent system of religion to the prevalent system of politics, the stage of advance in one system to the stage of advance in some other system. We get on in our study of society by comparing one stage with preceding or following stages, and one state with co-existing states. No valuable work can be done unless chronological and what may be called geographical comparison are thoroughly attended to. Montesquieu's famous work on laws fails entirely here.

The several tendencies of human nature co-exist in each people and in the world at large, though the representatives of the tendencies do not always recognize or understand each other; on the contrary, they sometimes despise or fear, suspect or hate each other. The several

stages of development in these tendencies also co-exist. We have various stages of advance in religion, in intelligence, in comfort, side by side, and represented by different classes or sections of a country, or by different countries. The lower stage of advance in a people does not stop when the higher begins. Both, for awhile, go on together, though the lower goes on with abating, and the higher with increasing energy, if there be progress.

Society has co-activity or coincidence of activity. In the body there are coinciding muscular movements and coinciding sensations. So in society there are coinciding activities of great number and variety—activities social, political, material, intellectual, moral, and religious; activities of all people, all institutions, and all lands. In a perfect society there is thorough equilibrium in the activities of life, the natural and proper equilibrium.

Society has co-operation. The divine heart affects the heart on the one hand and the divine wisdom appeals to the understanding on the other. As Scripture saith, "Let thy loving kindness and thy truth continually preserve me." In a person, the heart and head co-operate in religious love and contemplation. "Blessed is the man whose delight is in the law of the Lord; in His law doth he meditate both day and night." It is good when piety unites the estranged or indifferent heart and head; then is there life and blessedness. In our life sympathy must go hand in hand with thought; in our work, our study, and our recreation, feeling and thought must both be active. In moral evil, too, the heart and the head co-operate. When a person or a body of persons falls away morally and spiritually, then, in the language of the prophet, "the whole head is sick and the whole heart faint." So likewise it is in society. Here, too, there is or should be co-operation. There is deep philosophy in the command to love thy neighbor as thyself. Barren and wretched is the single person. Put

two together and how much greater the use, the happiness, the beauty of either, that is, if they be agreed, for "how can two walk together except they be agreed?" Cut off from a person, one by one, social influences and how that person will shrink. Association has a world of meaning. So in society every person goes on with his own activity, every family with its own, and every community and every country. While moving thus alone, though side by side, there is reciprocation. The woman works in the home, the man in the field. The farmer, the carpenter, the doctor, play into each other's hands. Manufacturing helps commerce and commerce helps manufacturing. Persons and bodies of persons act together. There is a reciprocity of influence between persons and persons, bodies and bodies, forces and forces, classes and classes. There are action and reaction. This in the family, the state, and in work; this in science, in education, and in religion.

At times men have worked together to advantage on a certain line who had refused to work together on other lines. Men, divided in everything else, have been right and agreed in politics or in morals. Fixed believers in civil and ecclesiastical despotism have sometimes in religious movements worked side by side with fierce advocates of democracy; as, for instance, in the religious wars subsequent to the Reformation. Infidel and Christian worked side by side in this country for social progress in the matter of slavery. Again, on the one hand, we have men devoted to religion, and yet opposing progress in certain lines, as necessarily hostile. On the other hand, we have men devoted to philanthropy, and yet opposing the Christian religion and its ministers, as enemies of culture and progress.

We are living in a union, whether we will or no. Like the guests at a dinner, each is to do his part. Though different men of different moods and ways, all are to have a common purpose to make the hour pleasant. We are

voyaging in the same vessel. We are not only to have peace, but also helpfulness if possible.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PARTS OF SOCIETY UPON EACH OTHER.

There is thus a consensus of the social spheres, conditions, and activities. All the structural parts, all the vital processes are co-existent. As the bud expands altogether and with order, one petal rolling outward and another following, so society expands.

In the shadowy realm called science, there are sciences and sciences. They stand in their ordered array as once the tribes of Israel, some larger, some smaller, one as much a part of the whole as the other, each one subdivided into families and households and persons. The great fighting army of science is marshalled in divisions and brigades and regiments and companies, all members of one body. So it is in society. In the great city of society, a city ever populous and growing, each people has its quarter, each quarter its neighborhoods, and each neighborhood its dwellings, each in place on the ground and under the heavens. The city is one and orderly. In this playing to and fro of person and person, of community and community, of sphere and sphere, society, with its various sets of muscles all acting together, its limbs moving in conformity, goes on with a certain swing of the whole body.

Society is not so much something that is made, is not so much a mechanism as a growth; is not explained so well by a mechanical theory as by a dynamic theory. The very universe is a growing universe. Everything on earth that has life has growing life; the life must develop, it must have a history, it cannot be complete at once. In the world of nature everything starts small, and if it become large, becomes large afterward, and by taking time and going through a process. Everything that is, starts in one sense poor in powers and relations, in beauties

and utilities, and if it becomes rich does so by taking time. And so it is in society. It is not like a stone or a heap of sand piled by the drifting wind, but in part and in whole has more or less of growth. All parts of life are full of causative power, are at once effect and cause. Society in all its parts is one great cause. As in the body respiration affects circulation and circulation affects respiration, and these are in turn means and ends, so it is in society, where we must not only trace out each sphere and part by itself, but also in its connection and interweaving, for we can learn much of one part by knowing the condition of another closely allied to it.

Man influences man. Person influences person, in example, in conversation, in business competition. Persons who individually will decide so and so cannot be relied upon to decide in the same way when they come to consult and act with others. This difference is owing in part to the power over them of the opinion of the others, and in part to an excitement created by mutual contact. The coolness of individual judgment and feeling is lost. And so men manageable enough alone may become quite unmanageable when acting together. A greater heat is engendered than is the amount of heat in the individuals kept apart; a greater momentum is created than is the momentum of the individuals kept apart. Sex influences sex. The influence has been profound. A reciprocal influence has often existed between reformers and conservatives engaged in the same general movement. A reciprocal influence has often existed within a people, between distinct races which have existed within it; as between the races of Gaul and Frank in France, of Saxon and Norman in England.

Sphere influences sphere. Other spheres influence the legal sphere. The law is not and never was isolated. It is produced and corrected by all other facts whatsoever. The nature, conditions, and movements of society create and shape the substance, form, interpretation, and ad-

ministration of the law. A great body of industrial and commercial law has grown up as industry and commerce have developed. The laws protecting succession of property to designated heirs owe their creation largely to industry. Laws of property throughout have a close connection with industrial life and growth.

Other spheres influence the industrial sphere. It is closely identified in interest with what men believe and feel and do in all the other departments of life, with the whole trend of their faculties and energy. It is closely connected in character and destiny with governments, intelligence, morals, and piety. Every economic system of modern Europe owes its structure and its form to antecedents and surroundings not only industrial, but also political, legal, intellectual, moral, and religious. Men, for example, are indebted for much encouragement in their work to the general laws which protect life and property.

Other spheres influence the religious sphere. The Roman Catholic phase of the Christian religion has been influenced by opinions and institutions in society around it, by Greek and Oriental philosophy, by Roman imperialism, by the spirit and barbarism of the new races of Europe; and finally, by the great Protestant movement. A Luther produced in the opposite party an Ignatius Loyola. The reformed church in France produced Jansenism in the Roman Catholic church there. The energy and evangelical truth of the Reformation forced the Roman hierarchy to adopt measures of reform, to pay increasing regard to the growing convictions and public sentiment of Christendom. On the other hand, early Protestantism was influenced in doctrine and policy by the church out of which it came. The Protestant church has also been influenced by intellectual discussions, physical discoveries, and military history.

Then, too, there is a continual intermingling and interdependence in the same sphere, as between language

and neighboring language; or between one literature and another, as in the interaction of the English and German literatures.

There is also continual action and reaction between the stage of growth reached in one sphere and the stage of growth reached in another sphere; as between the stage of progress in intelligence and the stage of progress in political life.

Country influences country. As climbers help pull each other up, so do men. They work themselves somewhat clear of their ignorance and crudeness by a power within the mind; and also one catches from another light and power. The condition of one people affects that of an adjoining people, this in proportion to the number and power of the ties of affinity. Where there are no points of contact whatever, as once between western Europe and eastern Asia, there are no such influences. There the social states are almost independent of each other. But each stage of a people's advance is often due to some influence by another people. For instance, Assyria, Phœnicia, and Egypt contributed to the birth of architecture and sculpture in Greece; their influence is apparent enough in her earliest work. Egypt, with her comparatively high culture, influenced Judea, Phœnicia, and Greece, to say nothing of Mesopotamia. Phœnicia's business capacity, her love for trade, her industrial, commercial, and colonizing genius, enabled her, by means of the Mediterranean Sea, to carry arts and culture from Mesopotamia and Egypt to the north of Europe. The ideal, imaginative, and reflective genius of Greece has exerted a powerful influence upon modern Europe in language and philosophy, in art and literature, in oratory, history, poetry, and the drama. Roman government, imperial in form, has greatly influenced government in Europe, in church or in state, ever since. Roman law has greatly influenced law in Europe ever since. Roman thought has greatly influenced

thought in philosophy and theology in Europe ever since. Roman language has generally influenced language in Europe ever since. Culture has begotten culture, the waves of progress have widened from the nation from which they began. As the intercommunication of the world increases the influence of the people on each other will increase, of China on America, of America on China. More and more, then, will it be true that the low will drag down the high and the high will pull up the low. There will be a levelling tendency.

Civilization has influenced civilization. The old culture of Babylonia, call it Accadian, Hamite, or Turanian, influenced the Assyrian, that influenced the Iranian or Medo-Persian, that influenced the Medo-Persian, that the Roman, and that the Christian.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE WHOLE OF SOCIETY UPON EACH PART.

The general character and bearing of a man has much influence upon his action in any single case, upon his judgment in any single matter. A person is apt to believe that which his interest, his taste, his prejudices, his affections incline him to believe. As against his general make-up, embracing his habits, dispositions, opinions, and beliefs, such views and arguments as have not already kindred within have grave difficulty in getting within. They may get in to-day, but only to perish to-morrow from neglect and starvation. "Long experience has taught me," says De Tocqueville in one of his letters, "that the success of a book depends more upon the previously conceived opinions of the reader than upon those expressed by the writer." Hence the great importance of general education, of systematic influence long continued, and the comparatively feeble effect of a single address or a single effort of argument.

The general character and bearing of society has much

influence on any single person. The power of public opinion is seen in the power of those passions of our nature which appeal to it, the love of appreciation, of sympathy, or of praise. In this regard for others we have much of the pomp and show of life, much of its extra-industrial activity. Vanity appeals entirely to public opinion. Ambition often only desires its object in order to stand high with others. Men live largely in the respect and favorable regard of others. They dread being despised, hated, or disliked, or even considered fools or foolish. Sometimes they dread being hereby injuriously affected in society, in business, in prospects, or being positively maltreated, incriminated, and punished with fine, imprisonment, or death. The tendency is that if public opinion favors democracy, we do; if monarchy, we do; if orthodoxy, we are orthodox; if religious scepticism, we are sceptical. Bigotry begets bigots, while toleration begets toleration. One does not wish to appear singular. Then, too, as a rule, we do not like to reason for ourselves, and so parents, superiors, routine, tradition do our reasoning for us. Each society, small or great, makes of knowledge, beliefs, customs, laws, and institutions a matrix in which each new individual takes form. Any man would not be at all the kind of man he is if he were alone in the world, and that partly because of the influence of others upon him. The society of which one is a part has a character, a spirit, an atmosphere of feeling, thought, and habit, which exercises a decided influence upon him. The country in which we grow up tends to work on us as the lathe works on wood. France turns out Frenchmen, and China, Chinese.

The influence of the whole is apt to reach the object and form of the state. Though De Tocqueville says, "A despotic monarchy or a despotic aristocracy may retain its power for centuries against the will of its subjects, . . . the people not having found the means of ascertaining and expressing its will." Yet the active or passive

will of the people largely shapes the form of the government, the manner of the administration. This fact that every set of people has its own natural social forms, makes worthless for practical use the discussion of abstract forms of government. The United States, at its organization, took that form of government which was natural to it, that form toward which it had been both consciously and unconsciously drifting. The people make a government simply to help them express their life and carry out their ends, no matter what the position on the scale of abstract perfection.

The substantial parts of government, aside from its mere forms, can never, for any length of time, be essentially changed from what the existing state of things makes them to be. A great revolution in government, if it last, has been preceded by some other great revolution in society at large; a revolution which may have taken place imperceptibly, but has been none the less sure in coming. The first French revolution, so far as it failed, failed just in proportion to its reckless destruction of all that had previously existed, and its attempt to realize a new type of society, and one that made no allowances for the previous character and circumstances of the people.

This influence of the whole reaches the body of law. Montesquieu, in his "Spirit of Laws," in speaking of this point, says: "How the laws have a relation to manners and customs. Solon being asked if the laws he had just given to the Athenians were best, he replied, 'I have given them the best they were able to bear.' A fine expression, that ought to be perfectly understood by all legislators. When divine wisdom said to the Jews, 'I have given you precepts which are not good,' this signified that they had only a relative goodness, which is the sponge which wipes out all the difficulties in the law of Moses."

The general condition between man and his God, man

and his neighbor, man and woman, man and industry, is the staple of the civil law, and determines the character, scope, and course of that law. If society advances in certain directions, law will advance in those directions; if society advances all around, law will advance in all its round.

As modern European society has evolved in relations, rights, and duties under feudalism, under absolute monarchy, under limited monarchy, and under republicanism, the law has crystallized, established, and formally enforced these. Lawgiver, judge, and jurist have laid them down in definition, declaration, and system.

As society grows and the relations become regular and fixed between man and woman, parent and child, guardian and ward, landlord and tenant, and so on, these relations are formally recognized in law. As society evolves the law evolves. Usually rulers and lawgivers do not make the law *de novo*, they merely enact, and in a limited way shape, what already naturally has grown up and is existing. The law itself is not the root and end of the matter by any means. There is something historical behind law. There is general society and its life. Out of the condition and history of general society grow the relations, rights, and obligations of which the law takes cognizance.

Laws may advantageously be somewhat ahead of the character and condition of society, but as the laws depend for their enforcement upon the authority and power of the public body to enforce them, it is of course necessary to have the public body favor them; in other words, to have public opinion in their favor. Without the public opinion our protective laws (to shut taverns on Sunday, to close bad houses, to limit the power of corporate monopolies) are quite apt to end in failure.

McKinnon, in his "History of Civilization," substantially remarks: "Of what use in any European state in

the middle ages would have been the English Habeas Corpus act, or the English Bill of Rights of 1688, or any of the other English bulwarks of liberty? Of what use would these have been in England then? Of what use was Magna Charta to her at the time when, in 1215, it was wrested from King John by his barons? With all these given to any state in the middle ages no more liberty would have been enjoyed. A few might have been found in these days to advocate such institutions, but the people at large, as they were then, would have given them but little support. There was no general knowledge. There was an uneducated and warlike upper class of feudal barons, an extensive and degraded lower class of serfs. And I refer to a period when no middle class existed; a period before persons associated together in the towns for manufacturing or for commerce, or for improving their condition in any other manner; a period before the people of the times had become a power. In the absence of knowledge and of a middle class the full, the free administration of such laws would not have been allowed by the sovereign, or by the nobles, or by the church, or by any two or by all three of these. Security of person and property could not then be secured by mere law."

In speaking of Magna Charta this same writer remarks: "As a precedent in favor of liberty, and as an index to future generations, Magna Charta was invaluable, but it was a nullity at the time. The monarch from whom it was extorted, and his own successors on the throne, and the barons by whom it was obtained, and their descendants, did not regard it or alter their conduct toward each other, or toward the unfortunate population under their control."

This influence of the whole reaches industry. The thought, customs, traditions, and institutions of a people go to decide in part how much they shall till the ground or manufacture or trade. A military people may keep

all industry in the background. A commercial people may keep agriculture in the background. The general character, environment, and policy of a people are to be kept in mind when we are considering what system of industry they may be induced to give up or retain, or how far they will modify their way of agriculture or manufacture or trade. In other words, the general economy of a people strongly influences their industrial economy.

A wandering tribe may have a certain domain as its own as against other tribes, as the American Indians have, and as have the great pastoral tribes of the Mesopotamian desert, each tribe there having had from time immemorial its own route of travel northward with the grass. But each such tribe has no subdivision of land that reaches persons. When a tribe settles and goes into agriculture it may not then have personal property in land, the village communities in India and Russia have not done so ; or the community may have personal property in land, as has often come about. Thus the general condition tends to decide whether property be owned in common or owned by individuals.

This influence of the whole reaches to literature. Human nature, religion and morals in general, political and social life in general, affect literature. The whole life of fact and thought affects it. The life of the past and the present affects the philosophic, the historical, the imaginative thought and expression of a time. Out of all influences of climate, religion, morals, politics, social life, art and literature, and original writers, comes the literature of any land, in any period. The whole life is a tree of which literature is a branch. The race to which a people belongs affects their literature ; the treatment they have received from neighbors or conquerors or circumstance affects it. The life of the time in which it is produced affects it ; especially affects that small part of it, dramatic poetry, as is evident in the drama of Greece, and in that of England in the days of Elizabeth and in

the days of the Restoration. Says Sidney Lanier: "The common life of a time connects itself with and colors the art of the time, and most especially the music of the time."

This influence of the whole reaches our moral life. The early education which society gives us has much to do with our morals. A child brought up in a circle which upholds truth, honesty, and reverence will probably grow up to uphold them himself. A child brought up in a vicious circle will probably grow up vicious himself. Our families influence us, our business associations, our various co-workers do. If they are good we are more apt to be good, if they are bad we are more apt to be bad. If those around us are superstitious we tend to become superstitious. If they are profane, we tend to become profane. If they have bad manners, we tend to have bad manners. The environment affects the man. The bad system often turns out the bad man. The savage, the jailbird, and the despot are in part the creatures of the state of society. Doubtless many a despotic lordling has been a naturally fair man who has succumbed to his surroundings. Says the historian Gairdner: "Richard III. is not a monster, he is the outgrowth of monstrous and horrible times." The respect and the praise of the public for virtue is a power for virtue. The ill-repute of vice and crime, their general condemnation, is a power against vice and crime. Public opinion is probably of greater force than law in maintaining justice, honesty, purity, and temperance.

The influence of the whole reaches religious life. In personal religion there is often something in the general make-up of one's self and surroundings to make the sceptic or the Christian, to make the worse or the better Christian, or to give the particular views or practice. The character of the influences bearing on one's judgment or heart is an important consideration. To understand the heavens, allowance must be made for the

glass and the personal equation. In theology, theologians have often in their systems been shaped or colored by a school of theology, a school of metaphysics, a school of natural science, a school of history. So among the people at large: if, on the one hand, the people be rude then religious life will be rude. This is seen among the heathen. This is seen among Roman Catholic Christians. This is seen among Protestant Christians. If, on the other hand, the people be cultured their creed and worship will be intellectual.

Let me further evidence this wide and comprehensive influence of the whole by the influence of the times; an influence, however, more easily illustrated than defined.

The exalted intellectual and social condition of Athens in the 5th century B.C. tended to bring out the full talent and genius of the people, and Athens, once beginning to be great, in war, in statesmanship, in philosophy, in art and literature, tended to be all the greater. The development went on apace while the season lasted. For example, Socrates was but one philosopher of a number of either real or self-styled philosophers. The spirit of philosophy was in the air, and, aside from the lesser philosophers, produced in succession Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

The 11th century of Christian Europe, starting with independence and vigor, the life communicated life, until finally society delivered itself from the brigand Normans, began to consolidate, established feudalism, and built the cathedrals.

In the 16th century and a part of the 17th, in the epoch of Spain's glory in strength and skill on sea and land, in art and literature, there was something in society in general that was one of the primitive causes of parts of society being so exalted as they were. There was an elevation throughout the general social and intellectual life that helped elevate every marked man of the country; helped make Velasquez, Murillo, Zuburran, and

others of the painters; Lope de Vega, Calderon, Cervantes, and others of the poets and literary men.

The same is true when Holland, all in one epoch of renown, showed the firmness of granite rock, freed herself from Spain, fought England as her equal on the sea,—Van Tromp sweeping the Channel with a broom at the mast head,—and was free and prosperous. It was in this time that Holland produced her great painters.

The people at large often originate the changes and movements which take place. In Europe it has not generally been some one man's doing that some city is organized. Romulus did not found Rome. A few men did not enfranchise the towns of Western Europe in the middle ages. The people made Greece and Rome. The people have made England, Scotland, and the United States. The people have made much. Their power and wisdom is manifest in many states and institutions; their genius in much of art and literature; their force in much of the manufacturing and commercial enterprise of history.

The whole body of the people in any given age has an influence upon the great men of that age; is favorable, as have been the greater ages, or unfavorable, as have been the lesser ages. As a rule, the great man, in whatever line, is the inspiration of the advanced thought of his age in that line. It is usually the case that when a man excels in a certain branch he shoots up, not as a mountain from a plain on a level with the sea, but only as a mountain from some mountainous district, the whole of which is far above the sea level, and some of whose mountains approach in height that one which is celebrated. As a rule, no man excels unless the way of thinking he follows is habitual to a class of strong compeers. So was it with Demosthenes, so with Cæsar, so with Shakespeare. A crowd of dramatic poets of no mean ability were carrying English dramatic art upward, only Shakespeare led off. It was the England of Ford,

Massinger, Ben Jonson, and the England of Shakespeare. It was an England of men in harmony of spirit, of men alike in their spirit, in their imagination, in their magnificent style, in their exquisite poetic feeling, in their tender and delicate regard for woman. These and other common traits were in them all, in the whole body of the eminent men of that age and land, and more or less in the body of the people. Hence life begat life, action begat action, and the growth was as great as the native soil would allow. This until the close of the season. So the great painters who have come down to us lived in groups, and are the survivals of a great number of painters of the same times.

The times are helpful to call out the greatness that is in man. Sometimes the people get roused to a revival of religion, a reform movement, a political revolution, and the movement rouses and sustains every man of power whose genius or heart is sympathetic with it. The times made Luther rather than he the times. The Reformation was in the air, was hovering over a hundred towns, was stirring in ten thousand homes. Melancthon's parents had its spirit. There was praying and hoping and looking. Come sooner or later it would without Luther. He set the fire to the vast mass of combustible material. Martin Luther was not the author of the Reformation. It was a popular movement which bore Luther along, and the nature and purpose of which he did not always comprehend, for he more than once stood aghast at results which were but consistent and legitimate results of the movement he was leading; for instance, at the movement, and finally the insurrection, of the peasants for liberation. The Reformation was of the people, was in the matter of religion an effort, in part, to secure liberty of conscience, and so, incidentally, liberty from spiritual lords. Along with this was a lesser movement for freedom from temporal lords. This movement, with the same principles as the other, was one

which Luther did not seem to understand. The leader of the religious democracy did not become the leader of the political democracy, but remained the champion of German feudalism against not only the emperor and the pope, but also against the peasantry and the people.

Moreover, and this thought is somewhat akin to the preceding, the general state of society seems more or less to determine the forms of talent and genius that shall become conspicuous and influential in it. I do not deny that men must be born with genius before they can do the work of genius, whether in war or statesmanship, in art or literature. The surroundings do not produce the genius, any more than the ground, the sunshine, and the rain produce the seed. But the surroundings have much to do in developing the genius. It is quite probable that each age of the same country has somewhat the same amount of talent, only some ages develop more of talent than do others. And some make a kind of selection; some ages are more favorable to men who have military talent, others to those who have industrial talent, and so on. One kind of talent trying to push forward finds the way closed; it is checked in development. With another kind of talent the reverse is the case.

This influence of the whole thus reaches every part of a people. It expands or contracts original and acquired qualities and forms. Centuries of living, of growth and decay and movement in every sphere of life, do their work on the character and condition of a people. It is clear, then, that persons, that great men, that institutions and policies, that tendencies of art and of literature, that systems of morals and of religion must be studied in the light of the age in which they exist. In conclusion, let me say that this influence of the whole expresses itself, though in part, through heredity, through early education, through example, through philosophy, art, and literature, and through public opinion.

SOCIETY HAS ORGANIZATION AND HARMONY.

As matter is in system, so are men. We perceive the system of the planets. Though they are each apparently alone and at immense distance from every other, yet an organization holds and swings and guides them, though they know it not. In this system we have some likeness to human society. In the animal world we have now and then a community in which is a co-operation of numbers and a division of labor, in which are definitely adjusted arrangements and activities, a regular growth and colonization. Among the insects are societies of bees, of wasps, and of ants, with a kind of co-operation and division of labor; the division not by voluntary arrangement, but a matter of natural structure and instinct; also each class of laborers structurally adapted to its work, never able to do any other kind. Among the birds we have the rooks living by themselves in groups, excluding strangers, possessed of a certain sense of ownership, having a certain rude government and society continuing from year to year and generation to generation. Among the quadrupeds we have the beavers, dwelling in social bodies and constructing works of a size and complexity impossible except done by the united and wisely directed efforts of a number. Now while it is unsafe to speak of the amount of intelligence, forethought, and free-will displayed by these various animals, still their societies, with the various co-operative work and defence, and the giving to the weaker members of the community a better chance of survival than would otherwise be the case, have a sort of likeness to the societies of men.

But in mankind we have society as much higher than that of bees and birds and beavers as man is higher than these. Many species of animals have been transient on the earth, and have passed away. Many species

of animals are to-day on the earth. But among these by far the most conspicuous of them all is man. He is something unique, is something more worthy on the scale of worth than ever was here before these human times.

As various groups of streams make up a river system, and there is many such a system, so is it among men. Though there be confusion and disorder in the affairs of the world, and things are far from being perfect and actions from being just, even as there may be a kingdom and yet it be not rightly ordered, yet there is among men orderly and powerful society. We would soon perceive a difference were, from any cause, the organization of men in society to go apart, and men to lose that disposition and ability which they now have to hold together. Men have each his own being and destiny, but are also joined into a society which also has its own being and destiny. We have many political bodies, each with its own environment, each more or less isolated in place, in laws, in moneys, in social usages, in language, in the form and spirit of whatever literature it may have. In each of these bodies, smaller or larger, be it the early English colonies of America or be it the United States or France, there is a deeper and broader fact than that of one's own being, even that of society's being. There is a common life, a joint, spontaneous life, with various deep and subtle tendencies and relations. There are different sexes, classes, occupations. There are a religious, a political, an industrial economy, and to a degree various other economies; and all these are intermingled and interrelated.

Upon the earth, as wilderness, man has appeared to drain its marshes, to cut down its forests, to fertilize its deserts, to prune its luxuriance, to clear its river channels and its harbors, to dot it with villages and towns, to cross and recross it with ways and highways, to make its roots, grasses, grains, fruits, and flowers a hundred fold

more prolific, more excellent, and more enjoyable. But more, he has appeared to create the most complete and complicated organizations known to us; namely, the families, communities, nations, and various other combinations of men. To him we owe these organizations, with their orderly life, their history of vast, multiplied and various achievement and attainment; organizations full of struggle, full of painful growth, full of imperfection; organizations often decaying, and always far below the ideal, the marks of the wilful choice, the perversity of men all over them; yet the grandest organizations known to us. We are come to co-operative life and action, to the realm of society, to the bloom and the beauty of earth, to social culture, to the family, the community, the nation, to a vast and varied life, activity, culture, and happiness. We are come to domestic life, to social, political, and industrial life, to the life of thought in philosophy, science, art, and literature, to the life of religion. These living persons, these men, women, and children, with reason, will, and affection, are not merely created and made, are not merely of a natural and mechanical system, but they also create and make. Being put into the world they dress it and keep it; they lay it out and build upon it and beautify it and occupy it; they fill it with teeming human life. Man unites himself to those before him; he takes of their gains and their treasures; he unites himself with those coming after him by transmitting human life and wealth; he unites himself to those near him and to those far away from him. He is grouped and related and acting and acted upon and in system.

Society is one body. As light is one, though it may be decomposed into red, blue, yellow, so is society one, though it may be divided into spheres, and these subdivided. The ruby, the sapphire, the oriental emerald, and the oriental topaz, though different stones, have one and the same base; so political and social and intellectual

life and religions, though different, are but manifestations of one and the same life. The many beings make one body of people, who think and feel; who work, get weary, rest and rise and work again; who have short strife and long peaee; who have short pain and long pleasure; who change, but what of that, if the change be not for the worse? who pause not in activity of body, thought, and feeling, but what of that? to go on is to live; who pass through day and night, season and year, ever some falling out and some joining; the body thus changing in its content, but, though centuries come and go, still, as from of old, society is one—an imperfect living body.

Society is a complex body. Apart from persons it has in no instance a common substance that has organs and grows; it has no organizations in the meaning of that word as applied to a plant or animal. There is no original and continuous substance expanding and taking on form, as an acorn expands into an oak. Only in the light of a metaphysical idea does society ever resemble a physical organism. Society is a body of beings of like physical, mental, and moral nature, but each wholly distinct.

Society is a spiritual body, a body of beings masters of themselves, and so has not the absolute physical necessity, the unchanging regularity, the unalterable periodicity of nature, but is mobile. It changes form and character with much greater freedom and rapidity than nature does.

Society is a systemized body. Analogies or parallelisms exist in society, as Vico was the first to point out. These indicate the possibility of system. Again, human nature manifests itself in religious, political, and other tendencies, each of which has a natural progress, while together they are the component parts of several manifestations of one life. Here, too, is the possibility of system. System in society is further indicated by

the interrelation of sphere with sphere, of people with people.

Society is an organized body. It is hard to define and explain organization; it is hard to make an exhaustive and satisfactory analysis of it, and what makes and conditions it. Organization implies a relation of order and help among the elements and groups which go to make a whole. It implies a general contribution to one object, and a general common life with this object in view. An organization is a kind of living thing with a certain energy and aim. Now society is not a mere assemblage of persons, a dead aggregate, a vast promiscuous multitude, with their desires, affections, and passions, but a people arranged each in definite established relations with the rest. Instead of each part and element being isolated and comparatively useless to the rest, as in the particles of a heap of sand, each part and element, while having an independent energy, interacts with others in such a way as to help them, and with them to form an integral whole. The different spheres are connected parts of one whole, several manifestations of one life; and all the various parts of society, in all the complexity of forms and pursuits, make an organized and living whole. Such was the Athenian social body, such to-day is the French nation.

As every human being, body and mind, is one, as every mind, intellect, will, and sensibility is really one mind acting all together and in several ways, so every society, with its constituent, its leading, and subordinate parts, with its separate organizations, with its free agents, is in a certain sense one organization, with all that this implies.

The body has hands and feet, lungs and heart, and each, according to its place, has power and something to do; each is related to the rest, and serves in this relation. Society is a similar structure, with similar relation and service between persons, communities, sections, classes,

corporations, and institutions; each with a separate and useful function, and yet all interrelated and interserving. There are farmers, carpenters, blacksmiths, doctors. One class cultivates the soil, another makes houses for these, and so on. Each person, who, if alone, as is the beast, would be weak, and after living in society would, if left alone, be weaker than ever, is now strong with the strength of society. Each gets the assistance of all, and that assistance given in a way in which it is the greatest. For each one labors at that in which, all things considered, he can do the best. A deer, if attacked, has to bear it alone; a subject of the United States, if attacked, has sooner or later the power of all to protect one. For a wild animal to get sick is to starve, or perish by enemies, because the rest do not help. For the individual member of society to get sick is to be helped by the well, and for him to get weak is to be helped by the strong.

The inhabitants of the same village or town or city or district or country are, to an extent, bound together by community of nature, origin, environment, country, religion, and action. They are more or less conscious of this community. They more or less intercommunicate, exchange views, methods, and results of labor. They more or less protect and help each other. From first to last we have co-operation, now in the family, now in government, now in industry. In England, the butcher, the baker, the merchant, the doctor, the dentist, each is of value to England; in Russia, to Russia. The state helps morality and morality helps the state. There is universal action and reaction. All the spheres are in order and mutual helpfulness and hurtfulness. No one's course runs alone; nothing is isolated. There is a common lot which holds the healthy and the diseased, the ignorant and the intelligent, the bad and the good. Any given society is a unit, in all its variety and through all its stages; it is a living unit, maintaining the integrity

of its organization by a perpetuated energy. It is a living tree; it is "a tree planted by the rivers of water that bringeth forth his fruit in his season."

In highly organized society there are subordinate systems, each of which answers the end of an organ and accomplishes certain definite results. There is a political, an industrial, and often an educational system.

In an organization the vitality and prosperity of the parts is essential. Some persons and bodies and groups and relations are more essential to the life and welfare of society than others. But in view of this unity the continued vitality, prosperity, of all the lesser persons and parts is eminently desirable. We cannot safely neglect any persons, communities, restraints, liberties, institutions; neglect either the material or the political or the intellectual or the moral or the religious life of society. We are ever to enumerate all these interests, all these kinds and amounts of good in society, ever to consider their conservation and advancement.

Within limits, increase of organization means increase of support and contribution to every part, means expansion of outward life and of inward life. Within limits, in the union of man to man, of body of men to body of men, comes more and more society's bloom and power. With the world's degree of organization to-day the people of every land may take of the products, the inventions and discoveries, the mental acquisitions of every other. The advance of discovery, of invention, of science, is an even advance across the world. The old isolation, independence, pride, ignorance, backwardness, and poverty are disappearing before men as mutual givers and receivers. They give and receive bread and meat, truth and virtue; while also it is to be noted that they give and receive error and vice, and the pestilence as well. Yet by all getting to be bound up in the same bundle of life the world wonderfully increases its power of development.

Organized societies are similar, just as trees or animal

structures are similar. It is because of this similarity that in the study of society we can use the comparative method with something of the same success that we do in natural history; that the study of part of a society, a lost society, will help us to a knowledge of the whole; that a custom, a ceremony, a belief, an institution perceived, will sometimes flash a light much further on through the structure of the society to which it belongs. And because of this parallelism matters obscure in one society are made clear when viewed in the light of similar matters in other societies.

It is in part because of this similarity of organization that we can employ the method of deduction in social science, just as it is employed in comparative anatomy or comparative physiology. Certain facts learned lead us to infer certain other facts not before perceived. This concrete deductive method, as distinguished from the abstract deductive method of geometry, is very practicable in the comparative study of society in general, or of language, politics, law, and religion in particular.

Similarity of organization enables us, by using comparison and deduction, to obtain great results in the study, through all their course, from early to late, of language, of political institutions, of law, of manners and customs, of religions. We have as recognized branches of study comparative language, politics, law, and religion.

By the political analysis of certain kindred states of the Aryan stock Edward A. Freeman was able to write his treatise on comparative politics. So, too, there may be a comparison of certain specific institutions in one country with certain similar institutions in other countries. By a comparison of village communities, as found in India and as found in Europe, Sir Henry Maine has gained valuable political and social information. Also by a comparison of the custom and law of these different lands he has thrown light on law and equity and political economy. So, too, there may be a comparison of certain

successive stages in growth of one people in any department of life with similar stages in the growth of another people. So also there may be a comparison of two similar countries when at like stages of advancement, say in the matter of parliamentary liberty; and then we may perhaps see the one stand still, as in France centuries ago, and the other go forward, as did England.

The cohesion and unity of history are found in part in this matter of organization. The philosophy in history is found in part in this continuity and organization in the life of society. Recognizing that there are other aims in the study of history than to give its philosophy, still if this be our aim, if we would study history logically and scientifically, then a whole body of illogical and unscientific historic lectures and literature is to be relegated to that limbo whither has already gone much unscientific learning. If really organized knowledge is what is desired, we are to leave off this going over and over the historic ground in other than a scientific manner.

Let us now turn to the harmony of society. Society, as it is and has been, has not the solidarity and harmony of a crystal, beautiful in some one of the many solid geometrical forms. Society is not a single, pure, solid body. It is a body that in parts is perfect and in parts imperfect; that in part tends to the good of men and in part to the harm of men. Yet while there has been disorder and discord there has also been order and accord, and this in proportion as society has existed in its natural and ideal constitution. In perfect society the lower is kept in place, and the higher, the natural order and subordination, are maintained. And there is harmony between the parts in each of the elements of excellence, harmony on each plane. The ancients represented the Graces as daughters of Love, with a duty to clothe and adorn her. And in art the Graces are always "distinguished by a mutual intertwining of arms."

In perfect excellence there is symmetry, there is

nothing in excess, nothing defective. In a perfect society there is a beautiful and complete development of man's being and of society's being, a seeking in the lower and in the higher and in every direction what is noble and beautiful and good. The wise are noble and the eloquent brave. The just are benevolent and the benevolent just. All the qualities exist which most become men and make them agreeable.

A kind of culture may be made up mainly of the very prominent development of the religious, the civil, the industrial, or the æsthetic phase of society, but the result will be imperfect and inferior. The ecclesiastical interest, where predominant, has cramped every development of life, as in ancient Egypt and Brahmanical Hindoostan. The civil element, where carried to excess, as in many despotisms, has been so with various injurious results. Material interests, where exclusively pursued, have dwarfed and injured all civil and social, all moral and religious welfare. Man requires not merely physical comfort. The South Sea Islanders had that; well fed and housed cattle have that. This deficiency of some element of culture has been either the ruin or the stagnation of many states. In Sparta, the cultivation of bodily strength and skill was about all the education that existed, was carried forward to the absolute neglect of letters, science, and art, of all political discussion, or even of military science. The people were great gymnasts and good private soldiers, that was all. The result was that Sparta never had a great general; that all its excellent bodily training was unavailing, even against those not so well trained physically when they were led by a great general. And so one day Epaminondas with his weaker Thebans gave Sparta a fatal blow.

Man needs the thorough culture of every part. The lower is not less important than the higher to the common safety and well being, while the several high parts are all needed. In the highest work of mind, the imag-

inative, the philosophic and the moral must be combined. Says William E. Gladstone: "The sense of beauty enters into the highest philosophy, as in Plato. The highest poet must be a philosopher, accomplished, like Dante, or intuitive, like Shakespeare. But neither the one nor the other can now exist in separation from that conception of the relations between God and man, that new standard and pattern of humanity which Christianity has supplied." Only a development all around will lift up human nature and society. It is an assemblage of all his endowments which constitutes a perfect man, and an assemblage of all individual and social endowments which constitutes civilization.

We must ever remember the largeness of the true type of man and the breadth of the true type of society. The full development of human nature healed and restored is beautiful in the individual instance and grand in society. Society is an ancient city, of costly materials and marvellous beauty. A thousand objects of interest are in it. Its inhabitants, each amid surroundings which are admirable, has his own intrinsic beauty and worth. Rising above, are seen the high structures of manufacture and trade and travel; the airy structures of social pleasure or of social worship; spires and domes, towers and swinging bridges above the roofs innumerable; while out around lies the earth in a belt of lakes and hills and forests, back of which are the distant plains and dark blue mountains even of the earth before man came.

SOCIAL GROWTH.

Progress consists of growth and improvement. Let us first consider growth. By growth I mean the gradual increase of a body, animal, vegetable, or social, or even a body of thought. I mean the process of springing from a germ or root and proceeding to full size by the addition and assimilation of matter, and often with change of form.

Growth is a vital process, and is therefore connected with the vital force of the body growing, takes its life and direction from that and that only; its philosophic basis is that and that only. A process like this of growth is to be looked at as it is, is to be looked at in the light of that by which it is what it is. Now growth is what it is by virtue of life. Life is the source of all growth that is truly growth and not simply an accretion. The life-force within the body is the source of the growth of the body. That very force by which the body is, is the true force by which it is to grow. Things live and grow by virtue of their inner force of life, and not by outside dressing and outside stretching. A university lives and grows when it aims straight and solely at the true ends of a university; when information and the training of men and women is its one sacred aim; when the board of trustees, when the faculty, when the president, if it have one, live with this in view and this alone; when this spirit is the spirit that reigns, this atmosphere is the atmosphere that is breathed; when with this pulsation of life the university lives; when money is expended solely with this in view; when professors are selected and maintained solely with this in view; when the library and museums are crystallizations solely of this force. Like the hum of a great manufactory, the hum of a university should be that of study. From the top to the bottom the great sign and the great seal of the place should be study.

Social growth is not growth in the human constitution, physical, intellectual, or moral. There is no development of this sort, much less any indefinite perfectibility of the human being all around. There are not in modern times any individual instances of greater mind than in ancient times. There is increase of knowledge: philosophy, science, poetry, and politics have made progress from the origin of history to the present day. But the hydraulic works of the Nile and the Mesopotamian Val-

ley in ancient times might be favorably compared with similar works to-day in Holland, or elsewhere in Europe. The former, if they be found inferior, were, however, made without pattern, example, or experience. The sciences of arithmetic, geometry, surveying, astronomy, were created then in ancient times, and their creation, in any true sense of the word, must be a high scientific achievement. Was not Euclid as great a geometer as any since, and Archimedes the equal of any natural philosopher the world has ever seen, Aristotle of any scientist? One says: "As regards the principles and methods of thought, of human culture, the great educators of Greece, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, surpassed any the world has known. Even in the science of nature modern thought has scarcely outstripped Aristotle, to whom the eminent naturalists of our time look with reverence for the breadth and sagacity of his genius." The Roman jurists are the equal in law and the Roman rulers in administrative ability of any in their respective spheres since, Hannibal and Cæsar as yet unsurpassed in war, Moses and Pericles in statesmanship, and Moses, Zoroaster, Buddha, Confucius, and Paul in such religious thought as has had power over the human mind.

There are old languages, the Greek and the Sanscrit, intellectually as great creations as the new in copiousness, expressiveness, exactness, and harmony. In the working and compounding of metals, especially brass, the ancient Egyptians appear in some respects to have excelled the moderns. It is said that there were chariots, swords, bows and arrows of brass or bronze, which they had the art of making elastic like steel. The pyramids and temples of Egypt are of a magnitude still unsurpassed. The architecture of old Egypt manifests the highest original conception, and, taking into account circumstance and situation, is the intellectual equal of any architecture that has succeeded. Its stupendous monuments are to-day the most colossal the world has

produced, and in majestic grandeur have no rival. In the arts of writing, of sculpture, of architecture, there have since been no superiors to the ancient Greeks. A writer remarks: "In whatsoever gives subtility and splendor the Greek intellect surpasses the modern, and there is nothing surprising in the enthusiasm of scholars concerning this wonderful people. The great names of Solon, Pericles, Plato, Aristotle, Pindar, Demosthenes, Æschylus, Phidias, suggest whatever is superior in human culture and accomplishment."

Such people as the Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, and Romans had as much race-vigor as the enterprising generations of leading Christian nations to-day. Those men who with their scant facilities conquered and held mighty lands, framed and perpetuated great empires, must have been as strong as the strongest to-day.

Many an instance of such growth is revealed to us by the comparative method of research now in the hands of ethnologists, philologists, historians, and students of social and political science. According to Robert Flint, in his "Philosophy of History," "Krause has exhibited this fact of society's growth with an ingenuity, minuteness, and suggestiveness previously unknown."

Growth may include increase of quantity. The body grows thus, as also a person's knowledge. And society's knowledge grows thus; it wastes not with use, and it may increase, each new generation having a larger body of it. In a measure, good or evil traits of character grow thus, and a society may thus grow, even by births, by added households, added tribes, added provinces, and by immigration. It has been in history that families connect with families, tribes with tribes, cities with cities, and kingdoms with kingdoms.

Growth includes increase of activity. True growth in the scale of being always involves corresponding increase of activity. Being, as it passes from mineral to vegetable and from vegetable to animal, increases in activity;

and as it passes in animal from three, to four, to five senses, it increases in activity. As it passes from the limited mind, feeling, and heart of the animal to the fuller mind and feeling of man it still increases in activity, and as in man it passes from the smaller to the larger mind, or from the smaller to the larger heart, it still increases in vigor, strength, and fulness of activity. As the person increases in depth, breadth, and variety of faculty, the more ways he can face the more sympathies he has. We read of the myriad-minded Shakespeare, we read of the deep, broad, and universal sympathies of Jesus.

The world gains in the speed and range of activity, increases in volume and energy of life, as it passes from being acted upon to acting spontaneously; as it passes from the mechanical and compulsory to that which is self-originated; as it rises from plant to animal and from animal to man, and in man rises from the appetites to the passions and from the passions to the affections and reason. In all this it rises more and more in the speed and range of activity, more and more from that which is less to that which is more free, more able to go and to come in every way.

Growth is generally after a plan. Things of nature grow from a hidden germ, and after a plan which seems to exist beforehand connected with the germ. The principle of life in a kernel of wheat produces a wheat plant, and in an acorn an oak. So is it in animal life and so among men, where social institutions grow each after its kind.

There is growth in structure; this from simple to complex, from indistinctness to distinctness, from the variable to the fixed. Parts gradually disengage themselves, and in shape and composition become more numerous, decided, and unlike each other. In direct proportion to the growth in structure is the gain in dignity and good. In direct proportion to the complexity of organization is the increase in capacity for knowledge, character, and

happiness. In direct proportion as we rise through mollusk, fish, reptile, bird, beast, and man is there increase in the capacity for use, culture, and enjoyment.

In society in general, in spheres and institutions, more and more varied forms successively make their appearance, and supplement or take the place of what was before. Society has behind it a genesis and a development, be it of the political constitution, or the body of law, or the economical system, or the religious; has behind it a germ and a growth in the principles, tendencies, and institutions of any present which we may study. This doctrine of social genesis and growth will throw light upon structural division in any period of the history of society; will help us tell what are the organic and natural and perpetual divisions and forms in society and what are artificial and temporary. Fully to understand the surface of the earth Humboldt and Ritter were forced to look beneath and study the strata in their historic order. So in society the system by which Mr. Buckle, Sir John Lubbock, and others have wrought is that our civilization is normally the product of antecedent material and intellectual conditions.

In the political sphere society grows from a household to a tribe or a village, and from a union of tribes or villages to a city-state, and grows in the state into a division of the executive, legislative, and the judicial faculties of government. So also a given organ of government grows. Parliamentary government in any state has usually come slowly, from many causes different in origin and date, has been modified in various ways before being clearly established as what it is—a systematic government by the people. So certain restraints increase; theft, violence, lust, the use of certain lands or articles, being now in each case more restrained than once. So certain liberties increase, liberties of removal, of possession, of action, of thought and worship.

In the industrial sphere, society grows from a single

household or village, providing for all its wants, to a permanent division of labor, with consequent exchange; and grows in property from tribal or village to individual ownership. It comes finally to be understood that certain tribes or villages own certain tracts of land, or have the use of them; that certain persons can peaceably retain certain things which they actually use, and finally even if they should cease to use them. To-day, in this country, the ownership of a farmer in the wild berries of his farm, if he does not pick them, is hardly acknowledged. This is a survival of other days, when much more was in common than now.

Along with this division of industry and property there comes a corresponding division of law. For as industry and property grow, the law in regard to them grows and divides. As property divides and subdivides there comes in a set of rights, obligations, and relations, which, as they grow, custom and law grow to take care of, and so is created and grows that large body of law that embraces the law of intestate and testamentary succession, the law of landlords and tenants, of vendors and purchasers, of creditors and debtors, of principal and agent. These along with the development of society in all matters of which law rightfully takes cognizance, the development of law keeps up.

In the intellectual sphere, science grows and branches like a tree, while in art, music, poetry, and dancing were once as one. Theirs was a triple alliance, with each an equal part of the whole. It is on record as so in ancient Egypt, Canaan, and Greece. But first the dance went off, and then music and poetry divided. Each of these arts bears evidence of its original partnership, and doubtless retains survivals of that. Then, too, architecture, sculpture, and painting were once as one.

Thus one quality of true civilization is increasing heterogeneity. Sooner or later every sort of demand

exists, and every kind of life, every sort of ability and resource, comes into play.

Growth is from lower to higher by a series of stages, each arising out of the preceding and in a certain way passing beyond it, each succeeding stage being larger, higher, and better than the preceding. In a growing plant or animal each stage of growth, as it matures, prepares for and secures the next stage. One step leads to another, one period to another, each successive result is made productive of the next. Each grade labors for and works toward the next following. There are many like growths in society. Knowledge in religion, politics, philosophy, and science passes through alternate conditions of chaos and order, of disintegration and re-integration, of solution and re-crystallization. A system of knowledge, however perfect, gathers and incorporates new elements, thoughts, ideas, and facts. As a necessary consequence, there follows a disintegration of the system in order to its reorganization in a higher form.

As another sort of growth, all societies, as they advance, seem to present an increasing feebleness of certain powers which in an earlier stage were strong. As the order of creation is first material and then spiritual, as the body develops first the physical then the mental, so all social organizations develop first the material and ruder life, and secondly a mental and more refined life. The tendency, to make more of the body than the mind, so prominent in the ruder nations, and the warlike tendency, equally prominent, have grown feebler in Christendom, and higher elements of civilization have gradually become more prominent. In many lands aristocracy and monarchy, once so strong, are now weak, and democracy, once so weak, is now strong. The one or the few are more and more ceasing to be rulers and owners, and the people are more and more taking care of themselves.

So in the growth of character the lower feelings, forms, and principles more or less give way at times to the

higher feelings, forms, and principles. Material give way to intellectual interests, and intellectual interests give way to spiritual. And in the growth of society in character, material welfare will be secondary to intellectual, and intellectual welfare secondary to well-being in heart and soul.

Oftentimes successive stages of growth more or less co-exist, as the animal and the mental nature of man co-exist, and each is susceptible of its own gratification. So a lower and a higher kind of life are found side by side in many domains of society. Old elements remain as survivals, though perhaps with changed significance, so that we have earlier and inferior views and usages alongside of later and superior ones.

A characteristic of growth is that while destruction is often very perceptible, growth is generally imperceptible; while the former is rapid, the latter is slow; while the former is often violent, the latter is usually gentle. Destruction may receive more the attention of the superficial observer, but the cultivated, the scientific, the philosophic pay far more regard to growth. Destructive work in society is coarse and barbaric in comparison with that work which is constructive, though the attention of the world has been largely pointed in the past, in its chronicles and histories, to the work destructive rather than constructive.

Again, there is often in societies the growth of germs which were not counted much on at first, germs good or evil in their influence. We have growth of parliamentary government in England from an unnoticed addition of representatives from the cities to the House of Lords. We have the growth of slavery in the United States, in itself and in its influence out of all proportion to what was expected. We have the Latin and the Teutonic elements in the Christian church finally developing into a Latin and a Teutonic—that is, into a Catholic and a Protestant—form of Christianity. Both elements were

present in the earlier Christian ages and both developed; the one earlier in the Catholic doctrine and life, the other later in the Protestant doctrine and life; the one more on the negative side of Christianity, the other more on its positive side; and each possibly in a somewhat exaggerated form.

Finally, the growth of any particular sphere or institution or part of society is intimately connected with the condition and growth of the whole. The growth in religion or in politics or in industry is not altogether, or perhaps mainly, a special movement, impelled and directed by special forces. The political or the economic development of a people is not a distinct movement, going forward by itself and through its own particular causes. Society is never so cut up into parts, so cut asunder as this. The movement is but a phase of a more general movement, nearly, if not entirely, as wide as society. The movement will be found related to other movements, and is more or less an outcome of society in its whole character, structure, environment, history, and condition.

That natural perfection toward which natural growth tends differs with different things; "one star differeth from another star in glory. There are things terrestrial and things celestial." The tulip delights by its beauty. Of a bed of tulips standing in the sun we ask no more than that they thus stand, unless it be that they wave in the breeze. The heliotrope delights by its fragrance; we ask no more of the humble plant than that it be ever thus. The rose is both beautiful and fragrant. Wormwood, displeasing taste and smell, has a medical virtue. Each part of the body has its peculiar beauty and use. So we have each his own attractiveness, utility, and excellence. "There are diversities of gifts," and the growth of each body is toward its own particular excellence.

PROGRESS, OR GROWTH AND IMPROVEMENT COMBINED.

The roots of progress are natural need, the desire to supply that need, and the supply. The calf needs and craves and gets food and grows. The mind needs and craves and gets knowledge and grows. The human being needs and craves and gets goodness, and so not only lives in goodness, but grows. On the contrary, in the animal, certain lower wants met, he is satisfied; in certain ignorant and stupid people, their lower wants met they may be satisfied, and, though needing, are not craving knowledge, and so they remain ignorant and stupid; and certain irreligious people, not seeing with sufficient clearness reason to improve their condition, are without motive to do so, and remain irreligious.

When we need, and feel our need, and have an opportunity to satisfy that need, and improve that opportunity, then we become larger and better. And so the first beatitude is, "Blessed are the poor in spirit." Whenever men see some political or material or intellectual or moral or spiritual good which they have not, desire to have it, and try to get it, they gain on it. Thus it is that in society, through this desire to better themselves, men go from need to supply, from having little to having much. And there are ever those who have a want which will never cease, who even hear a voice calling, "Come up higher." These are the seed corn, the elect leaders of progress. With the human being there is no necessary maturity, so that it may be said of a good person, he is never so good but he can grow better. Now as it is with the good person so it is with a good society. It should never come to a standstill. It should ever grow and improve. The story of it is that it be thus flexible, thus young, thus capable of reinvigoration and advancement, by new ideas and impulses, by discoveries and inventions, by new methods, relations, or environment.

In speaking of progress in society, we are first to learn

the nature of such progress; we are to form a conception sufficiently definite and complete to enable us to know pretty well what we are talking about. The word progress, as applied to society, has had many meanings; it is vague and only semi-intelligible. The idea pre-supposes a definite object to be attained, and movement toward that object. The value of the object determines the value of the movement.

Progress is more than mere change. As time passes on we change in appearance, in feeling and opinion, in place and occupation perhaps. Our friends change; some are altered and others gone forever. These changes of time and place may or may not be accompanied by progress in character or in fortune. So with a people, change does not necessarily mean progress—change in the form of the government, in the personnel of an administration, or change in the educational system. A piece of land may be run over by the freshet of a stream successive seasons, and may be much benefited or much injured. Change, to be for the better, must reach the life, the habits, the culture, the essential features. Many a conquest, many a war, many a political agitation has been without progress. The subduing various parts of Europe, various parts of Turkey or of India, has often been without progress. The vast sweep of Genghis Khan, of Tamerlane, may or may not have been attended with progress. Says a writer about India: "This country has been subdued over and over again and dynasties established by men differing in religion, race, and political ideas, having nothing in common but the lust of conquest. Indeed, in its history there seems to have been always a movement of a certain kind; yet so far as Indian life, and Indian habits, Indian civilization, in short, are concerned, the movement has been hardly more than a ripple on the surface; the result of it all has been conquest, and not assimilation, and therefore gradual growth and change. Indian life in its essential features does not differ from

what it was when Alexander the Great declared its great river the boundary of his empire."

Nor is progress mere change though the change be for the better; as when in England or Germany the whole system of institutions, customs, rules, and opinions inherited from past generations is modified in order to make it better meet the needs of the present generation. This is but change to suit the changed circumstances, just as there is change in our clothing to suit the seasons; but this is not progress.

Progress consists in either growth or improvement, or in a combination of the two. Progress in society is the advance of men and of society toward natural perfection. Hence to understand progress we need to understand perfection.

Natural perfection consists in variety, intensity, and nobility of activity, and the highest natural perfection is the fullest possession of these qualities. Accordingly, a plant is more excellent than a mineral, an animal than a plant, a man than an animal. And of men, that man has most of natural excellence who has most of these attributes. And among men, to pass from animal feeling to rational feeling, to pass from sleeping to waking, from less thought to more thought, is to rise in dignity. There is no worth in sleep, no dignity in mere nothingness.

Natural perfection in general must be perfection of nature according to original constitution. The perfection of a plant, an animal, a person, is perfection according to kind. Natural perfection in a human being in general is his perfection in body, intellect, will, and sensibility; is his greatest possible strength, richness, variety, activity, and nobility of life; is his perfect capacity to think, feel, will, move, and act. Life, fuller life, is what we want, even life everlasting, and filled to the full.

Human perfection includes the perfection of the highest part of man, and as that is the moral and religious

part, the highest human perfection includes also moral and religious perfection.

Perfection is accompanied by happiness. Life in its activity creates happiness, and in proportion to the depth, breadth, frequency, and high character of that activity is the happiness. Naturally, the lower kind of animal life must be less happy than the higher kind, and the higher kind less happy than human life, and the lower kind of human life less happy than the higher kind. And so an animal fully happy may not be as happy as a man partially happy, and a savage fully happy not be as happy as a civilized man partially happy. A civilized man will be less happy the lower the plane of life, and only when he reaches his highest plane of life, the moral and religious, will he be the most happy. All things considered, the worthier the life the greater its desirability, even for happiness. When a man is at his fullest of bodily, mental, and spiritual life, then that pain of things which is natural to this imperfect world is reduced to the least possible degree, and the utmost possible positive happiness is realized.

Sir William Hamilton has said: "Human perfection and human happiness coincide, . . . for as on the one hand the perfection or full development of a power is in proportion to its capacity of free, vigorous, and continued action, so on the other all pleasure is the concomitant of activity, its degree being in proportion as that activity is spontaneously intense, its prolongation in proportion as that activity is spontaneously continued; whereas, pain arises either from a faculty being restrained in its spontaneous tendency to action, or from being urged to a degree or to a continuance of energy beyond the limit to which it, of itself, freely tends. Then to cultivate fully and harmoniously our various faculties is simply to enable them, by exercise, to energize longer and stronger without painful effort; that is, to afford us a larger amount of a higher quality of enjoyment."

We have had reasoned out for us by philosophers and moralists, ancient and modern, and by theologians, the perfect man, our ideal of life and duty, our standard. We have had this taught didactically by the sacred books of the world, and especially by the Bible, as in the Ten Commandments, the Book of Proverbs, and the practical portions of the Epistles. This matter, however, besides being presented in an abstract and metaphysical, or even didactic, manner, has also been presented to us in a concrete and practical manner. Certain duties have been presented to the imagination of men, as in the parable of the Good Samaritan, and in many stories of many lands. We also have the ideal of human excellence presented in ideals suited to certain countries, ages, and callings; in popular tradition, legend, and poetry among many people; thus, for example, in Homer's ideal of Achilles in war and of Ulysses in peace.

Natural perfection in a human being is also that perfection of which he is capable according to his peculiar nature, training, and circumstances, and may be a different perfection with different persons and in different times. The knight of the nineteenth century is a different man from the knight of the ninth, not in loyalty to prince and sovereign, not in defence of the weak borne down by the strong, not in faith and hope and charity, but in the form of the manifestation. A given person's perfection is, physical, mental, and moral manhood, not, however, after everybody's pattern, but after his own; is the getting out of him, with all his peculiar powers and their combinations, all that there is in him; the getting out of him the most for himself, his contemporaries, and his successors; is all that we mean by bodily, mental, moral, and religious education, but all after a unique sort.

Next, what is perfection in society? Perfection in society is the highest manifestation of each of the constitutional characteristics of society; is the highest manifes-

tation in society of the particular and the local, of similarity and variety, of continuity and co-existence, of unity and organization, of progress, of rhythm and epoch, of restraint and liberty; the highest manifestation of life—social, political, material, intellectual, moral, and religious. This is practically what we mean by the true, by the beautiful, and by the good in society, for this is the true, the beautiful, and the good in the concrete, in the reality. This is practically what we mean by the worthiest ends.

Perfection in society is practically perfection in every sphere of society—the family, the political, the material, the intellectual, the moral, and the religious. Society, being a unit, must be perfect in every part. This we are to remember when we are laboring with all our might for improvement in any one direction, as in the matter of education, or of temperance, or of the advancement of the Christian religion. The defeat of many systems and attempts whose aim was to benefit men has been the forgetting that human nature has a number of sides. We cannot put up one part of a building very far without putting up the other parts.

Perfection in society is also the due order and subordination of the spheres of life, some of which are worthier and more capable of giving blessedness than others. The life of a perfect society is a life in which each person is all he can be; a life with homes alive and loved, homes secure, peaceful, inspiring, and comforting; a life free; a life progressive; a life with forms ever suitably expressing it; a life charming by beauty; a life satisfying from a variety of sources; a life now bright with banquet and music and song and jest, now serious with care and toil and deliberation, and ever solemn with prayer and praise, with separation and death; a manly and intensely human life. The highest civilization is the nearest approach to the perfect development of each person and of his individuality, and to the perfect development of each people with its individuality.

The question which may now be considered, and at this point, is how far progress in the sense of growth coincides with progress in the sense of improvement. By the growth of society certain inperfections are removed or diminished, certain forms of wickedness come under restraint, but other forms of imperfection and wickedness equally bad come in. If the quantity and quality of imperfection and wickedness remain the same, though the forms are different, how much improvement is there in this?

Are growth and improvement theoretically one and practically one? Is growth, as defined, accompanied by improvement, and is improvement accompanied by growth? Certainly growth is always accompanied by improvement. Among many people, the natural growth in the spheres of life has been improvement, in that it has diminished the evil and increased the good; in that it has made life better, more valuable, and more happy. The natural growth of the lowest tribes is an improvement in this respect. The natural growth of ten thousand societies that have made more or less advance in the various spheres of life has been improvement in this respect. So growth includes improvement. But improvement does not always include growth. There may be improvement in circumstances where growth is not found. There may be improvement and nothing more. There may be simply the removal of practical evils found in a certain state of mental or civil growth.

Some general remarks about progress may now be made. First, in progress the lower is at times sacrificed to the higher. In the face of prudence of a lower sort we should sometimes curtail our gains, we should use up part of our vast property, venture our prospects, venture our health, venture life even; it may be to nurse a sick member of the family, or to change climate for the sake of such a member; it may be to educate children; it may be to give one's self more entirely to some high purpose.

Man exists worthily for something more than to be a prudential creature. Prudence is good, but prudence is not the highest rule in that school which says, "He that findeth his life shall lose it, and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." We are to be brotherly, to be humane, to be occasionally noble enough to deny ourselves. In the dreadful, steady economies and savings and hard and stern letting of certain natural laws work how are we to be merciful, forgiving, generous, and humane? Where is the opportunity to be noble? The sick, the lame, the deaf, the infants, the waifs will call out such qualities. In a perfect world opportunity is not given as in an imperfect. The struggle to start in business, or to get an education, may need more than cold maxims. Those who have something special in gift, and will do in that direction if possible, need sometimes more than a severe letting alone. Brotherhood must mean in heaven more than it has yet meant on earth.

Again, progress in political, social, educational, or other institutions and movements ought to be free; it ought not to be interfered with by civil, ecclesiastical, or other authority. If it be cramped, it may either cease or it may burst out like imprisoned waters. Revolutions may ensue. In nearly all the great crises of progress in English history the movement has not been arrested by force, the just demands, say for intellectual or religious or political freedom, have been granted in time to prevent revolution.

Progress can be communicated by contact: it has a curiously contagious power. The ferment extends: the leaven works. With all the great progressive races of mankind it has been that the principle of progress once beginning to work has in time developed wonderful effects. It was so in the Greek and Italian societies, and it has been so in the modern European societies; so also it is to-day in India, and somewhat throughout Asia.

In almost every instance we must allow time for prog-

ress. Arthur Helps remarks that it "takes enormous time to get anything done. We must allow, for instance, for sickness, also for unpunctuality, laziness, and disobedience of mankind." But in orderly and natural progress time is a necessity. Even Jesus himself, as one says, "travelled the long stages of the road to perfection through the years of childhood and of youth." And W. E. Gladstone says, "As by the changeless law of nature the higher gifts cannot ripen fast," so in society. We must expect progress to come like the coming day, by gentle and imperceptible degrees, and to come slowly. Alchemy slowly changed into chemistry, astrology into astronomy. There are for a long while "inducements of tendency, isolated points of contact, fragments of organization, and a hundred half-concealed forces of assimilation," before the completed system can come in science or in society. Organic society is slowly produced, slowly modified. For a thousand years has England been growing and improving; the progress has been slow.

Again, progress is not necessarily continuous. It may be accompanied by real or apparent retrogression. England has, on the whole, been becoming freer for a thousand years, but in the twelfth century Norman despotism interrupted the progress, and in the fifteenth, Parliament was less independent and liberal than in the fourteenth. The way may sometimes turn back on itself. There may come sudden and strange catastrophies of stoppage; as when a reformed man falls and then rises and goes on again; as when the enemy comes in on an advancing church like a flood, now with force, and many are driven off, and now with seduction, and many are led away. Progress goes on amid backslidings, mistakes, and disappointments.

Nor is progress always equable, an equal quantity in an equal time. The movement is apt to be undulatory, periodic; now sluggish, now active. For nine months of the year in the temperate latitudes vegetation remains

at a standstill, and only grows during the remaining three months. So in science, some genius, like Copernicus, arises and science takes a new departure. In literature, some genius, like Herder, arises and the literature of a people receives a new impulse. In industry some invention is created, like the steam-engine, and industry makes an immeasurable bound.

Nor does society follow the lines of life with equal rapidity. The battle-line is not straight. Now the civil interest is foremost, now industry, now education, now art, now a moral reform, now a religious party. This inequality must be attributed to the inequality of the causes which favor and those which hinder, an inequality in human beings and their surroundings. Each part of life has a tendency to become exclusive and predominant, but such exclusiveness is unnatural and tends to grave injury. Neither material interest and comfort nor intellectual culture nor religion should be exclusively pursued by a person or by a people. Progress means the gradual elevation of man's nature as a whole.

Further, the agents that secure the welfare of society in any of its parts are much the same. That which helps religion helps material comfort more or less. Also those agents needed for permanence and those for progress are much the same. That which helps maintain any good does, when increased in strength, help advance that good. The conservative forces and the growing and improving forces in society are much the same, only they must be stronger when used both for holding on and for progress, because we have got to do both. Many qualities that conduce to order conduce to progress, and *vice versa*. Courage, enterprise, mental activity, industry, integrity, justice, prudence, that help order and permanence help progress. While everywhere the great stimulant to progress is hope. In the political, the material, the social, the moral, the religious life despondence discourages

and hope encourages. The Gospel appeals mainly to hope.

Progress is oftentimes by the voluntary use of means, and so far is absolutely dependent on these. A man will hold that which he really earns and gets in wealth and power, but he will not get more unless he use the means. He may be careless of taking advantage of new opportunities for acquisition of various sorts, and not lose, but he will not gain. He may cease to be courteous and helpful to others and still keep the power and position he has, but he will more or less thereby cease to grow. The same is true of a corporation, a church, or of a nation.

So also progress goes on by all sorts of helps and helpers, "sometimes," as one says, "in garments of royalty and attended by princes, and sometimes in the garments of poverty and attended by peasants." On the one hand, statesmen sometimes champion it; governments take it up; it leads armies. On the other hand, it sometimes rises slowly and obscurely with this leader and that from among the common people. A deputation of peasants waits upon the emperor. A humble singer publishes his song, like the singers of the middle ages, to reform morals and religion. A poor scholar, like Wycliffe, sends the Bible abroad.

So also progress goes on with struggle, goes on with fightings and defeats and victories. We are connected with what is; by habit, by association, by sentiment, by more or less of public opinion. And so evil things are confirmed and continued. We dislike the unfamiliar; we suspect, and even resent, the new and untried. Change is danger. And so people keep the error, the old tests, the clumsy machinery and methods. Asia is full of it; Europe and America have it; this unreasoning, obstinate conservatism. We sternly try those who would rise above their level, or those who would introduce change. Men have sentiment, affection, and interest in connection

with the slavery, the despotism, the monopoly, or men do not agree on the time or manner of the change. There is sore contest when progress impairs the prerogative of the monarch, or the power of the aristocratic class, or the authority of the established system of trade, science, education, morals, or religion. The old will not part with its reputation, its position, its numbers, and pass the sceptre over to the new without trouble and a struggle.

Further, progress goes on by courage and self-forgetting. In the struggle of progress men drop out sickened, hurt, dead; men for their efforts at the time of them are treated with perfect indifference, the indifference of years; sometimes are actively "despised and rejected of men." The names of many are probably never recorded, the names of others are finally mentioned with honor; but it comes often after the grave has closed over the person. The world goes its way and reform goes its way. Tiberius Cæsar is on the throne governing the Roman world, and the most conspicuous man in it in his day. Jesus Christ, a Galilean peasant, gets crucified when he happens up to the capital of his province, crucified because a reformer. He too gets into history. The Roman great go up and down. Meanwhile, a Paul does the same. He too gets into history. The Cæsars still live when a Christian bishop, Augustine, writes for his people; and he too gets into history. But these men of progress, and that progress of the highest sort, received not the great outward honor.

The pioneers of any movement generally have peculiar obstacles to encounter. Men's opinions, habits, interests are all to be encountered crosswise. The story of the pioneers of good movements in any direction is a great one; it shows courage, fortitude, persistence, the taking of good name, of means of living, of length of days and life itself, in one's hand. The head of the column of attack is often struck very hard. With many

leaders in something new and better in politics, philosophy, science, literature, art, morality, or religion, it is first indifference, then ridicule and derision, then opposition. Thus fell in politics many a man; thus fell in science Roger Bacon and Galileo. In literature we have first the cry, "Not this man," but afterward enthusiastic admiration. One audience has left and a better informed audience has taken its place. It was so in English literature with Wordsworth, it was so with Keats. Said Coleridge, "Great artists often have to wait to create the taste by which they are appreciated."

Finally, under its present constitution there appear to be in this world, limits general and special to progress. So far as these limits are general we can study them out; so far as they are special, we must study them in each case by itself. The notion of absolute perfection, while some things are largely as they now are, is certainly chimerical.

THE INFLUENCE OF PROGRESS.

Progress helps progress. Take progress in industry. Labor creates a habit of labor. That amount of progress which we have made with a savage or an emancipated slave or a young person by getting him at work tends in itself to create that greater amount of progress, the habit of work. All people need long enough training in hard and regular work to form the habit of industry and to learn to use the implements with which to earn an honest living and secure a comfortable home. The habit of industry formed in a society we have the foundation for all personal and social culture. "Work," as one says, "breaks up that great and terrible habit of indolence which all savage men possess, the habit of lazy lounging. Labor starts into more rapid action the sluggish blood of the people who take no note of time."

Says Chaplain Pierce, in his "Half Century of Juvenile

Crime," in writing about the street boys sent to the New York House of Refuge: "Almost without exception the best boys, so called, and the worst that are sent to the Refuge are lazy. They have lived truant, vagrant, and vicious lives. They hate work . . . they are sluggish in school and unable to render proper attention to moral instruction. The shop with its carefully adjusted stints, with its delicate labors, requiring constant and absorbing attention, with its daily recurring duties, always demanding faithfulness, has an amazing power over their minds. . . . The first work with a child of feeble mind is to catch and hold the attention, when this is done the rest of the work is comparatively easy. The well-organized shops never fail in this, and for this reason the boy is strangely transformed by its power. He grows into a habit of labor. It becomes a sort of necessity to him. He finds that workmen in the business he is learning are receiving from twelve to twenty dollars a week. It awakens his ambition, and the great defence against stealing, the ability to command a moderate salary by labor, is thrown around him. How many boys, sons of lawyers, of ministers, of tender mothers, who have been living loafing and criminal lives have borne testimony to the reforming power of this constant hard work. It was their first introduction to honest labor."

Again, labor creates capital. It is only by doing *some* work that we can get that capital by the aid of which we can go forward and do *more* work. Labor provides means for new industrial enterprises, mining, manufacturing, or commercial, when needed; it furnishes means for schools and universities, means for art, science, and learning, means for benevolence and religion. We labor, and in taxes we pay a part of our labor for the support of the various institutions and activity of government proper. We labor, and we pay a part of the proceeds for the support of that education which government takes care of. We labor, and a part of it goes to the

blind, the deaf, and the poor that government takes care of. We labor, and a part goes to the support of the institutions of religion, of which in some lands the government takes charge and in others not.

Movement forward in some cases accelerates. Many favorable influences once at work help each other. So a man's reputation grows; so his influence grows. The ball once rolling and skilfully managed will roll faster and with more momentum. "To him that hath shall be given, and he shall have more abundantly." The capital increases more rapidly the bigger it gets, until it reaches its ultimate limit in the nature of things. When science and art, literature, morals, and piety, shall be at work with combined and earnest attention to overturn every power of iniquity, to make improvements, political and material, moral and religious, then each improvement will make every other easier; the material will help the intellectual, and both will help the moral; then will there be a momentum gained that will increase the power and speed of good.

Furthermore, progress helps progress by the inspiration of hope. The very idea of regaining lost property or lost health or lost youth and brightness enlivens and renovates. As the spring, or the song of the poet is inspiring to the lover of the beautiful, as prophecy and divine promise are inspiring to the Christian, so is progress inspiring to the worker for progress. It is the inspiration of hope, and no man is above this inspiration. It is natural and it is happiness to live on hope. We read of Jesus, "who for the hope which was set before him endured the cross, despising the shame."

Progress has disadvantage. One disadvantage occurs at its beginning, and that is the searching strain of the whole body in overcoming the inertia and commencing the momentum. This is apparent in a loaded wagon or in a train of cars. It is sometimes apparent in the beginning of a day's work of physical labor. It is notice-

able in the beginning of a new calling or of a new course of life; habits are not formed, the powers are green, untried, and unskilled. Similar is the case in the transition of a people from long inertia to an active political or industrial life. The Oriental is soon to prove how far he has the capacity to bear such a strain.

Another disadvantage of progress is the conflict it creates, the hostility and opposition it excites. In the very nature of things a conflict seems incident to progress. The conflict is with conservatism, and this conflict has never ceased to agitate the world. Conservatism, even unreasoning conservatism, is good, otherwise necessary institutions and the whole framework of society might be pulled to pieces. But still, if society would prosper and the people prosper, improved character and condition must be accompanied by improved institutions. Yet it is always the case that institutions and interests which have had power in society have sought to remain unchanged. So it has been with mediæval Catholicism. Protestantism had to go through the Thirty Years' War in order to secure itself existence and toleration. The momentous question of the right to private judgment by a goodly portion of Europe was only decided by the same conflict. So it has been with mediæval feudalism, so it has been with absolute monarchy. They have struggled to hold on to a power which has been slipping from their grasp.

Still another disadvantage of progress is in that changes which result in greater good are accompanied by inevitable inconvenience to some, and oftentimes positive injury. There are extensive changes wrought by the introduction of some new agent, and these changes are, as far as possible, to be understood and provided for, and not to be vainly fought against. The gain to the many through a new route or a new means of travel, through a new invention or a new kind of machinery, is accompanied by more or less loss to some. Such a dis-

turbing element was the introduction of the magnetic needle, with the result that ships now went safely far from shore; that Africa was sailed around; that a western continent was discovered; that trade passed from the land to the ocean; that countries on the old lines correspondingly declined and those on the new lines correspondingly prospered. The centres of commerce passed from the shores of the Mediterranean to the European coasts of the Atlantic. Genoa, Venice, and other states went down. Portugal and Spain first, and afterward Holland and England, began to come up. There was also an absolute increase of commercial activity, which resulted in an increase of manufacturing activity, which in turn still more increased the commercial activity by manufactures being compelled to seek new markets in various parts of the world.

The introduction of gunpowder, by destroying the great preponderance in battle of the mounted nobles and knights and increasing the value of plain footmen, diminished the importance of nobles and increased the importance of footmen. The introduction of gunpowder greatly extended the influence of the sovereign, and afterward by another operation transferred a large share of this influence to the mercantile and moneyed class. While, also, guns and artillery made wars more expensive, and so more money had to be raised, and the commercial and manufacturing classes grew in importance in proportion as their aid became necessary. The application of steam to machinery has greatly multiplied machines and manufactories; has called large masses of people out of the country into manufacturing towns and districts; has created a pressure of population in certain places, where no provision has been made for it; has resulted in overcrowding, in physical disease and moral corruption; and so has compelled more attention to lodging and sewerage, to drainage, ventilation, and the supply of water. Manufacture, developing with force and

rapidity, has gravely disturbed preceding institutions and conditions, and created a good deal of suffering.

Yet another disadvantage of progress, at least as progress appears to us to-day, is the danger of getting back to superficiality again, only by another road, and to a superficiality which tends to be proud and pretentious. The many things taken into the mind, the many things undertaken by the mind, the constant occupation with many exteriors,—of men, of houses, of places, of books, of science and literature and art,—the sending of life so much to the surface, leads on to superficiality in the rich man, in the prominent man, and in the many men. Must we not have an adequate number of still hours, days, periods? Does not nature have it, and does not nature demand it of us if we will do our best?

The diffusion of knowledge is not a good unmixed. It brings and keeps before us the business, the discovery, the science, the art, the literature, the amusement of the world; it keeps in our presence the whole. The mind dissipates and revels; it gorges and gets drunk at the intellectual feast; it goes on and on, as in some world's fair, scattering attention on a thousand things, reading day after day only the voluminous and varied and world-wide newspaper with its magnificent *mélange*. Such food forever must affect the fibre of the mind.

We have in the progress of civilization to-day a great abuse of publicity. There is a useful exposure of many evils, which need but to be known to be removed or mitigated—evils of war, or attendant upon it, evils of the prison or the asylum, of intemperance or of fraud. But there is, also, a more or less unnecessary exposure of private pecuniary difficulty, of private opinions and doings, often with great real or imaginative detail. There is an increase of the appetite to publish and to read such. This greediness of novelty, of sensation, is unwholesome in itself and painful to many innocent victims.

Then, too, the increase in the rapidity and strain of

life tends by a natural law of acceleration to feverishness, and to have a feverish life politically, industrially, socially, or religiously cannot be healthy or good or wise; it gives a taint to what is, and it tends to break down the more frail, the more ill-balanced persons. A too intense life gives that nervous tension to the body which sometimes leads one to chew tobacco, smoke, drink, or take opium; sometimes leads one out of his bearings and straight to bodily and other destruction. One loses mental balance; his conversation gets intense, he uses awful words freely, he likes the intense in style, speaker and hearer, writer and reader. There may be such a thing as an activity that tends to hiding of the truth, to breach of trust, to the taking another's life, to the playing rashly with one's own—a morbid, eager life, that tends to break down the barriers of prudence, of decency, of morality, and is sometimes fraudulent, knavish, ruffian.

The diffusion of culture and refinement seems also to be attended with a practical loss, wilful or physiological, of power to propagate the species, with a dying out of the species cultivated; this, while an inferior class seems as productive as ever. A very natural and good way to preserve and extend what we value is through our own families. Very desirable is it to have in twenty years a great increase of the highly intelligent, the highly moral and pious; desirable is it in any community, in any church. Large families would accomplish this. A thousand times is it apparent that a good local church or a denomination of good Christians, or a body of genuine reformers, might within twenty or thirty years very largely increase its influence, its power for good, through a merely natural growth out of the family. Yet as we look around we see how often this is far from being the case. The matter looked at from this point of view is a very serious one, whatever be the cause of it. If through any cause the best of us, the best portion of the people, fail to have families, and even large ones, the matter is a very serious

one. In the strong supports of religious faith let the pain of maternity be faced. The old Jewish honor of the large family and the old dishonor in the barren couple should return.

Another obstacle to the advancement of society is the tendency in civilized societies to multiply the race from inferior specimens. The principle of the survival of the fittest seems to fail the more humane we become, and this will, to an extent, delay and menace the attainment of our ideal condition. Civilization respects life, and we save every life we can. All men survive now, the weak as well as the strong, and survive to propagate their kind. The diseased, the enfeebled, the unintelligent propagate an offspring of like character, and civilization nurses the same. The natural checks existing in animal life to the reproduction of the weak, the diseased, and the less intelligent are removed.

Another historic evil in the progress of people is the tendency of the abler and the stronger, the more advanced, and the favored people, to either govern or fight or work or push the inferior people out of existence. Almost everywhere the touch of a civilized people is decay to a savage people; sometimes through constant violence and conflict, sometimes through enslavement, sometimes through disease or vice brought in, sometimes through being crowded for room, sometimes by new and unsuitable habits, and sometimes by a mysterious blight from the mere presence and crowding of a superior race. We have seen it in the Indians of the West Indies, in the Indians of North America, in the South-Sea Islanders, the Australians, and the New Zealanders. The Negro alone holds his own and flourishes, the sole exception.

An evil seemingly connected with modern progress is the growth of large cities in number and size to the grave loss of brute and man. The pavements wear the horses out; there are foul air, foul smells, and deficient light; there is increased danger of bad water and unwholesome

food; there are the sounds—the cries and the outcries, the bells, the rattle and the roar; there is the jar; there is the difficulty of getting a walk or drive in the country; there is the great distance that often separates home from work and man from the men whom he wishes to see.

These are evils of civilization, evils that concern the daily life of multitudes. These are disadvantages arising out of the very progress of man. Some way must be found for improving upon this state of things. All such facts must have all the thought given to them that social science can bestow. We shall have to learn how to meet the internal resistances, how to meet the obstacles which are created by the very progress.

THE PREVALENCE AND NATURE OF WICKEDNESS.

It is a fact unparalleled in the history of any other creature of earth, that man more or less refuses obedience to certain of his own instincts, namely, those that are moral and religious. He oftentimes likes neither and follows neither, though he suffer therefor. To the student of being there is something very peculiar in this, for we know that throughout the realm of life the instincts are, in general, followed as leading on to satisfaction and welfare. There is in this, corrupt nature and practice, whatever be the cause. Inscrutable mystery as it is, a wicked disposition and will are at work; they form the dark background of each life, they are a great fact in human nature, society, and history. Going into the animal world we see that which we should call sin if animals were intelligent and moral; we see indifference to suffering, positive cruelty, and utter selfishness. Any farmer will notice this among the stock of his barn-yard. Coming into the human world, so far back as we can go by every avenue open to us, we find the same great fact, the strain ever in the blood.

Conscience attests our own lesser or greater wrongful-

ness, and observation that of those about us. One sees a wide prevalence of ordinary wrong, together with a prevalence of crime and vice. There is no land or portion of a land where human nature is exempt from unrighteousness. History is full of struggles with wickedness in the different spheres of life. Justice has had to fight injustice; tolerance, intolerance; humanity, inhumanity; the governed have had to struggle for the privilege of taking part in the government. Religions of personal preference have been at strife with state religions. Civil liberty has been at conflict with civil tyranny, and all because of sin and wrong. Ever is the kingdom of the saints called to make war, now with some government, now with some false religion, now with some infidelity, and now with some heresy—long, wearisome struggles, all. It is ever Jerusalem and Babylon in the typical language of Scripture; ever the Christian and the anti-Christian spirit.

Heathen literature alludes to sin as a universal fact. The Greeks and Romans, with one consent, believed that in their time a general degeneracy of the human race was in progress, a more or less hopeless deterioration in character and condition; that men were growing worse and the various people of the earth were becoming feebler.

Certain characteristics of wickedness are to be especially noted. One is that wickedness has life; that bad character is living character, is real, actual, positive. It has come into existence and lives and breathes. Where it appears it is as much in being as the pestilence. Moral corruption is as true and real as is physical corruption.

Again, wickedness has variety. We have the various crimes; we have theft, murder, suicide, assault, adultery, abuse of children, and all the long list on the statute books. We have the various vices—intemperance, gambling, licentiousness. We have the relations of life affected—the parental, the filial, the conjugal, the social,

the business, the political relation. We have multiplied varieties of selfishness, injustice, unbrotherliness, and inhumanity.

Further, wickedness has continuity, has a tendency not to die out, but to perpetuate itself. Wicked character tends to become fixed and permanent character. That which gets a footing tends to hold on. Meanness, once in a man, tends to stay in. The self-indulgent tend to remain self-indulgent. Reason and conscience once thoroughly broken down tend to keep down. Unwillingness to do right becomes inability to do right. It is hard to restore the vigor to a stiff clay soil whose constitution has been thoroughly broken down by hard usage. A fair moral nature once defaced and deformed is like a flower thrown into and trampled in the mire. Bad habit and disposition once created tend to remain in existence. In some cases there is a very tyranny exercised by them upon the soul, as in the debased appetite for opium or for strong drink.

This continuity of wickedness is seen in certain social bodies, classes, and movements, which, after having become more wicked than good, more harmful than helpful, have still lived and thrived. Wrong-doing, whether by persons or families, by corporations, classes, or a whole people, has sometimes a long vitality, sad as the fact is; has continued on and on with strength to work as an obstacle to all sorts of progress, and to be a creator of all sorts of direct mischief and misery, carrying persons and people far from righteousness, prosperity, and happiness.

Again, wickedness grows. It grows in itself and directly. The illiberal become mean. The unfair become false. The crooked become knavish. Impropriety becomes laxity, and laxity pollution. Wickedness grows in itself numerically. It does so in a straight line. Lying repeats itself. Dishonesty repeats itself. As all the pests of our vineyards and orchards, our grass and

grain fields, increase and multiply, so it is naturally with the plants and pests of moral corruption. Wickedness also grows in itself numerically by branching off. Badness is capable of reproduction, one infirmity begets another. Feebleness here becomes after awhile feebleness there. Misconduct here leads to misconduct there; the vulgar become profane, the intemperate impure. The human being may go on sophisticating his reason, impairing his judgment, silencing his conscience; making his doom in this direction, with all that this implies.

Wickedness increases also by spreading from person to person. This in the natural descent and increase of families; this also by contagion, as a disease, wickedness in one stimulating wickedness in another; this also by various other influence which one person has over another. Vicious persons, classes, and communities tend to go deeper into corruption. Immoral states and actions tend to continue and grow and spread; tend to take the people as the swine were taken, downward into the sea.

Says John Stuart Mill, in his "Essay on Nature": "The general tendency of evil is towards further evil. Bodily illness renders the body more susceptible of disease; it produces incapacity of exertion, sometimes debility of mind, and often the loss of means of subsistence. All severe pain, either bodily or mental, tends to increase the susceptibilities of pain forever after. Poverty is the parent of a thousand mental and moral evils. What is still worse, to be injured or oppressed, when habitual, lowers the whole tone of the character. One bad action leads to others, both in the agent himself, in the bystanders, and in the sufferers. All bad qualities are strengthened by habit, and all vices and follies tend to spread. Intellectual defects generate moral, and moral intellectual; every intellectual or moral defect generates others, and so without end."

Further, much of this wickedness is wilful. A person

may consent to neglect his opportunities, to waste his gifts, may consent to be and do wrong, may allow himself to become neglectful or fraudulent or intemperate or dishonest. A person may choose to work against the good that is born in him, or that has been instilled into him, or that is in his family or his circle or his surroundings.

There is a blundering into wickedness, a drifting into it and a falling into it; a getting mixed up with it, a general indulgence of it that has ceased to annoy the participator, has ceased to be felt, or perhaps even perceived. In many cases there is a falling away from one's own standard of virtue and piety, not to say how often this standard is below what it should be. In many cases, in this or in that, the person has become morally or religiously feeble, he has been overcome by bad influences from without, bad opinions encountered, bad examples met, bad persuasion used; or he has been overcome by bad influences from within, bad appetite, bad disposition, bad desire.

Wickedness is also at certain times deliberate. We must recognize in the world a good deal of refusal to quit a course that conscience condemns, a good deal of deliberate continuance in a way that is known to be wrong. Men have allowed the vision of God to become dim. Men have allowed themselves to be untrue, dishonest, impure, intemperate, spiteful, ugly, mean, careless of good. Men have so allowed themselves in the face of argument, expostulation, and warning. Wickedness has not been a matter merely created and shaped by ancestry, education, and environment. Every mature person must be conscious of more or less deliberate permission of sin in himself, and must have observed more or less of it in others. Often a person makes no decided effort to overcome penuriousness or fretfulness or censoriousness or quick temper. How many have been allowing this demoralization of head and heart, have

been neglecting the very foundations of their worth and happiness. So far is there self-will in this matter.

So prevalent and persistent have been wickedness, trouble, and sorrow in this world that certain despondent and despairing persons, of whom mention has been already made, have adopted a philosophic theory that things are ever tending downward. They see so much of the prevalence of evil in the sorrow already spoken of, and in sin; so much cheating, fraud, and plundering; so much vice and crime, fault and superstition; so much moral and religious insensibility; so much partial and so much utter thoughtlessness as to justice or brotherhood or humanity. But people at large can never be made to take any such view; their testimony largely is, that the world is far from being miserable, from being where it were better not to be. Experience and observation show that positive happiness has been and is attainable here; and religion teaches that happiness, if not attainable here, may be hereafter, as the result of certain conditions fulfilled here. Even if life seem more dark than bright, more sad than joyous, it is believed by many to be a discipline for a future life to those who will. It is quite possible that the sum of human life throughout the duration of the human species yields a large balance of happiness, and even of natural goodness.

THE INFLUENCE OF MAN'S WICKEDNESS UPON SOCIETY.

The life of society, when seen with the eye of the imagination, is beautiful and grand. The every-day widespread life of humanity, for the most part humble and plain, is far from common-place, but is deeply spiritual, is real and satisfying. It is radiant and fresh as the morning, this world of men. A light and air, ideal and celestial, are in it. As far as human observation goes, earthly society, in its spirit, structure, and life, shows the highest wisdom known, the idea and its partial execution

being grander, more beautiful and interesting than in any other work perceived by us. But the highest problems of existence are not here solved as yet, the most worthy aims are not here realized as yet. On the scale of progress we have not got to the farthest we know of.

How do we account for culture and growth and improvement arrested? Why have India and China ossified? How do we account for the fact that men have gone far on the path of progress and turned back? And so we say of the civilization of Egypt or Babylonia or Assyria or Persia or Greece or Rome, it is dead.

The great difficulty in the way of attaining the social ideal is human imperfection, and the most prominent form of this imperfection is wickedness. Men are easily selfish, intemperate, untruthful, dishonest, unjust; at least are too easily so. There are so many persons each with his own intense personality and desire, each with his appetites, passions, opinions, and personal interests; so many little groups each to seek its own; that the danger is grave, that each will come into opposition, even into collision with others; that there will be, not co-operation, but war. Such has been the case in ten thousand instances. Our world has been a world of rivalry and jealousies, of bickerings, animosities, and strifes, of selfish war of every sort and carried out to every degree—sects at war under the same religion, sections at war under the same government, corporations at war under the same laws. Rival steamboat lines, rival railway lines, rival corporations of other sort cut each other's throat without mercy. Business rivals in the same place sometimes cut under one another in the same way, and so I might go on.

The general failure in man's character has worked a general failure in his permanent progress in character and condition. This tendency to indulge self at the expense of others has worked as a great dynamic force, has wrought mischief unutterable throughout society and the world. It has acted as no other force against the natural

order and progress of society. Were it not for the disturbance, the stoppage, the injury thus wrought, social science would be like any of the natural sciences; would be the study of individuals and species largely perfect; would be the study of an order beautiful in germ and unfolding. Were it not for wickedness, social science would be no more than the study of natural and easy processes of development; would be a sort of descriptive, social physiology with its interest and value. But while all this has yet its place, it is made secondary to the study of a disease which has afflicted the social body, and to a study of the remedy for this disease of wickedness. Much attention must be given here if we are practical in our study, if we would improve man's social condition and destiny. We have reason to believe that, figuratively speaking, there should be such a study as social pathology, a study of disease in the social man. To attempt to tell how society may have permanent life, health, and growth, without attending to any serious disease which may exist, is quackery, conscious or unconscious. The truly scientific spirit should lead us to give heed to such disease, to ask what influence it exerts, and, if the influence be injury, and only injury continually, how it can be got rid of.

Wickedness in the person, in the family, in the state, in society at large, is a fact that social and historic philosophers should attend to. But the most of such philosophers have greatly underestimated this difficulty. It is a great mistake and defect of most of the men who have produced books on social science,—Comte, Fourier, J. S. Mill, Spencer, and others,—their general ignoring the reality and depth of wickedness. They have treated the matter superficially. Comte thought that physiological knowledge would enable us to overcome sin; at least, that the social feeling, wisely enlightened, would enable man to overcome and outgrow his selfishness. Herbert Spencer speaks of a spontaneous evanescence of evil, as

though it would exhale away. One full of the idea of a natural and necessary evolution of the universe as of one being or thing has a strong temptation to regard wickedness only as imperfection, or as a necessary stage of progress.

The deepest poets have never painted human nature as perfectible in itself. The best men of affairs have never held any such opinion. Ordinary observers do not have any such view. Whatever else may be perfectible by virtue of power inherent in itself, human nature is not, and all attempts to work out politics and society from such a point of view have been failures. So far as the reconstruction of the state and of society by the French in the first revolution was such an attempt it was a failure. So far as the various social efforts to frame communities have been on such a platform they have been failures—the phalansteries of Fourierism, the communities of Icarianism, and all that class. The attempt to make society without allowing for a weak moral and spiritual condition in man has been like at attempt to build of brick without mortar. Human nature is poor and imperfect, apparently diseased and distempered, and all without apparent possibility of help within itself. A thousand means of help have been tried, many of them excellent, yet human nature has continued sinful.

Wickedness has shown itself in a bad influence upon morals, and this is but saying that men are immoral. Who can picture the growing corruption of the fair souls of children, the paltering with wrong-being and wrong-doing in youth, the steady lowering of the moral standard on the part of one and another, and of innumerable of them? Who can portray the indolent acquiescence in more or less badness by a vast human multitude? Who can picture the mercenary activity, the coarseness, the meanness, the baseness of many? What avarice has there been! What a world of fraud, and how much quarrelling! Who can narrate the work of spoiling one's happiness and

the work of injuring the happiness of others? Who can recount the injustice which has been and which is? Then "man's inhumanity to man has made countless thousands mourn." Note the blighting effect of intemperance upon the reputation, character, business, home, and hope of a person; its injurious influence upon the happiness and culture of a family; its detrimental influence upon the comfort, the intelligence, the morals and piety of a land. Many a time has the righteous cause been driven to the wall. Many a time has cunning prospered, have theft, murder, or unrighteous war succeeded. The voice of naturally selfish men is not stopped as it should be; private and public bad conduct in various ways is not checked as it should be. Vices give fuller effect to all other evils at work to retard and destroy. They deprive a people of manhood, deprive of that self-sacrifice, even of that energy necessary to maintain their position.

Then see the wickedness which one nation has committed in its action toward another. Witness the earth-hunger, the coveting and seizing the lands of a neighbor; the sin of Ahab toward the vineyard of Naboth; the sin of every great or small empire the world has ever seen. Who shall give the tale of the wars of which this has been the cause? Look at the attack of Henry VIII. on Bologne, an attack which resulted, however, only in impoverishing the English. Look at the wicked invasion of Holland by Louis XIV., an invasion, however, which but brought on a series of wars that involved Louis XIV. and his kingdom in the gravest of difficulties. Look at the wicked seizure of the Spanish crown by the French emperor Napoleon, a seizure, however, which proved his ruin. Look at the invasion of Russia, the draining France of men and treasure; all which, however, put the Allies in Paris.

Wickedness has influenced religious life. Like every other power of man, spiritual power is weakened by neglect, by abuse and disease. Wickedness blinds the eye to

God and to the value, the worth, the glory of love to God. If the "pure in heart shall see God," it follows that the impure in heart shall not see him. Wickedness diminishes fear of God, lessens regard for Him, and produces a good deal of religious paralysis. Like all other great theories of law or morals or art, so the great theories of religion have been much lowered by man himself, in his lowness and ignorance, his weakness, his error and sin. Thus has it been with Brahmanism, Buddhism, Moslemism, and thus has it been with Christianity. Men greatly lowered the earlier doctrines and departed from the earlier precepts. Those who receive at second-hand and those who come after are apt to corrupt. The earlier Brahmanical writings are one thing and the Brahmanism of the past thousand years is quite a different thing. The "Divine Buddha" is one thing and the Buddhism of to-day is quite another. Christianity has had connected with it man-made doctrines, man-made precepts, and a man-made spirit. Its followers have at times and at places wandered far abroad from piety and morality. Its kings and priests and laymen in the church have even at times left men in misery and in want, in hardship and filth, and prosecuted unjust wars and horrid persecutions.

Again and again has wickedness in some of its forms stood in the way of advancement in art, science, literature, popular education, industry, and liberty; again and again has it corrupted and paralyzed government and religion, and caused society to go backward into barbarism. In Greece, what religious faith existed, declined. As the religious faith went, the moral principle founded on it went, and then went all the intellectual glories, all the political liberties; then the science of government ceased to make any gain; then society stopped on its way to a more perfect state. Rome declined in religion, then in morality, then in political liberty, then in political power.

Here is an evil principle at work in persons, at work in politics, in trade, in all life a deeply moving power. The general indifference does not make the reality any less dreadful, does not at all diminish its broad, deep, and lasting effect upon a person or a people. We are here considering but its social effect, though its terrible effect upon the individual is the great cause of its social effect. In the sinful being and sinful doing of persons is the one great evil of society. Here is that which is most dreadful in the history of man.

The study of history reveals wickedness; that it has brought to naught all the calculations of progress founded upon natural ability and tendency; that in many cases it brings to wretchedness and want; that it wastes the strength and impedes the prosperity of a people; that from the beginning until now it has been the great drawback to persons, families, communities, and people. In its thousand forms of manifestation wickedness has been the cause of the far removal, in all times, from a good which would otherwise exist. It has been the cause of the greater part of the blood and agony of the race.

It is of great importance to all who are interested in maintaining what already exists in culture, and in gaining more, to remember that wickedness is the main reason why history is the striving for a perfection never realized. Remove wickedness and deterioration of every sort is at an end. Such stories as are related of Egypt, once mighty now base, of Persia, once great and now humble, are told no more. Just so far as wickedness ceases in China, China makes progress; in India, India makes progress.

In view of this fearful lesson of human depravity and its consequences to persons and to society we are impressed with the fact that depravity is a historic force which needs very much looking into. To the correct observer of the past and present in society, wickedness

looks very big and very mighty, so big and mighty as to incline one to desponding and despairing views, as to seem to be an insuperable barrier to permanent progress. The life, variety, permanence, growth, and wilfulness of wickedness in human beings is to be remembered by the student of society as a powerful cause at work among men, a cause not to be put out of court, but standing there, unless fairly met, to help shape the destiny of persons, societies, and history. If no fundamental remedial procedure be adopted, the germs of wickedness develop, and no genius of race, no fertility of soil, no advantage of climate, no ameliorations of government or of social condition, can then withstand their exhaustive and destructive influence.

IMPERFECTION AND INCOMPLETENESS IN SOCIETY.

Mortals are ever erring in wisdom, ever failing in goodness, ever coming short in happiness. Ever has the world a scar on its face, ever must it look elsewhere for a higher life of purity and a higher life of perfectness. There is a dimness over all brightness. If we go east or west or north or south there is much that is thrown down and cannot be set up again without loss. There is much that is hidden which it were better were revealed. There is much darkness with no light. There is much that comes short, much that is useless and that is worse than useless, that is positively injurious.

Our bodily condition is imperfect. Too many are poor in health, are sick. Too many, especially of children, do not complete the natural number of their days.

Our material condition is imperfect. The most of us are fairly fighting for our food, our clothing, and a convenient shelter, fighting to keep the wolf from the door. By the nature of things the world ever stands with but a year between it and starvation, the mass of the world with less, while war or famine or pestilence or accident would bring the evil day still closer.

Our whole condition is imperfect. It has a mixture of good and evil, of strength and weakness. There has ever been virtue without talent or talent without virtue; a man good in thought and poor in expression or a man good in expression and poor in thought; a good natural disposition and piety or piety and a bad natural disposition. Ever is it that some grow crabbed with years, that some dislike the prattle of children, that some youth are wayward, that some family is put to shame, that some friends are offended, that some sacred rites become in their celebration conventional and sometimes profane. Ever is it that there are persons more or less vicious, persons more or less degraded by meanness or dishonesty or want of honor. The administration of society has ever required and still requires the state and the code of civil law, soldiers and the police, judges, courts, and prisons. In many lands, past and present, has there been ignorance of the ways of health, the ways of comfort, the ways of knowledge, the ways of moral and spiritual life; ignorance, with its inevitable blundering, woe, and death. Still we read about the scourge of certain preventable disease; we read that Russia loses 2,000,000 infants yearly. Still we read about injury done by blundering men, or by false and bad men. Some quack economical theory is introduced, some useless war is undertaken. Neither government nor the industrial economy, nor education, nor morals, nor religious bodies have been what they should be, and it has all worked to the degradation and suffering of men, women, and children. The face of the middle-aged is marred with it, the face of the old is saddened with it. The home is in its dismal shadow, society labors under it. No, if in some period of time persons, institutions, and the whole of working life are to be perfect we have not yet reached that period of time. The real is still far from the ideal.

Perhaps the world will ever keep in an unfinished state, and so man will ever have something to rouse him.

Perhaps it is of our nature to remain imperfect on earth at least, with ever something to be done. Perhaps it is our glory that such is the case. It may denote the quality of our being. However this may be, the perfect with man is still far away.

DETERIORATION IN SOCIETY.

There is a sad line in the history of human life, namely, the history of deterioration instead of growth and improvement, a story of degradation, of growing evil. This is one part of things as they have been and as they are.

There is deterioration in persons. Some persons, before their time, deteriorate in bodily quality. The body, the great sustainer of the mind and heart, becomes diseased or perverted or enfeebled. Destruction goes on faster than reconstruction. With us all, "the earthly house of this tabernacle" at last decays and finally dissolves. But with many of us, long before our time, the body is degraded from its high position of health and perfect service, and is in greater or lesser measure a poor, injured, debilitated body. If, as is frequently the case, the cause be of our own creation, then it is a sad course we have been taking, this of physical neglect or of physical wrong-doing, this having abused the servant untii, like a dumb brute abused, he can no longer carry or serve us.

Some persons deteriorate in mental quality. They lose in various of the mental powers. They lose in mental brightness, in mental acquisitiveness. Their minds become less fertile. They cease to get or give.

Some persons deteriorate in moral quality, in moral perception and sensibility. They care less than they did for certain moral qualities. This or that or the other moral evil has gained on them. The obligation to be better presses less than it did. The aspiration to be better is feebler than it was. The person more and more does as he has been doing.

Some persons deteriorate in religious quality, have less

and less thought and emotion about God, become less and less interested in religious duty and privilege, have less and less religious vitality and force. A proud, self-reliant, irreligious, vitiating will has been growing. Some have passed into almost entire worldliness. Some have even become Sadducees and ceased to believe in spirit, have come to be without faith or fear. The forces of evil have gained on the forces of good in the soul. And it is not fated, but is of the man's free-will, this wronging of one's own life. He has surrendered to a process. There is a greater and greater subversion of energy, a steady passing away from moral order and beauty and worth and value, a steady going into disturbance, disorder, discord, and chaos.

How sad this growing decay of the higher worth, value, beauty, and power; of the higher happiness and manhood; this downward passage of a human being on and on! The evil growing, the state more settled, the habits stronger, the nature more firm and enduring; the working of sin and moral and religious death; the continuance of the blindness, the apathy, the self-will, and generally the person unconscious, ignorant, and indifferent, and his method, his purpose, his direction, his affection wrong. There are dead boughs on the tree. Eternal winter comes to reign in the spiritual part of the soul.

There is deterioration in society. There has been, for example, deterioration in the family. In the earliest known history of heathendom family life was purer and more regarded than in later times. Among the Greeks the family lost in dignity and in power for good. Marriage came more and more to be a mere contract for the good of the state. Among the Romans, as time passed on, marriage lost much of its originally solemn character and became a loose and temporary contract, while a vicious celibacy became common. But in many ways has deterioration worked. It has worked in industry, intelligence, and taste, in morality and religion.

Here and there among men, time and again, in history, there has been degradation in the very religion. It has grown dark and cold, like a mountain on which night has fallen, has passed more and more into rites and forms and superstition, and instead of a nurse has become a nightmare. It may have risen to theological and philosophical thought. It may have settled more or less of creed, of form of worship, of ecclesiastical system. It may have been believed in, obeyed, elaborated, and embellished. It may have grown at last into the very fibre and structure of society. The living of many, the use and custom of many, is with it as it is. The position and reputation of leaders is with it as it is. But when finally called to account by the critical spirit of a new generation, the religion, as it appears, fails to evidence itself, and just so far as it so fails it looses power over the thoughtful. Many are the wrecks of goodly vessels. Many a religious body, general or local, has lost its promise and its performance, has become more or less an obstruction, and has finally fallen like a house grown old.

In ancient Rome religion came to be a mere ceremony, a ceremony indeed somewhat sacred by tradition and immemorial usage, by associations of poetry and of deeds of glory in the past; somewhat dignified by connection with matters of state; somewhat sustained by a superstition born of the fears of the ignorant, and nurtured by tricks of impostors; also somewhat maintained by the love of pleasure and amusement, an opportunity for which was afforded by the festivals, which did more to corrupt than to preserve the morals of the people. "The whole array of the priesthood began to be despised, nay, what is more significant, the priests began to despise themselves; the feeling of reverence was extinct. The idea of sanctity was so far removed from the popular divinities that it became a constant complaint that prayers were offered which the most depraved would blush to pronounce aloud." Atheism, in its practical

forms, was stealing into the halls of legislation, the cabinet of kings, and the closet of philosophers.

Western Asia, Southern Europe, and Northern Africa once came to be without any real deep religion. Outside of China and India vital religion was not found, the majority of thinkers had become believers in a sensual or sceptical materialism. There came to be an all but complete reign of epicureanism. "Darkness covered the earth and gross darkness the people." Read Paul's account—he lived in the night of that period.

Here and there, now and then, there has been in a land a deterioration of all life. Often the life of a people is like a river which ends in a stagnant swamp, or like a stream which comes down from the mountains and runs awhile in the desert and then begins to die away, the fertility and beauty of its banks steadily decreasing until at last the desert reigns. A rude people have become ruder. As whenever in natural history "we can note that a group of organisms is characterized by habits likely to lead to degeneration—such as parasitism, immobility, specially simple modes of nutrition, or minute size—we may be justified in supposing degeneration," even so, when we find any low group of people characterized by habits which lead higher groups downward, we may be justified in supposing degeneration. Is not this the case with savages? As animals like "the sponges, all the polyps and corals, and the star fishes, rotifiers or wheel-animalcules are probably descendants of far larger and more fully organized animals, provided with locomotive appendages or limbs, and oysters, clams, etc., can be accounted for as degenerate descendants of a higher life, of head-bearing active creatures like the cuttle fish," so it is probable that savages are an example of degeneration, in their inferiority of bodily structure, of mental capacity, and of moral character. Atrophy has probably taken place, and loss of valuable qualities of body, mind, and heart.

There are certain savages who use a language derived from the Sanskrit. The inference is that we have here savage descendants of the civilized Aryans. As compared with the Copts who once existed, the Copts of to-day are a decayed degenerate people. In various parts of Africa there seems to have been a falling off in civilization within modern times. The Rev. J. L. Wilson, a missionary, in his work entitled "West Africa," contrasts the sixteenth and seventeenth century accounts of powerful Negro kingdoms in West Africa with the state of the present small communities, possessing little or no tradition of the more extended political organization which their forefathers had. Arthur Mitchell, of Scotland, in his work "The Past in the Present," says: "In South-eastern Africa also, a comparatively high barbaric culture, which existed in special association with the old descriptions of the kingdom of Monomotapa, seems to have fallen away, and the remarkable ruins of buildings of hewn stone, fitted without mortar, indicate a former civilization above that of the present native population. It is a matter of history, too, that in North America a similar degradation has overtaken the Iroquois and Cheyenne Indians."

Herbert Spencer says of savage communities: "Most of them, if not all of them, had ancestors in higher states. . . . The tribes now known as lowest must exhibit some social phenomena which are due not to causes now operating, but to causes that operated during past social states higher than the present." The Bushmen of Australia, "divided into tribes wandering over a wide area, have, notwithstanding, a complex system of relationships and consequent interdiction which could not possibly have been gained by any agreement among them as they now exist, but which are comprehensible as having survived from a state in which these tribes were more closely united and subordinate to some common rule. Such, also, is the implication of the circumcision and the

knocking out of teeth which we find among them as among other races now in the lowest stages."

The traveller Von Martius held strongly to the opinion that the savage tribes among whom he passed many years of his life were a people who had fallen away from a higher state of civilization. Other authorities of a similar character might be quoted.

But people much higher than savages have deteriorated. "The earliest Egyptian civilization we know of is the highest; the earliest phase of the religion is the purest; the earliest pyramid is the biggest and the best built; the earliest temple has the best masonry; the earliest papyrus, though as yet hardly understood, is the wisest." And as the earlier civilization declined to the middle, that, in turn, declined to the later; the extraordinary work in masonry, in goldsmithing, in weaving, and other arts descended to a lower level of excellence. In other words, Egyptian civilization, with a brilliant start, was ever afterward but slowly decaying.

India and China went far in the path of progress and then stopped. There must have been a time when they were far advanced as compared with a previous state, and were still plastic, free, and advancing. They had architects who carried the art of building by a series of improvements up to a very high point; they had shipbuilders who, by innovation after innovation, finally produced a comparatively very superior vessel; they had inventors who only stopped on the verge of our most important improvements; they had engineers who constructed great irrigation works and navigable canals; they had attained to a considerable division of labor; they had a large commerce; they had polished manners; they had literatures, philosophies, and elaborate religions; moreover, they had great cities and highly organized governments. For a long while there was active life, and the innovation that begets improvement. There was also the infusion of conquering races, with new life and

different customs and modes of thought. But the growth came to be almost entirely arrested, and century after century the countries remained almost entirely stationary.

In China we see the highest condition of society, intelligence, and material prosperity yet attained independently of the Christian religion. Things have been improved until they are as perfect as possible upon the principles according to which they were established. There is a highly organized state, a large measure of mental culture and universal education, and a good degree of material civilization. But this culture, though highly finished in certain lines, has been to a large degree unchanged for two thousand years, and is hard, dry, prosaic, and mechanical; the people think, feel, and act in a monotonous, uniform way. Every thought is a repetition, and every action is prescribed. There is but little spontaneity. Religion, philosophy, science, politics, literature, and manners are all stereotyped. A certain system bears absolute sway over all and in almost everything. The past is the great ruling power. Life there has long been comparatively stagnant.

The modern Turks, Persians, Arabs, and Tartars seem inferior to the Saracens of old, whose scientific attainments are admired and acknowledged even by Europeans of the present day. Some think that the race of Castilian Spaniards who conquered the Mexican and Peruvian kingdoms has deteriorated morally and politically. As we have youth, fresh, well-knit, handsome, and vigorous, and then age, dull, bloodless, and feeble, so we have often the bloom and then the decay of a people. Power has waned, art declined, learning sunk, population become sparse, until the people who had lived as a great body and grown and prospered, who had "turned rivers and pierced mountains, cultivated the earth like a garden, and introduced the utmost refinement into the minute affairs of life," have with their great buildings and their mighty doings ceased to be, often the overwhelming rush of some

outside and comparatively barbarous power suddenly ending the work of destruction which had already begun. In the Mesopotamian valley in olden time great campaigns were waged, great military empires were created, great engineering works for drainage and irrigation were constructed, temples and palaces were built, and yet not only did progress cease, but the empires decayed within and rapidly were overwhelmed. Babylonian, Assyrian, Medo-Persian, and Greek empire and renown came to be largely of the past. For the Mesopotamian valley and the mountains of Persia, neither Greek nor Roman, Saracen nor Turk, has ever revived the ancient culture.

"Ruins show us that in Java there existed in the past a more developed society than now exists, and the like is shown by ruins in Cambodia. Peru and Mexico were once the seats of societies large and elaborately organized, that have been disorganized by conquest; and where the cities of Central America once contained great populations, carrying on various industries and arts, there are now but scattered tribes of savages." Every civilization but the Christian that the world has yet seen has, after a period of vigorous growth, had an arrest, and then stagnation or a decline has followed.

A stop has sooner or later come to all the religious, all the moral, all the political growth of the world outside of the influence of Christianity. The inspiration has ceased; the discoveries have ceased; the various gains have become less and less, and finally have been succeeded by losses. Institutions that began as benefactors have ended as enemies, and the whole people has seemed sooner or later to be stricken with decay.

Are there going forward in society at large or in particular, inevitable tendencies to decay and death, side by side with others to life? Must we accept the physiological theory of society and history, and say that there is a national life as there is an individual life? that every social aggregate has a certain amount of potential energy,

the expenditure of which necessitates decay? Is there not more hope for man than this theory would indicate? Is not the difficulty somewhere else, and to be remedied.

The return of a strong society to weakness is not natural and necessary. The analogy between a nation and a human body which grows old and dies is in this respect deceptive. The body is worn by exercise and exhausted by a repetition of its functions, but in a society whose constituent members are renewed in every generation, and where there are accumulating advantages, reason does not compel us to associate weakness and decay with mere age, with mere continuance.

RHYTHM AND EPOCHS IN THE LIFE OF SOCIETY.

There is in life a rhythm. There is an accent or emphasis or musical succession. In the universe, planet and moon have their coming and going, variable stars their alternate brightening and fading. On earth, the tide forever rises and falls. There is the passing from day to night, and back again to day. There is the passing from summer to winter, and back again to summer. There is the everlasting death and life of vegetation. There is the certain orderly series of evolving life in each species of animal. Each living creature has this same periodicity. Its feelings have their order of excitement and repose. Its very diseases have their order of growth and decay.

In man there is a beat in the heart, a rise and fall in the breast, an undulation in the soul in its longing, its desire, and its love. Now we are tossed about and now our habitation is upon a rock. Now we are at the top of a mast and now we are struggling, gasping, in the sea. Now we are elastic and active and now we are exhausted and rest.

There is a rising and falling in every sort of human activity. There is the busy day and there is the still

night; the tired are sleeping, the hot sun has long gone down, and a thousand lush fields lie warm in the moon. There is the daily cycle of woman's work—breakfast, dinner, and supper, and again breakfast, dinner, and supper. There is the cycle of season in man's work—ploughing, sowing, reaping, and ploughing and sowing again. We advance in our projects, we go backward.

So also human affairs on the large scale have a cadence. The poet speaks of the "whirligig of time." In political government there is transition from the more to the less conservative party and then back again. We have Cromwell, then Charles II., then William and Mary. In taste we have now the classic and now the Gothic in architecture. In religion we have now zeal, now indifference, and now zeal again. Such is the rhythm of life.

Because of this rhythm in the life of society it has epochs. While there are in history no cataclysms,—that is, states or conditions that come suddenly or abruptly,—still there are epochs. The fact of continuity in history is not contradictory to this. By epochs I mean periods which are new. Society has such in the growth of its nations, spheres, and institutions; often a series of such. It has the flow and ebb of prosperity in many lands—in Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, Greece, Italy, Spain. As the world sleeps and wakes again with each recurring night and day so in the matter of progress people and communities and countries sometimes sleep and wake and sleep again.

The political sphere has its epochs. The prevalence of feudalism in Europe, that peculiar social hierarchy and system, marked a new phase in European history, one peculiar to itself, and making a social and political epoch. It was neither the imperialism that had been nor the rude tribal governments that followed that. Then we have epochs of political progress, as in the two English revolutions, as in the American revolution, and the French.

Intellectual life has its epochs. Scholasticism was a new thing in the intellectual history of Europe, and when it came it marked an epoch. The Renaissance marked another. Each period, while beginning under the old, was something new. We have epochs in learning—times when it receives a new impulse, when a new enthusiasm exists in its behalf. Some great magnetic man may kindle the new fire, some great discovery, as that in the 12th century in Italy of the Amalfi manuscript of the Roman law, may do it. Some new comers, some foreign immigrants may do it, as did the Greek scholars coming into Italy after the capture of Constantinople in 1452. But whether with influence plain to be seen or influence not perceived, the epoch is there. It is there in art, as in Italy in the 16th century. It is there in philosophy, as in Germany during the last hundred years. It is there in science and in criticism, as in Christendom through the same period.

Religious life also has its epochs. In Judaism we trace of periods a succession, initiated respectively by Abraham, Joseph, and Joshua, by Samuel, Solomon, and Zerubbabel, each with a beginning and ending, each generally appearing without observation except to the few, each differing from the rest in detail, each bearing the type of religious ideas and feelings higher, each being more near the coming of the kingdom of help, the higher and wider Gospel dispensation, in each the creed growing more and more luminous and definite, and religious knowledge becoming more certain and explicit. Though Phariseeism, intensified devotion to legalism, became prevalent the century before Christ, still the tendency was as I have said. There was a giving way on the side of formalism, ceremonialism, and mechanical ritualism, and a coming in of spirit and of truth. There was less of the priest and more of the prophet and the written word; less of the temple and sacrifice, and more of the synagogue, with praise, prayer, and scripture. The Ju-

daic religion was herein more and more divesting itself of its local form and fitting itself for diffusion; was becoming less a religion of precepts and more one of principles; was growing less attentive to rules and to externals and more attentive to spirit and to internals.

In the development of Bible religion the Christian religion marks an epoch; and in the religious history of Europe the period of Christianity dominant marks an epoch.

It is in the progress of social science to discover, to describe and arrange the series of epochs in each growth, and to study each epoch by itself.

TYPES IN SOCIETY.

Types are identities in the structure of various bodies amid all their superficial diversities. In the four great orders of animal life we have as corresponding and identical the anterior fin of the fish in the lowest order, the wing of the bird in the order above, the fore leg of the quadruped in the next order, and the upper arm of man in the highest order. The structure of these four orders is then so far similar. So throughout the mineral, vegetable, and animal world certain general forms are continually found. In our insight into the order of nature we have discovered that all differences in the structure of the vegetable species and similarly in the structure of the animal species are but differences from one fundamental type in each case, are but modifications of one plan of structure.

It is a part of the work of social science to discover any such similarity of structure between the various social bodies, institutions, forms, and developments; not slight, superficial, and accidental resemblances between one condition or event and another, between earlier and later states and events in a people or in the world, but radical agreements. It is worth while to find if there is

continuing similarity, and to what extent. Yet the typology of society, if existing at all, appears to be a region of doubt and uncertainty, a country somewhat incapable from its very nature of being well explored. How far types exist in society is a matter of inquiry.

There may be types in social structure, similarity in certain parts indicating that they are of a common type; similarity in families indicating a family type; similarity in political bodies indicating the political type in general, or the monarchical, the aristocratic, the democratic type of state. There may be natural types of political society.

Out of the primitive family and household structures, almost everywhere the same in the earliest historic times known to us, we can seem to trace all that government on the earth which has been termed patriarchal. We have of this kind all tribal and clan government, and all government of city-states made up out of clans. Taking the early household as the type of such government, we see in its manifold diversities that some parts have been developed at the expense of other parts, some modification having been made because of new circumstances, or through differences of aim in the government,—as whether it be military or industrial,—or through differences of place,—as whether the people be close together in a fertile river bottom or in a city, or be scattered in the mountains or upon the desert.

At least in the great Indo-Germanic branch of the human race there appears to have always been one type of civil government, that of kings, elders, and commons. Now it can be surmised that all governments which have been created among these people are but modifications of this, sometimes one part, as that of king, being developed, and the other parts diminished, if not annihilated.

In religious life there may be one true type, and the varieties may be natural or diseased alterations of this

type; may be an increase or diminution or some other change of distinct parts of this type.

There may be types in social growth; similarities in order of development in the state, in civil law, and in industry.

THE LAWS OF SOCIETY.

A law expresses "the constant and regular order according to which an energy or agent operates." It is a uniform tendency to certain forms and combinations if the circumstances be similar. The question arises whether there are natural laws in society, laws controlling all the life and conflict of human interests and passions. Much attention has been given by students of social science to the discovery of any such laws. Yet many laws supposed thus to be discovered can be clearly disproved, and generally the way in which the error crept in can be pointed out. It generally came in, not by induction from a large collection of social facts, but from an unwarrantable introduction of some philosophy. And every attempt to discover true laws must run great risk of being frustrated by the mere immensity and complexity of the mass of the facts. Very little is yet known in the matter.

We have had classes of inquiries devoted respectively to theories,—metaphysical, religious, social, physical, and other,—each of which has maintained the existence of certain laws in society and in history.

Among the metaphysical theorists, Fichte thought that history presents the existence of a law by which reason, the absolute ego, develops from infancy to maturity, passing through the five great epochs of instinct, authority, reflection, science, and philosophy. Schelling makes history to be a self-evolution of the absolute mind in humanity through the three periods of fate, natural law, and providence. According to Hegel, who reduced

history, as well as nature, to sheer logic, history is the human development of the absolute reason, beginning in China, continuing in India, Egypt, and Greece, and ending—in Germany, in a complete triumph of art, religion, and philosophy! He represents the course of historical development as a series of stages in the growth of freedom, and says that there is a law which requires all general and all particular history to pass through three particular stages.

Cousin found in all history, as the only possible phases of civilization, the three ideas and epochs of the infinite, the finite, and the relation between the two, accompanying which epochs are predetermining climates, the Asiatic, the Mediterranean, and the European respectively. Comte thought that there is a law compelling general and particular history to pass successively through a theological, a metaphysical, and a scientific stage.

Among the religious theorists we have Bossuet and Schlegel, who believed in a certain law which tends to the universal prevalence of Christianity under the forms of the Roman Catholic church.

Among the social theorists we have St. Simon and Fourier. St. Simon thought that there is a law in history which constantly divides it into organic and critical periods. Fourier thought that there is a law in history which divides it into four great periods, corresponding to infancy, youth, manhood, and old age.

Next we have physical theorists. Hegel introduced an idea, now quite prevalent, that all the movement in nature and society is under one law. This he said is that of a perpetual coming into being. His own aspect of the idea has passed away, but the idea remains under new forms. One of these is that there is some sort of natural necessary and universal evolution, a general plan on which the universe is developing; that all parts bear the evidence of this plan, are in certain ways shaped by it, are in conformity to it, in harmony with it. Just as

there is a typical shape which is found through all vegetation and a typical shape found through all animal life, so there is a form of development which has existed through all the universe so far as known.

This view meets a certain philosophic longing for unity, and is especially entertained by philosophic persons who have given much study to natural science. Under this general view we have Darwin's law, the survival of the fittest. It is well to examine society, whether there be in it the working of any such law. The struggle for existence operates among all who go alone, who do not combine, such animals, such families, such tribes and nations. It has with all such ever been, woe to the weaker, woe to the sick, or to those who are in any way deformed or badly located in comparison with others. In this struggle the strong survive and flourish while the weak are pushed aside. Self-interest reigns to-day in national bodies just so far as they go alone. So far as they combine, that far the law of the survival of the fittest is thwarted in its working. In history, the more cultivated and energetic races have conquered the weaker and less advanced. Even the Arabian and Ottoman races have had special elements of superiority which warranted their sway. Thus the strongest and fittest races prevail, multiply, spread, and become the progenitors of the future people.

Among physical theorists we have Herbert Spencer. He starts all from a physical basis, out of whose history comes first physical history, then vegetable and animal, and then human history, and with him there ever work these laws, namely, that toward complexity, that toward individuality, and that toward fitness to surroundings. With him they pervade all organized and animate life; are found apparently throughout the universe, and govern human life, because it is a part of all life. Mr. Spencer and others have established, that societies develop from comparative unity to highly mul-

tiple and heterogeneous states by successive differentiations. Industry exhibits a marked tendency to a division of employment. Civil government tends to increase in complexity. Many a historic institution has passed from the general to the specific, from that to the variable, and from this to the individual.

Henry Carey says: "Force can neither be created nor destroyed. Every manifestation of force must come from a pre-existing equivalent force. Human force, whether physical, mental, or moral, results necessarily from conversion to human use of forces that have existed from all time." He believes that the laws which govern inorganic matter govern that matter when, as he says it does, it takes the form of men or of communities of men.

I do not know that physical and social laws are in harmony with each other any more than are physical and chemical laws. I do not know that in the physical and the psychical universe together there is a unity of law and a unity of force, that there is a single system of laws and a single system of force.

We must be careful in regard to all such *à priori* assumptions as to the existence in society and history of laws which are found, or claimed to exist, in nature. If these laws of nature are found to exist over man, then our philosophy of society and history is seemingly a very materialistic one.

To pass to a miscellaneous class of theorists, we have Jean Baptiste Vico, of Florence, and a disciple of Bacon and Grotius. He thought to establish by an historic induction that the career of states proceeds under periodic laws. He thoroughly elaborated a supposed law of cyclical progression, a law which had already been stated with more or less clearness by several philosophers, a law which at present has but few advocates.

We have Herder, who thought he perceived throughout the human race from its origin a law which works for the

universal prevalence of reason. Condorcet thought that there is a law of social progression and perfectibility. M. Buchez, in his "Introduction to the Science of History," thinks history to be under a law which requires its division into four epochs, each initiated by a revelation. M. Leroux, in his work "Concerning Humanity," thinks that there is a law of progress toward equality, a law working in three stages, which stages correspond to the three chief stages of caste or tyranny, namely, that of the family, that of the state, and that of property. Hermann makes history necessarily run through four successive periods, to wit, art, industry, religion, and science. Again, some claim that there is a geographical tendency of civilization from east to west; others, that civilization goes from lower races up to higher, for instance, from the descendants of Ham to those of Japhet.

We have also had presented a law physiological in appearance, wherein all history in general and particular divides itself into periods, corresponding to infancy, youth, manhood, and old age. As to this analogy between social and animal development, the doctrine that such an analogy exists is an old one. Plato, in his "Republic," instituted a comparison between the chief divisions of society and those of the human mind. Hobbes endeavored to trace a resemblance between society and the human body. Comte frequently declares universal history to be the biography of mankind. Dr. Draper has made this analogy the central idea of his "History of the Intellectual Development of Europe." In that book he divides all histories of nations or of civilizations into five distinct periods, credulity, inquiry, faith, reason, and decrepitude, corresponding in the individual to infancy, childhood, youth, manhood, and old age. This particular analogy does not bear a critical examination, and seems to be arbitrary, though many people, churches, brotherhoods, corporations, and institutions of every kind have seemed to decay and die. Many a time

a people reach a certain pitch of greatness, internal and external, and then sink—in good government, in military power, in industry, in fine arts and good taste, in morals and religion. But such people have never matured and grown old. What is seen is not growth, maturity, decline, and death, but growth and then decay and death, which is a very different matter, and means simply that there is a tendency to decay in society. This blight strikes a people in any period of their career.

Laws exist of another kind than natural laws of the sort already considered, namely, laws over men; laws which, if obeyed, will fill the earth with beings satisfied in body and contented in spirit; beings who ever draw increasing advantage from that world which is mineral, vegetable, or animal, and from each other in their own world; beings, too, of a high mental and moral culture.

To obey the laws of health and hygiene is life; to disobey is disease, and oftentimes death. Vice of body exhausts and consumes, itself punishing sins against the body. The passions, after irregular, violent, and continued indulgence, become impotent to give pleasure. In many ways is vice self-avenging. If the laws of industry and thrift govern a people in the production, accumulation, and distribution of their wealth the result will be prosperity; if they be flagrantly disobeyed the result will be adversity.

We have also the working among men of great moral laws. The universe is governed not only by physical but also by moral laws. Persons, classes, and nations suffer for wickedness and thrive by righteousness. "The way of the transgressor is hard." With persons, communities, corporations, classes, as a rule every wicked path is a path toward damage if not a path toward ruin; every good path is a path toward benefit and happiness. The proverb of Solomon declares of wisdom: "Her ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are peace."

There are also certain religious laws, which every man

who hears of must observe. We find such laws in the Bible. One is "Repent;" another is, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned." Still another is, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart."

In conclusion, laws, so far as real, are to be studied as ways not to be obstructed, but to be kept clear, and are to be submitted to. To ignore or defy and resist them will only do hurt, while on the other hand to obey them will do good. If we would promote our own and the general happiness we must give up all idea of resisting what in the nature of things cannot be resisted. We must fall in with the ordinances over us; we cannot alter them, we must conform to them. In none of the spheres of life have the laws been more than half obeyed, hence men are where they are. These physical, social, economical, political, moral, and religious laws are a power over us, a power which it will do us no good to run against, but the rather much hurt. If these laws be broken, the inevitable consequence of breaking them comes along apace. We shall certainly have justice and judgment. The great lesson for all is obedience. He who uses the proper means will make money. Just so far as any laws are obeyed, laws of political economy or political science, moral laws or religious law, will the benefit of that obedience come.

THE RESTRAINTS OF SOCIETY.

We are under a great body of limiting and restraining influence. The influence comes from every quarter; it comes from God above, from man, from nature, and from within ourselves; it comes from a system that exists as well as we. This system is of things various in kind and form and measure, in themselves, in their general working, and in their working upon us. This system is made up of persons good or bad, or both, of

rational and irrational beings, of voluntary and involuntary agents innumerable.

There is, first, order in general: the order of natural law, laws physical, social, economical, moral, and religious, the order of nature, the nature of the body, of the mind, of society. By such law and order we are bounded and conditioned, are made subject, have our power of self-direction greatly influenced and controlled.

There is, secondly, social order of an artificial sort: the laws of the state, the laws of the church, the by-laws of the corporation, the brotherhood. Under the natural and to us necessary operation of this double system we find ourselves. Whatever else it is for us it is a restraint upon us, it schools and educates us. By nature we need training, being inattentive, wandering, a law unto ourselves, imperfect and incomplete, unenlightened and without self-control. A certain amount of restraint in some matters through a certain age, and in other matters through life, seems desirable, that we may learn to confine and direct the body, the mind, the heart, the will; that we may learn to work, to study, to be useful to ourselves and others, to be good; that as persons and societies, we may have intelligence, morals, religion, culture. We need to be taken up and made. Force needs to be applied. Hence the need of the family, the school, the state, the church, public opinion, natural law, whether of matter or morals or religion; and under these, discipline,—steady, irksome, hard discipline, the body, the mind, the heart receiving it.

Of course the nature of the restraint determines its value; a restraint upon good were an evil. In much certainly the natural restraint of things is a good to us. A first use of restraint is to restrain evil desires, and a second to restrain evil actions. When self-restraint can do this, well; when the restraint of others can do this, then sometimes well. Even a prison has a virtue. In the language of Burton, "it brings many a lewd, riotous fellow

home, many wandering rogues it settles." In the beginnings of culture in any department control is very important to repress indolence, caprice, and self-indulgence, and so we have restraints, duties, discipline. In volatile minds and in strong and unregulated passions a restraint upon liberty is needed, a compelling of obedience.

But restraint is valuable in a far broader sphere than in the repression of wickedness, it is valuable in the cultivation of good. As men can't live in the whole air or all over the ground, and must live in one place rather than in all places, so they can't live all abroad socially, but must live in some matters conventionally and in many morally. They must walk or drive in the road rather than in the field, and if they do not do so naturally they must be trained to do so. The regular working of society in its domestic duties, its social customs, its civil government, its moral and religious life, seems in much suitable and fit for our good, it seems to train and develop us.

One cause of civilization, and the first chronologically, is restraint, is discipline or drill—monotonous training and tedious usage. What rude men most need in the beginning of culture is to be made to stay in one place and to work, is to be set in certain ways; all this until they cease to be separate, repellent persons or families or tribes, and become a common society, a common political body; all this by almost any force acting long enough to create a cohering body, a certain organization with a civil and social polity. Put on anything which will keep the people from doing as they want, from flying apart; anything which will fix each man to one spot, to a routine of habit, will enjoin on each person certain duties which shall be his and all he need think of; anything which can compel obedience, can drill, can be rigid, definite, coercive, and then by effort and unconscious imitation men acquire a civil and a social habit of life. Government of the rigid kind in every direction is

of great advantage. It binds the people together, it brings them into one body, and by virtue of all this it impels them forward in culture. First, we have the habit of acting with others, then the disposition, and then the instinct of acting with others, to maintain government and all the other economies of society. The human being becomes a social and political being. Society and the state are created.

At first such power does its work better to have but a small number to work upon, say the members of one tribe or the men of one city; at first men are drilled better in squads. This need of drill, and in small sections, explains why people in early times were benefited in being kept apart by deserts and mountain chains, by prejudices and distinct languages. Society could set or crystallize or form, and while this process is going on with the child or an army or a people one system of training is better than two or than three systems. One system continually crossed by another will prevent the benefit of any system. So it was well that foreign creeds and methods and systems and examples could not readily be brought in contact with the people; that commerce was discouraged; that inter-communication of every kind was repressed. It was well that those undergoing training should get the impress of but one mould, should receive the influence of but one set of religious, civil, and industrial ideas. Foreign influences would set men to doubting, would lead to confusion of example, to confusion of authorities concerning right and wrong, concerning policy and fitness, and in these circumstances the power of training would be lost. Men would take the liberty to step out of rank, to not go to school or to church. Men would, in more or less numbers, slip out from under the regular rule, from under the power that was making a distinct and valuable impress, and the work of their training would thereby be sadly marred.

"Hatred of discipline" is dangerous, "impatience of

slow and careful work" is dangerous. Discipline is imperative for every young person, for every uncultivated people. Without discipline the tendency is to superficiality and barbarism.

In rude societies it has often happened that certain fixed customs have helped reduce to order and keep in order the people, these customs coming, say, from imitation of a chief or obedience to a priest. Again, ecclesiasticism and ceremonialism may have helped the people. Such powers have often been great in the youth of persons and of societies, and their rule has often been good for the young spirit and the young society, has strengthened both character and faculty. Often thus has the ecclesiastic extended his jurisdiction to men's actions in every department of life, and to their very opinions on every subject of thought; often thus has he created the standard of all life, religious and moral, civil, social, and domestic. To be a good man was to follow this guidance, to accept this authority; but indeed the authority could not be treated as a matter of choice, it must be obeyed.

A theocracy likes to make of a people one great family, under the same roof, working in common, with one language, one faith, one law, one sovereign. This is the ideal which governs men's minds under a theocracy. Here is unity and order. Under such a culture many of the ancient societies were brought to a considerable degree of civilization. It appears to have been thus in Egypt, thus in Chaldea, thus in Assyria, thus in ancient India. It was under such an ecclesiastical and ceremonial culture that modern Europe was trained. The law of nature, nevertheless, is stronger than the laws of men. People often outgrow a theocracy.

It is oftentimes some foreign authority which has conquered a tribe or a people, that makes them learn obedience and industry, those first requisites of civilization.

The conqueror is despotic, and sees to it that he is obeyed.

Then personal slavery has proved a school in which people have learned obedience and industry. This school has taken in many from a life of fighting and robbery and forced them to a life of slave labor, which in turn has often been followed by a life of free labor in their descendants.

After awhile, as a person or a society advances, discipline becomes unnecessary, grievous, and also injurious, both in the way of perverting and of enfeebling. So whenever a person or society, at such a stage, can do so, the inflexible training regulations, so many and so minute, are dropped. The machinery of this sort is done away. Where this has not been the case, as in ancient Sparta, or in modern India with respect to the religious system, or in parts of Europe with respect to the feudal or to the police system, there natural development has been arrested. But when reason and the nature of things have been allowed to take their course, and irksome discipline is sooner or later removed from persons and from society, then we have liberty, with its increase of exertion and enterprise, involving a consequent increase of comfort and happiness.

When outward restraints are taken off, inward ones are still needed. And here comes in beneficially the influence of true religion, the influence of a feeling of duty, the influence of prudence, the influence of others or of public opinion. Under the head of inward restraints come certain religious systems which, while not maintained by force, are maintained by public opinion, by a general faith in them. We have the Puritan discipline. England and Scotland have had its training. The English and Scotch descendants in the United States have had its training. Matthew Arnold says in his lecture on "Numbers": "As a stage and a discipline, and as a means for enabling that poor, inattentive, and immoral creature,

man, to live, and appropriate and make part of his being divine ideas on which he could not otherwise have kept hold, the discipline of Puritanism has been invaluable; and the more I read history, the more I see of mankind, the more I recognize its value."

Look at the first French revolution as an illustration of the need of inward restraint, when outward restraints are removed. The people got from under civil control, from under ecclesiastical control; they cared not for the public opinion of foreign nations. So much the more important, then, that they should have inward restraints. They did not have these to the extent desired, and in consequence there were not sufficient brakes upon the wheels of the revolutionary movement. The aristocracy were deprived of their possessions and driven into exile; the clergy were struck; the throne was overturned; the king and the queen came to the guillotine; there were massacres in the prisons, and at times daily public executions in the chief cities of France. An irreligious populace howled over France, and was in a rage for blood.

THE RELATION OF THE RESTRAINTS OF SOCIETY TO LIBERTY.

The right adjustment of the two necessary forces, order and liberty, secures the proper movement of society. Life, happiness, and progress are possible in the same persons and situations, with various relations between order and liberty other than the right relation, but the highest life, happiness, and progress are possible only with the proper relation. The first force includes all the laws and influences under which men are. The second includes all impulses and tendencies which prompt men to self-activity, to independent effort of all kinds. These forces are not antagonistic, are not, indeed, entirely distinct.

There is the relation of social order to liberty and, in

the case of persons, to what may be called individualism. There are social claims and there are individual claims. The line between is obviously very varying with age, sex, time, and place. There must ever be more or less of a compromise between the two opposite tendencies. Hardly in any case must social order or liberty be absolute.

Social order must not go too far; must not seek to have us all of one pattern in thought, in books read, in subject-matter of conversation, in style of language, in the manner of writing poetry, of painting pictures, in opinion about public events. Uniformity must not destroy individuality and originality. Where should we come out if our original men were repressed, if freedom were dead? The individuality of man and of various communities and societies is to be remembered. And the power for good of this individuality, and the value and beauty of variety, must be remembered. With the increasing intercourse of men and the increasing power of public opinion there is a tendency to the destruction of that variety which individuality would give; there is a tendency toward a uniformity which is repressive, monotonous, and melancholy. Just as a child or a servant can be trusted to direct himself, he is to be trusted. So in society one must ever have all the liberty he can enjoy without damage to his fellows, and it is a duty to renounce sovereignty over men just in proportion as they become able to govern themselves. Civil or ecclesiastical or any other government should do this without being forced. And when a people are fit to be self-governing no power other than the people should govern. Such a people are the only seat of authority.

Society hurts the individual and itself, besides doing wrong, when in any way it interferes improperly with the freedom of the person; when in any way it hinders him unduly in realizing his destiny or in performing his duty; when in any way it claims, with no sufficient reason, to be

master of the person, the thoughts, the religion, the activity of the individual. These are personal and private matters. The public, in whole or in part, have no authority over a person here. If he be fit for it he should be left, if grown up, his liberty to think, to feel, to will, to worship, to go and come, to improve his mind or his condition, all as he sees fit, the only limit being whatever may be required in order that all may have the same liberty. Taking away liberty where it can be properly used, just as far as this is done, whether by church or state, by caste or class, benumbs all the desires and activities of men and injures all their best interests.

There is that in lands and times which, if trusted to, may, in the case of the people fit to be free, be relied on to work out results in society, as in nature, that are wise and useful. There is in society a nature of things which does not depend upon our will, and which, in the matter of maintaining life and growth, we cannot artificially regulate so very much. The action that is best is that action which is an effect of the natural structure and the natural way of working. The least that such nature is interfered with, the better. The case of society is quite similar to that of the human body in health, or even in sickness. In each case, we are largely to see simply that Nature has her way and that her laws are obeyed. There is an art and a skill which men are called on to use with themselves, with their families, and with society at large—the skill of the teacher, the doctor, the gardener; the skill which can see that the pupil, the sick person, the tree, gets the best chance. Such is the skill of the parent, the legislator, the administrator: that important skill to know when to let children alone, when to let the people alone, to let them be free in thought and action, and only under the power of influence.

On the other hand, freedom is not to be interpreted as liberty to disobey the physical, political, economical, and moral laws; is not to be interpreted as license. Society

has suffered so long from abuse of power that all social evils are associated in the minds of some with the exercise of any power or authority. Some think that to be free is to be outside of all law, servitude, or obligation whatever. Freedom is not the doing as one likes; is not the absence of all law, of all subjection, of all subordination to, or dependence upon, another; is not independence; is not anarchy and confusion. It does not release from any natural law or binding order, but only from all unnatural and illegal bondage. It does not permit lawlessness in thinking and in acting, or defiance of heaven.

Liberty is not liberty to be harsh and denunciatory without reason; is not liberty to drink ardent spirits to drunkenness; is not liberty from the eternal obligation to be truthful and honest; is not liberty to be a rascal because one has the chance; is not liberty to be too self-indulgent because one has the money; is not liberty for Joseph to yield to Potiphar's wife because the way is open; is not liberty to gamble, to swear profanely, and to set whatever immoral example one pleases; is not liberty on the part of him who has, to exact all he can out of him who has not, be the former the owner of land or of a manufactory which would give employment to others, or be he the owner of food, clothing, or lodging which others must have. True liberty is not liberty to trample under foot justice, brotherhood, or humanity; is not freedom from obligation in the family, in society, in the state, and elsewhere.

There are in all matters laws to control, and we have only that liberty which is left after we have obeyed these laws. Liberty is liberty in connection with order, in connection with certain restrictions; is freedom limited, not unlimited; is freedom partial, not absolute. It would be impossible to allow any person absolute freedom unless he were alone and nothing else existed. We are parts of a complicated system, and are to be limited on every side.

It is impossible in the circumstances to have it otherwise.

Let us consider specifically that relation of social order to liberty which consists in the relation of rightful human authority or government to liberty, the righteous authority of the parent, the state, the church one may be a member of. With the world as it has been and is, this relation to be just and useful must be a varying relation. It varies with the growth of the child. It varies with the progress of a people. One great and constant problem of good parental, good ecclesiastical, good civil government, is to know how to adjust the relation. No civil government of Christendom to-day but is face to face with the difficulty, the difficulty of securing just enough authority and just enough liberty, the difficulty of an excess of authority or of giving more liberty than the people are fit for. Only in the balance proper for each people and each time does the natural and healthy constitution of society exist. And government with its power can easily derange the balance, which, if done, the vigor of society is diminished, its power to withstand shock is lessened, its ability to grow and thrive is hurt.

Between human authority and human liberty are the social and the civil constitution of the people. Between the two are the laws and customs of the people. Between the two in a church is the creed. These constitutions, laws, customs, and creeds are treaties, compacts, contracts between authority and liberty, or rather between society and the individual. They form a ground which neither shall intrude upon without reason. A part of human history is the history of a struggle between the governing and the governed, each to get more power. Such is a part of the history of the Roman republic in the famous struggle between the patricians and the plebeians. When in such a struggle anything is gained by either party it is generally put into some one of the above forms that it may be preserved.

Authority should gradually prepare the way for liberty, and should yield its ground just in proportion as people are fit for liberty. Authority should cease to substitute itself for the will of the people just in proportion as the people become able to take care of themselves, and should know how to retire step by step at those precise moments when the people need it no longer. Liberty is the right and the interest of the people of whom society is made up, and government exists in order that these people may have this liberty. Government does not exist for its own sake, but for the sake of the people, and should change in form and extend or contract as the needs of the people require.

The growth of centralization in France came finally to injure the self-governing power of the provinces and the cities; came to take away the opportunity and the capacity for local self-government. And as on such self-government is based genuine representative liberty in the people as a body, centralization took away the opportunity and the capacity for this also. In the reign of Louis XIV. the centralization was such that individuality had largely ceased to be; a few lords controlled the offices, a few proprietors owned the land. The monarch could set the creed for faith and the rule for practice, could imprison and set at liberty, could kill or make alive. Here the social force had become truly despotic. Such despotism also tends to become a curse to such a people by false interpretation of standards or of laws; by breaking down the established and the valuable in standards, laws and institutions, and methods, to serve its own ends. "It is remarkable," said De Tocqueville, as quoted in his Memoirs from Senior's "Journal," "that the glorious reigns in French history, such as those of Louis XI., Louis XIV. and Napoleon, ended in the utmost misery and exhaustion; while the periods to which we are accustomed to look as those of disturbance and insecurity were those of comparative prosperity and progress. It seems as if tyr-

anny were worse than civil war." In all this, the collective body, or that which represents it, has overdone the matter.

On the other hand, the individual force may become too dominant. In many a savage tribe it is so. In many a league of states for a campaign it has been so. When men are united in a state or in a political party or in a church, the ends sought for by common action, the principles or the platform on which these persons act, demand, if co-operation is to exist, that each individual so far sacrifice his individual feeling and views, his rights of opinion and expression, as not to interfere with the common aim. The common body is strong only so far as it is harmonious on its platform, harmonious in its presumed common thoughts, feelings, convictions, and interests. The common body is weak just in proportion as each unit or each other part goes its own way in relation to the matters in common. If individuality triumph in the matter of the country, then patriotism is a word and not a thing; if in the matter of the political party, then the party cannot fight, and cannot stand a fight; if in the matter of a church the uniformity of thought, feeling, and aim be gone and individuality be supreme, then that church is a form and with only the force of a form.

For authority in a family, in a school, a college, a church, a state, to hold the balance level between control and liberty is difficult. Each situation calls for its own decision. The simple standard for the decision is, that relation between righteous government and freedom which in these particular circumstances and with these particular persons will supply the most favorable conditions for the highest possible development of all in every good direction. This standard is found by common sense, by reason, by experiment, by the advice of the wisest.

THE LIBERTIES OF SOCIETY AND THEIR INFLUENCE.

Liberty is freedom from all that hinders, from all that drags down or keeps down, from all that injures life or growth of any sort in any person or body. It is freedom to think, to worship, to meet, to combine, to organize, to dwell, to go and come, to choose a calling, to manufacture or trade, to choose a wife, all as one pleases; it is freedom to educate one's self or family in what system of knowledge, science, philosophy, religion, and after what method one chooses. Only in all these things allowance must be made for the just claims of the family, the state, and society, and also provided that whatever things are just, honest, and of good report are encouraged, and whatsoever things are wrong and unseemly are restrained.

Such liberty has in it nothing positive, nothing of substance; is but a negative element of well-being; is but an escape from certain slaveries, a deliverance from certain improper and injurious restraints. With it we have the chance to try to get that which we want to get. Liberty is only opportunity; opportunity for man to live, to thrive and be happy in any and every way he chooses. It opens the road to any and all welfare, but is not in itself anything so good; it is only a door, a gate by which to enter if we choose or can, that is all. But it gives every man a fair chance to gain substance—material, mental, and moral; to gain of the various richness and sweetness of life for the body, for the mind, and the soul; it gives a person a chance to grow up to the "perfect stature."

In his "Science of Law" Sheldon Amos remarks: "Liberty indeed is in itself only a negative term, and denotes the absence of restraint. But it also connotes a positive condition of the most momentous sort; it implies rest, meditation, imagination, slow and steady culture of the faculties, combinations and association for all sorts of purposes, and especially that slowly-formed belief in the

certain power of carrying resolutions into action on which so much of human strength and greatness depends. Liberty, then, on its positive side, denotes the fulness of individual existence. . . . It is only in a condition of liberty that industrial occupations can be pursued, that commercial enterprises can be undertaken, that family ties can be cherished, that social bonds can be gradually and slowly matured, and that leisure can be found for the gradual culture of the various sentiments, emotions and aspirations, on the mutual play of which throughout the whole community the complex life of the state depends."

There is personal liberty. One form in which personal liberty is lost is slavery. One form of slavery is family slavery, that of wife and children to the head of the family. He is owner and master of the rest. He can buy or sell members of his family. In some cases he can kill. This has been a very wide condition in the family life of the earth. It has existed in savage, in civilized, and in some form even in Christian lands. Another form of slavery is chattel slavery, a condition in which myriads have been born or into which they have been brought. Slaves can be bought and sold; they have neither rights, guarantees, nor real society. In the ordinary church or state despotism there is something held in common by rulers and ruled. The rulers are merely ministers of some power or order beyond human control, the king or priest being from God. But the power of the master over the slave is strictly personal. The master acts not in the name of God or of some great conception of society held in common by him and his slave. The tyranny is unadulterated, pure, personal tyranny, which is the hardest of all to bear. Make a man a slave, deprive him of the privilege of selling his time, his labor, and his thought, take these from him by force and he loses interest in them all; he works no more than he can help; he cares for no improvement; he tends to become

not only indifferent, but also lazy, shiftless, deceitful, and dishonest; he tends to become servile, cowardly, and helpless. And unless he has hope of getting free, what interest has he in the welfare of the country, or what ability has he directly to help any good word or work?

In the Roman Empire the slaves came to be the sole cultivators of the land, and they never seem to have helped defend the soil. Outside of towns there were fewer and fewer freemen for this purpose, and in the towns the freemen were of too feeble a nature. Only that the barbarians could be employed against each other was the empire defended from the beginning, and so through slavery the empire failed of what would have been a great resource in its time of need. When the time came that slavery ceased, that men had hearth and land to defend, they quickly stopped the inroads of warlike wandering shepherds. Probably the extensive enslavement of the laboring classes was one cause of decay in the ancient states.

Another form in which personal liberty is lost is serfdom, the permanent binding of persons to the soil. The serfdom of the middle ages in Europe did not entirely deny the personality of the serf. It guaranteed to him the right of marriage, and certain rights of possession in goods and movables. In these things serfdom does better than slavery.

Still another form in which personal liberty is lost is that of caste. Here the lower ranks are in hereditary and perpetual bondage of a certain kind; are restricted to a certain isolation from the upper ranks, to a certain set of occupations. Social divisions are very deep and broad, are kept sacred by all the powers of the church and maintained by all the powers of the state; nothing can raise the low man, nothing can depress the high one. The people are bound together in several almost distinct classes, governed each by its own law, and paying no attention to the laws of any other; each class

has its own spirit, traditions, and life, and has little sympathy with those of any other.

There is civil liberty; it embraces liberty of every sort, it is the measured general liberty of persons, of towns, cities, corporations, counties, provinces. For persons it is, for example, protection by law from false imprisonment; it is freedom of assembly for persons, whoever they be, and whether few or many; it is freedom of movement for persons, whoever they be, and whether few or many; it is liberty to stay in a village or city or district or country, or it is liberty to leave; it is liberty to travel, and without a passport; it is liberty to emigrate.

There is liberty of thought. It relates to every subject upon which one can think and express an opinion. It is liberty to teach, to discuss, to publish, this in religion, in morals, in civil government, in literature, science, philosophy, art, and industry.

Activity of thought and liberty of thought are two different matters. While there may be activity of thought against a good many things which we cherish, and such thought is to be met by other thought, still, liberty of thought is never to be interfered with. The action of thought is in every direction, and is often against what we desire and for what we deplore. Free thought fighting what we love or what we hate is one thing, and the privilege of freedom of thought is another thing.

Each person has rights of thought as against his fellow-men. To force him to think as dictated to is in the first place impossible, in the second place can be historically shown to be a principle of action producing very injurious results, and in the third place has no warrant, either in reason or in Scripture. Freedom of thought is an indispensable condition of reform and improvement.

There is nothing so powerful as the simple truth. Thorough examination often puts an end forever to a false-

hood and makes a truth more clear and full and unassailable. Compulsion never comes nearer to destroying a falsehood than to stop its temporary manifestation. To do so, as in the case of an immature person, met by a political, a scientific, an educational, a moral, or a religious heresy or lie, may be practically equivalent to destroying the influence of the lie over that person. But the thought itself is alive, and if that person meets it again, is as fresh as ever. Educators, the parents, the church, the government, the school, often use compulsion in this thing as a matter of mere policy—decline to have the pupil meet the falsehood until he is better able to grapple with it; shield the pupil from danger by keeping him ignorant of the falsehood. Properly used, this method is legitimate and has effectiveness. Multitudes who are guardians use the method. In a sense it is one of the great methods of the world. The trouble has been largely with the illegitimate use of the method—the using it where it were wiser to face the falsehood and discuss it; the using it where those with whom it is used are mature enough to face the falsehood and where it were better that they should; the using it with persons over whom there should be no control in such matters; the using it in an improper way as to persons and as to manner. Certainly we cannot justify in the use of it discourtesy and railing, or the persecutions of history, or the religious wars of history.

Then, again, compulsion is often used against what is the truth. The method is open to arraignment because it has been so often abused in this way. Certainly a method so liable to abuse in the conservatism, the pride, the feeling, the will of men and of that class of society whom we may call the guardians of the rest is to be used guardedly. And yet how has power in the family, the state, the church, and in society at large been oppressive in this respect.

How without liberty of thought can we have those new

leading principles which at times are needed? How can we get out from the old where it is petrified, or from the conventional when it has become unnatural. At times we need thought, agitation, discussion, movement, revolution against the traditional system. It was liberty of thought which made possible the Rome of Augustus, the Italy of Leo, the France of Louis XIV., and the England of Elizabeth. Reflection and discussion open the public mind to questions in religion, in political science and economy, to social and legal questions, and to questions of morals both within and between nations. Such questions stimulate the faculties and form part of the daily conversation of a free people, call forth their minds in the way of self-government, and stimulate education and enlightenment.

Another form of liberty is liberty of conscience. It is of the general economy of things that each person must find for himself his religious duty. Helps, suggestions, patterns, advice may be given, but the person must be free. In the imperfection of human reasoning and the liability to delusion all should be tolerant. Intolerance springs from bigotry and fanaticism, self-conceit and self-righteousness, from a zeal to save souls or to maintain power, from pride of opinion or desire to succeed. Intolerance often leads to abominable cruelties.

Still another form of liberty is political liberty. This is the liberty to take part in the government, the liberty to be a working part of the ruling body. It is the liberty to have a share in making the laws, voting the taxes, electing the rulers, and an equal chance to obtain office. It is the people as the basis of government, the people with right and power. It is democracy proper, such as was the ancient Athenian state; it is a republic, such as is in the United States. It is every degree of popular power, whether in a democracy, a republic, or a monarchy. A state is a free state, whether it formally be a democracy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy, when

the sovereign power lies with the people, the men of adult years, and where the people have the utmost freedom of discussion, deliberation, and action.

Political liberty cannot exist with self-government absent at any point of the ascent from local to general; cannot exist without a *bona fide* representative government. Neither without the other is sufficient. Local self-government has existed more or less everywhere in a very high degree; has existed in China, in India, in Russia, and yet by itself has brought no great liberty. As a rule, wherever local self-government in the town or in the province has existed without self-government still higher in the state, even the liberty already possessed has been precarious. Wherever provincial states have existed alone, no matter how great their liberties or how zealously defended, these have rather lessened than increased in the course of time, unless the provinces have united in some national representative system. Many minor German states lost their liberties for lack of this. So did some of the minor states of Spain. On the other hand, when there is a national representative government without local self-government there is no liberty, at least none such as exists in the United States of America. There is needed for the highest political liberty a union of free local governments with the general government.

Dr. Arnold says, the desire of taking an active share in the great work of government is the highest earthly desire of the ripened mind. De Tocqueville says: "I have often asked myself what is the source of that passion for political freedom which in all ages has been the fruitful mother of the greatest things which mankind has achieved." Lieber says: "The noblest human work, nobler even than literature and science, is broad civil liberty, well secured and wisely handled. The highest ethical and social production of which man is capable is the comprehensive and minutely organic self-government of a free people."

Others have expressed their appreciation of political liberty in that for it they have given up home and country, and have dared the prison and the scaffold. Sons and husbands have been shot to death in the ditch or by the wall, shouting liberty. The cause is hallowed by long disappointment and patience.

We now come to the liberty or independence of states. Taking a state as already formed, it exists with a certain purpose to serve, with certain duties to perform, and has a certain right to be unobstructed in their performance. But liberty in its fulness cannot exist if the people as a whole be not free of foreign interference, have not the power to establish that system of government, of industry, of education, or of religion which they desire.

A people is not to be subject or dictated to by another people without its own consent. This is best for the people and for the world. This principle of the independence of nations,—in other words, the spirit of nationality,—is one that is favorable to the highest and most exhaustive development of man and society. One of the directions of progress, then, is toward that complete independence to which each nation seems entitled.

Another form of liberty is what may be called liberty of property; it is the liberty of persons to possess property. In the ancient forms of life in common, property as possessed by an individual hardly exists. The household, the township, the village, the tribe, or some other sort of body owns the property. No person owns any of it. And if a person apparently has property, he only has the use of it for a year or a series of years, or at the most for a lifetime. If it be land he is only a tenant; if it be household things or certain privileges, he has only a hold limited in degree and in time. This type of property existed largely among primitive people, and exists largely to-day in India and in Russia, at least so far as land is concerned, and in this respect

exists also somewhat in Great Britain and elsewhere. "Personal testaments and wills were introduced only at a late period, at a time when the state and the family had broken away from the immobility of inheritance, and had begun to give free play to individual action. Ancient Hindoo law knew nothing of testaments. The same is said of Athenian law prior to Solon. At Sparta, testaments do not appear until after the war, and at Rome they do not appear at first." In the other view, that of liberty to make a will, property can be truly owned by any person; can be owned absolutely and without limit; can be given away, sold, or left at death freely. No family, no commune has rights. This liberty is found in its most perfect form to-day in Italy, in various German states, and in the United States.

There is also economic or industrial liberty. This includes freedom of choice as to what one's calling shall be, and non-interference on the part of labor unions or brotherhoods of any sort. A boy can learn any trade he pleases. This includes freedom to work at what wages one chooses, to work for whom one chooses, and to work as many hours a day as one chooses. It includes free choice by every person in all matters connected with his calling in life. To make difficult of access or to close certain callings to men or women who might do well or might excel in them, is to hinder progress, and besides, is unwarrantable interference. Self-defence alone can warrant it. Economic or industrial freedom also means free trade as opposed to a protective tariff.

It is because of his individuality that man essentially needs liberty. Physical force, such as gravity or electricity, is in similar circumstances always exactly similar in manifestation: not one of a thousand manifestations has any variety. So it is with chemical force: in similar circumstances ever the same compounds, not the least variation. So it is with vegetable force, though

here the circumstances are never exactly similar; but it is only for this reason that no two plants exactly resemble each other. Here we seem, however, to come within the shadow of something new, namely, not force general in character, but force individual in character. Yet plants of the same species have in themselves no individual qualities. In all these spheres there is no proper individuality, there is no liberty, there is only an absolute necessity. But as we approach animal life, at least in its higher forms, we approach individuality and we approach liberty. A herd of cattle is full of individuals in character, form, and physiognomy. There is more or less native will and wilfulness and self-direction. When we enter human life, however, we enter where individuality is very prominent, where each individual is unique, a species by himself, the expression of a single creative idea, where each individual is in a measure from himself thinking, directing, and feeling; is in a large measure free of nature and outside of necessity.

People are not like the ocean sand, made up of a few kinds, but are made up of distinct persons, free agents. Each of these would seem, then, to have natural rights and liberties as to his thoughts, his sympathies, and various other of his activities. It would seem that he should be largely self-directive, that no one has a right to interfere with him. And it would seem that essentially, with men perfect, no one can so well guide each person as he himself; that it is politic as well as just that he be free; that he can do best when least subject to others, when most at liberty to determine how and with whom he will live and act, when he stands on his own feet to direct his own life without needless interference on the part of any.

It would also seem that no person is so in the way to all good as he who, while mindful of all rights of others, is free; that he alone can get the utmost possible out of his gifts and circumstances. It would seem to be

better that when possible all have liberty, and all liberty. Beyond such restraint as is necessary for immaturity, human beings must have liberty or there is hurt. Ultimately, freedom must exist if men are successfully to pursue comfort and knowledge and every great natural satisfaction.

Ideally considered, each person is to be left alone as far as possible to manage his own affairs through and through. He is off from his fellow-men in very much indeed. He is alone. He is lord and sovereign, owner and proprietor, sole and entire occupant. Society may ask of him that which society indispensably requires. He must give to society and the state that which belongs to them, but he must keep much that belongs only to himself. He must keep what pertains exclusively to his own interest. In this sphere, society is not forcibly to enter, even to protect him against himself; even to save his health or to save his soul. Society may use personal persuasion or public opinion with him, and these are great powers, but then it must stop. And society in restraining any person from stealing or murdering does it for the benefit of every person. In government, industry, intelligence, and religion we can only find the best possible growth when growth has been first restricted and then has become free. We need in all these growths, first, a course taken similar to that which we take with the young, namely, restraint by authority and rule, and then liberty. The perpetual visitation of law having ceased, the everlasting drill being taken away, men flourish unwontedly and society makes marked advance. So it was in ancient Rome when the old ecclesiastical law with its trammels was abolished; so it has been in Protestant Europe since the old ecclesiastical system has been largely superseded. The result is similar when all other impediments to liberty are removed.

As in family life it is better that each family should manage itself, so it is with society; and as in property it

is, upon the whole, better that the owners, or those whom they select, should manage rather than some chance alien, so it is in society. Other things being equal, a people has flourished in proportion as it has been free. It has become more intelligent, comfortable, rich, moral, and strong. A government that secures the largest amount of liberty consistent with the general welfare and with the people's ability rightly to use the liberty has, as a rule, tended to elevate the people's intelligence and to foster activity in almost every sphere of life. When any field of activity is open to all comers, it is for that very reason more fully occupied and more thoroughly cultivated. For instance, commercial liberty is a great stimulus to commerce, which has always flourished wherever it has been free. In regard to liberty in general, and taking a whole people, Scotland's history tells us how a nation's general progress was brought about by a people resolved at all hazards to be free, and where religious teachers were the patrons of freedom and education. England and the United States, very much noted for freedom, have very much of human welfare.

Bondage is at war with living men, and living men are at war with bondage. By nature intelligent persons are freemen. If bound, they will grow uneasy in their bonds. Sooner or later over the whole world growing man tends to rebel against every unnecessary restraining authority and power. All human government but self-government in some shape is liable sooner or later to be thrown off. All monarchical, all oligarchical, all democratic government which does not allow the mature individuals their largest innocent liberty, is liable to be sooner or later repudiated. All lords and sovereigns who bid others do their will must have other than the fact of power and position to be heeded when man becomes worthy to enter into his patrimony.

But man is imperfect, and the question of liberty is a question of special cases. Each case is to be considered

on its own merits. All the cases of society and history come in here. Practically, in society, liberty as yet must in various instances be a graduated matter. It is so with all children. It seems to be so with all women. It is so with a part of the men.

This general fact in no way excuses those who hold others in subjection that are fit to be free, and of course does not excuse any lord or master in cheapening truth, honor, and justice. There have been rulers who have betrayed their solemn trust, who have filched from many poor to enrich themselves, who have been stern and cruel, who have cursed men for aspiring. History tells of their want of pity, of the heads they have made fall into the basket. Outwardly, perhaps, there are order, victories, empire, and glory. Great palaces and a great capital shine afar, and the story of the whole is a part of the story we have called history. Now and then there are drums and trumpets and flags and horses and batteries and piled cannon balls. But within there are crops destroyed, villages burned, owners staring at ruin, women and children pitiable, others looking steadfastly at death in the turmoil of battle or in the quietness of wounds or camp disease. Law exists, it may be, but its forms are profaned. Religion lives, but despots invoke God to bless what he abhors.

The name of liberty is a great one among men, and has an enchanting sound to many ears, charming most often the youth. Aside from its chance, liberty has strongly attracted some persons to its very self; it is as the bride of the human spirit. What will a man take for his liberty? In the language of another, "There is a pleasure in speaking, acting, and breathing without restraint, under no master but God and the law." Liberty is so substantially right, so pleasant and profitable, that men have grasped it whenever they could. To get it is worth a discussion, a struggle, an emigration—has often been deemed worth a campaign, a war. Men have risen

in revolt for it. Men have died for it. In its various forms it is a grand possession. In its fulness, the Apostle calls it "the glorious liberty of the sons of God."

THE FORMS OF SOCIETY.

Form is more essential, more prevalent, more important than some imagine. A piece of granite has form. Every blade of grass has form. Every animal has form. In all orderly creation the substance takes on a particular form. Every creature has a natural form. The body has a natural form, something not separate and independent but something in which the body is complete, yet by which it is not really confined. This form must change with certain changes in the body, and if it should not change then it would become a dead form, and would be a limitation of the body, a hindrance to its vital force. No human life but takes on more or less permanent forms of thought, feeling, expression, and action, forms of speech, forms of daily work, forms of religion. This is natural. This also is desirable as a help to facility, as a help against uncertainty, disturbance, confusion, and strife; this within and without.

Social life is full of forms: the formalities of bowing and handshaking, of knocking for admittance, or of leave-taking; the conventional forms of wearing the beard or the hair; fashion in clothes, in furniture, in houses; the formalities of public meetings; the formalities of language—its idioms, its proverbs, its well-worn words, belonging to all and used by each; the formalities of government, of law, of courts of justice, of religion. These various forms are full of meaning, interest, and value. In many instances they have accumulated and been perfected through long experience. The oldest people on earth are those who are the least disposed to part with them. Nowhere are they so important as among the Eastern people. Still, forms are but means

to secure human excellence and happiness, and did they not serve us in these respects we would readily perceive their secondary nature.

Social energy creates social bodies, which in turn have a natural form. There are a number of permanent forms in the state, in the church, in the industrial system, and in other associations of men. The family and civil government are natural; men cannot make them or not, and on what pattern they please. Other forms are human contrivances. Men can make them or not, and on one pattern or another as will best serve the purpose. The most of the main forms of society are, however, not directly made, and upon determination to make them, but are either inherited or grow up naturally.

To an extent, the internal character tends to shape the external form; the inherent qualities of an object express themselves in its exterior appearance. The disposition, desires, habits, and usages of a people take certain forms rather than certain other forms. A people's condition in industry and wealth, in intelligence, morals, and religion, together with existing historical circumstances and traditions, tend to give the forms of government general and local, the forms of law and its executive, rather than that these are created *de novo* by the will of the people, or according to the reason and conscience of some great theorist.

As in any given person with a decided bent in one direction, intellectual or emotional, there is a congeniality and harmony of the various parts with the predominating part, so there are differences of form in general and in particular, where the type of general social constitution has a decided bent, for instance, military or industrial. There has been in every such case a unity throughout the structure. The military type of social organization has more organized control than the industrial; this especially in war, but more or less also in peace, having here less of a political freedom, while the industrial has more. This

is seen in savage societies. These are generally quite military in their type. So also is it seen in the ancient civilized societies of Western Asia and Southern Europe, which also were quite military. With industry we have the growth of freedom more easy, as is seen in modern Christian societies as they tend to become industrial.

In addition, we have the transformations created by a change in the direction of the general activity; as, for instance, if it go from military to industrial, or the reverse. If the alteration be permanent, it must sooner or later be followed by an alteration of the social forms. If a nation become less or more military, less or more industrial, its structures, organs, or institutions change correspondingly. Herbert Spencer alludes in this connection to the twice-repeated lapse of the Dutch Republic into a monarchy, under the reactive influence of war; also to the reversion from parliamentary to despotic government, which resulted from the wars of the Protectorate in England; also to the effect which a career of conquest had, in changing the first French Republic into a military despotism. Certainly, war and preparation for war must have some effect upon the form of the government. We must therefore note the fact that there come sometimes changes of form in social bodies, arising from changes of direction in social activities.

It follows from what has been said that practically perfect forms are those which truly and fitly express the being and life of the time.

The forms of a society may or may not be the best for it. Every people in every stage of progress is not able to, or will not, support the best form for it of government, or of society, or of industrial economy. The nature and circumstances of a people often shut it out from the best. Oftentimes a savage people need the forms of a higher faith than they possess, of a higher civil rule than is theirs. Oftentimes the inferior, needs

to be held under the training hand and mind of a superior; and oftentimes such a training is forced upon a person, upon a tribe, or even upon a people. The people may be half savage, and might do better under some forms imposed upon them from without, and which at first they did not like; which at first required of them a discipline which they did not have. A people may like violence and rapine and be very averse to good government. A people may have simply a prejudice against a certain set of political forms because it is imposed by a foreign country; and yet these forms may be better adapted to maintain welfare and promote progress than the forms the people themselves would choose. Many an industrial system, a political system, an ecclesiastical system fails from such causes, and must be changed to one better adapted to the capacities and moral qualities, to the likes and dislikes of the people.

Says John Stuart Mill in his "Representative Government": "Men, because of their habits, are very impracticable in this matter. Some will not have a monarchy, though it were better; others will not have a republic. Some, like the American Indians, like the barbarians who overran the Roman Empire, will not have regular government at all. So a people may be unwilling or unable to have the best forms. They may, from indolence or carelessness or cowardice or want of public spirit, be unequal to the exertions necessary for preserving it. They may not be willing to fight for it if attacked. They may be cheated or get into a panic or an enthusiasm. In such a case a civilized government, to be of advantage to them, will require to be in a considerable degree despotic. . . . Again, a people may be unwilling or unable to fulfil the duties which a particular form of government requires of them—a rude people to practise the forbearance which civilized forms require, unable to restrain their passions, to curb their pride, to abstain, say, from

private conflict, and let the laws avenge their real or supposed wrongs."

Yet with all that has been said, men have some power directly over their social, political, or industrial forms, those which are the product of the people's nature and circumstances. People may let forms get worse or may strive to make them better. Human judgment and skill may be exercised about slavery or no slavery, about an absolute or a limited monarchy, about an absolute or a representative government, about tariff or free trade. These things are often in good part beyond the will of man, but also they are often affected, they grow or decay, by the will of man.

People can learn to be different from what they are, and to do differently from what they do. They can learn to be better and do better. The new idea steadily presented to them becomes familiar, and they may be led to overcome their dislike of it, be it a new method of agriculture or of manufacture or of education or of civil administration or of army organization, or be it a moral reform. Especially may they be so led if they feel that the old has worked poorly; or that, at least, the new works better than the old. We must not disparage the power of human determination. Yet as John Stuart Mill says in his "Representative Government": "The amount of capacity which a people possesses for doing new things and adapting themselves to new circumstances is a quality in which different nations and different stages of civilization differ much from one another."

To a people fit to be free, all artificial organization beyond what is necessary to preserve the proper action and development of society is a hindrance to prosperity. With every people the artificial part should set lightly, should be ready to change with time and place. The life and maintenance and prosperity of society in its religion, its morals, its politics, may safely be left largely to that nature which is the same in all lands.

Generally, all organizations change in such a manner as to require more or less change of form. In the progress of generations this is the case with governments, churches, and universities. The life and vigor are rather in the spirit; the form is but the method, the policy, and may need modifications. Hence, properly enough, in the advance of a country, changes in constitution, in church, in creed, in methods of study, in methods of industry. Times of violence and helplessness, times of ignorance and superstition, times when science and art are feeble must have a world of laws, methods, ceremonies, usages, phrases, system, which as times improve should pass away; otherwise there is bondage and hindrance to the development of good life. When governmental or educational or religious life is better understood as to its proper nature and end, we may look for a tendency to a corresponding change of form.

THE INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIETY.

To the observer of society, institutions are an early object of attention for their prominence in carrying on the work of society. In coming to the institutions of society we come to a very practical matter; to a very widespread and continuous class of instrumentalities of life and action; to a distinct and prominent part of the great and complicated machinery of social life.

By an institution I mean mainly a group of usages, laws, and ordinances. Such a group is slavery, the feudal system, the English common law, the state. But the word also applies to a single usage, law, or ordinance, if largely independent, important, and operative; as, for example, marriage, the mail, the jury, the coronership, the justiceship of the peace, the theatre, the press, the oracle of the ancients, the Lord's day. These two meanings together exhaust the meaning of the word.

There is sufficient uniformity among institutions to ad-

mit of their being arranged in system. We have domestic institutions: marriage, the dower of marriage in France, polygamy, the family, family worship, the testamentary disposition of property. We have social institutions: caste, slavery, the feudal system, chivalry. We have political institutions: monarchy, aristocracy, parliament, common law, the bar, city self-government, the police. We have industrial institutions: property, money, the bill of exchange, the corporation, the copyright, the patent. We have educational institutions: the public school, the university. We have religious institutions: the church, baptism, the Lord's Supper, the ministry, the papacy, monasticism.

If one could make a collection, as it were, of institutions living and dead, and should examine them, he would find them capable of a common description; he would find certain characteristics applicable to them throughout, though to some more than to others.

An institution is an organization. It is more than a huddling together, than a conglomerate. It is like a plant, an organized body, with its own being, unity, and vitality; its own continuance, direction, and growth. It has its own ends, its own ways of accomplishing these ends, its own structure and parts, its own instinct, its own sympathies, usages, and traditions; and if it has members and officers it has its own. In a sense it has a certain legislative, executive, and judicial power, is a little state. The degree of organization differs, however, with the institution. Sometimes the organization is compound, that is, embraces subordinate organizations. The institution of government embraces legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. The institution of the United States Congress embraces the institutions of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The institution of Jesuitism is a vast system, the system of an army.

An institution, by virtue of being an organization, is somewhat independent, free, and sovereign. Though it is

not meant by this that an institution is insulated; for the institutions of a land are in various ways connected with each other.

An institution is an organization of certain usages, customs, laws, ordinances, ceremonies. It is more than any one of these. We have the institution of monarchy. We have again, in the crowning the monarch or in the paying him homage, that which is in one, a custom, a law, an ordinance, and a ceremony.

An institution embodies a certain purpose, spirit, conviction, principle; seeks to carry out a certain line of action; exists to maintain, perpetuate, and perhaps develop and extend these. It is a channel which protects and carries along a certain current of life. It is a tool, an instrumentality, an inspiration embodied, a power organized. Within its girding and guardian walls the principle stands fast. Men will fight for an institution as for a principle, considering it much the same thing. The ages and crises of history are in part the ages and crises of institutions. The principles, convictions, practical ideas of a land are in part embodied in its institutions—the principle is the essential part; the institution, the accidental: the principle, the permanent; the institution, the transient: the former is the spiritual, the latter the formal element. The principle is upheld the more firmly by the institution because the impulse toward the principle is re-enforced by various accidental motives. Some institutions secure liberty, others guarantee the rights of the family, others of the state, others of property, others of religion.

An institution must be a body well defined, widely important, and extensively operative.

An institution requires a certain self-restraint and conformity. It more or less limits freedom. It is somewhat a harness, somewhat conventional. It is against too much individuality and radicalism.

All the institutions of a country together may be called a set. In a given land there is a system of institutions

which, like the system of law, corresponds to the natural system of society and is a part of the general system of society. There are as many sets of institutions as there are countries. Different people have a more or less different blood, history, character, and surrounding, hence have a more or less different constitution of society—social, civil, industrial, and religious—and a more or less different set of institutions. The institutions of a people are largely recognized in its body of laws.

Institutions have a natural or an artificial origin, or an origin partly natural and partly artificial. Of natural origin are the jury, the common law, and the Parliament of England. These are natural growths. Of artificial origin are the Presidency, Congress, and Supreme Court of the United States. These were made for a purpose, as a house is built for its occupant. In the violent middle ages the institution of the Truce of God was created by the Council of Clermont to give security to all for four days and a half of each week. Of mixed origin are the caste system of India, property, money, and the bill of exchange in Europe.

Institutions vary. They vary in structure. Government is highly organized, is a system of institutions; while marriage is very simple. Institutions vary in vitality. Many an institution has perished; but the family and the state "renew themselves with the ages and are ever in unfading youth." Human life has never outgrown them. The needs they serve seem ever to exist, and they seem ever to serve those needs. They have a permanent goodness. But most institutions are more or less transient.

Institutions vary in influence. The Christian church is more influential than trial by jury.

Institutions vary in extent of distribution. We have a goodly number peculiar to but one country. We have a goodly number extending through a group of countries: monarchy, aristocracy, representative government,

the jury system. We have some which are world-wide; such are the family and the state.

Institutions vary in importance. The family and the state rise in importance above many other institutions, as the giant Sequoias of California rise above the lofty pines of her forests.

The same institution will vary with circumstances: circumstances of race, climate, war, conquest, culture. Hereby monarchy, aristocracy, republicanism, democracy varies. Ancient democratic institutions differed according to the city, and sometimes in the same city in different ages. The primary popular assembly, whether of the town or of the people at large, has differed much throughout the world. It is because of the difference of the people or of the circumstances that institutions which appear the same have not always the same effect; that the civil institutions of the United States when copied by the South American states are not equally serviceable.

Institutions change. The principles, the spirit, the laws, the substance of the system of things cannot change, but the forms, the institutions may change, at least in all matters not made imperative by competent authority. As a rule, institutions are not to be maintained and justified as of absolute worth, for being merely forms, they have no worth and value in themselves. Maybe from the beginning they should have been different, less clumsy, more just, or some change elsewhere may require a change in them.

Institutions may change in form. In some lands monarchy has changed from absolute to limited, and aristocracy from having many privileges to having few. In Christendom both ecclesiastical and civil government have much less scope than once.

Institutions may also change in motive. The general ideas of a later age often differing much from those of an earlier, certain institutions retained may be supported for new reasons. Coarser motives may have given way

to finer. Shaking hands, probably once a precaution for safety, is now an act of courtesy. Worse motives may have given way to better, as in the progress of time has been the case with certain monarchies and aristocracies.

Institutions grow: in Europe, feudalism, monarchy, republicanism. In most institutions no form is final. In most there should be full opportunity for change. The English Parliament presents a fine specimen of institutional growth; presents increase in articulation, in independence, in spirit, in power. Some institutions remain for long, dormant in the germ, or with development arrested at a certain stage. This was the case with the eldership in some of the ancient Greek cities, and has been the case in many town or tribal popular governments in Europe and Asia. This has often been the case in Europe with the assembly of the people of the town or at large.

Institutions decay. The Senate of Rome that once directed the entire policy of the Roman state lost power after power, lost in respect, lost in independence, altered in constitution, and at last, under the Empire, was but a shadow of its former self. In early modern Europe free institutions decayed: municipal, provincial, and national. In later Europe monarchy has decayed, the king giving way to the people; aristocracy has decayed, the baron giving way to the burgher and the peasant; serfdom has decayed. Some institutions, though still strong, are comparatively feeble to what they once were, even as "the grand river currents of the world to-day are feeble remnants of the currents of pre-historic time."

Institutions may revive, may be animated again by the old spirit and maintain the old principles. Parliamentary government in England illustrates this; the judiciary of various lands illustrates it; the Christian church affords many illustrations.

Institutions perish, though sometimes the form re-

mains like an empty snail shell, or is temporarily occupied for other than the original purpose, as the dead institutions of the Roman public were used by the Roman empire. Monarchy died out of some of the ancient cities; aristocracy died out of some of them. The Christian church died out of Northern Africa. Institutions perish because deprived of proper nutriment and support, or by systematic repression, as pagan institutions in early Christian Europe, as free institutions in early modern Europe.

Sometimes an institution is abolished by law: a certain court, like that of the English Star Chamber, or monarchy, as has been the case in France. Sometimes the institutions of a great king, perhaps established by a code, fall into oblivion after his death, "the origin, progress, and decline of the institution being confined in a very short period," as was the case with the institutions of St. Louis of France, as Montesquieu points out.

Some people are more institutional than others. The Romans were than the Greeks. The English are than the French, and Western Europe is than Eastern Europe, and Eastern Europe than Western Asia.

Some governments favor an institutional tendency more than others; the freer governments more than those which are absolute, for these dislike all self-government, "in whatsoever narrow circle or moderate degree it may strive to maintain itself. This is so much the case that often despots of the best intentions for the welfare of the people have been the most destructive to the remnants of former, or to the germs of future, institutions in the very proportion in which they have been gifted with brilliant talents, activity, and courage." Liberty is favorable to institutions both in number and variety; extreme restraint is unfavorable.

Institutions depend for success very much upon the people behind them. With almost the same set of civil institutions the United States does much more in

the way of good government than does Mexico. The English have maintained in perpetual vigor the institutions of self-government; have successfully given them to every colony, and even planted them with some success among a conquered people, as witness in India. The French have done far less on these lines.

We are now prepared for the use of institutions. An institution is a form or an organ that is to supply some need. Institutions are to society what the arms and legs or the heart and lungs are to a man. They are constructions for the purpose of getting or doing what is wanted. Whatever tendency to receive or do, society may have, it sooner or later develops an especial something in that direction of the character of an organ or a structure, or it develops a class of workers, who may or may not form an institution. Because of the tendency for food, we have the farmer; for trade, the merchant; for law, the lawyer; for religion, the minister. Each want creates a class to meet it, and each class is trained to its work. Now a class may or may not create a structure by which to do its work; the farmers do not, the merchants do not, the doctors do not. The lawyers do; they have judicial machinery, which machinery may be called an institution. The ministers do; they have the institution of the church, which in turn has subordinate institutions.

A useful spirit generally works out its purposes by some instrumentality, generally works itself outwards by an institution: justice by some organization for practical justice, like government, law, and the courts; brotherhood by some organization, like government, the church, and the Freemasons; humanity by government, the church, and by humane societies; the spirit of religion by the church with all her subordinate institutions, as preaching, the Sabbath-school, and the prayer-meeting. Some change slowly going forward in the condition of society may be the occasion of a new institution.

The growing custom of sparing more or less of the prisoners taken in war created the institution of slavery. The growing consolidation of neighboring states has, in many instances, created an imperial system of government. Changes which, being more rapid than the preceding, may be called movements have occasioned institutions. Educational movements have created educational institutions. A movement of reform in the church created the brotherhood of Franciscan Friars.

As a rule no principle is so fruitful as when embodied in a fit and elastic institution. An institution gives method and machinery to serve a certain purpose and principle. It impels, nourishes, and develops them. It gives them persistence and regularity. It guides and moulds them. It carries life and action beyond impulsiveness, temporary enthusiasm, transitory fashion. It has a great protective power. Where would Mormonism be to-day were it not instituted, or charity, were it not instituted, or piety? Institutions are a great conservative power. By them in their energy and action we resist the onset of all sorts of enemies.

The institution is also a great formative power; as witness the power of the civil institutions of the United States over the great body of people who have come from under civil institutions of a different nature; as witness the influence of the church over those brought up in its pale, or the influence of a good public school system.

An institution has also the social power, that power of contact, example, and excitement which comes when men are massed; each countenancing the other, impelling the other, each more firm, more deeply moved than if alone. Thereby the regiment stands more firm in battle or has a wilder panic in a rout. Thereby the people of a time rise higher in political, literary, artistic, or religious excellence or sink lower in general decay.

Institutions, then, are an instrumentality for securing

human welfare. They indicate complexity in society, yet they indicate order and method. In any given age the institutions of a land make a great body of form and method for the people, are a great body of structure which it were impossible to suddenly do away with, and which is the constituted machinery by which much of the work of life is carried on. Other things being equal, institutional society is far more valuable than that which is not institutional, is stronger in all in it that is good—can guarantee more, can procure more, creates a more fixed habit, a deeper and more permanent love; adds to theory a better practice, gives to spontaneous interest or enthusiasm more power to continue them, the power of usage.

Political liberty, for example, is partly maintained by certain institutions, which are the means and machinery by which a free society acts, by which a people can express its will upon questions of public policy as against monarch, aristocrat, majority, minority, monopoly, or ring. These institutions have been slowly invented and perfected. They are the product of ages of trial and experiment. One is constitutional government, varying with the genius and circumstances of the people, being republican, monarchical, or other, as the case may be. There may be an aristocratic and a democratic body, as in some of the Italian republics of the middle ages. There may be a monarch styled king or emperor; an aristocracy and a democracy, a popular body of electors, as in Great Britain; each body having a share in the sovereign power. Or there may be simply the people, as in the United States. But in every case there is what is known as a constitution, as something behind the arbitrary will of an individual or a class. Other institutions that support political liberty are courts of justice, and corporations with chartered rights, provincial and local. All these keep up the love and the practice of freedom.

Institutions may be good or bad in moral character;

they may sustain some spirit which is constitutionally immoral,—a spirit of conquest, a spirit of tyranny, a spirit to hold others in slavery,—or they may sustain some spirit which is moral, as justice in government, brotherhood in the various social and industrial leagues of brotherhood, humanity in the institutions of charity. Principles of morality should reign in institutions as elsewhere.

Institutions may be morally good or bad in practice, and may be in policy; may be favorable or unfavorable to human welfare; all this according to time, place, people, and manner of administration. There is ever a great work to do in getting out or keeping out from the institutions which are about us, all unjust or unwise rule, all domination and tyranny, all that enslaves and degrades; in keeping the institution wholly an agency of life. Many an institution has been abused to fraud and lust and murder. Every institution, aside from its natural good or evil, or both, is liable to abuse—slavery, the family, aristocracy, monarchy. With man as he has been, all institutions without exception are liable to abuse, not the church only, or monarchy only.

For the most part in history, institutions have been of natural origin; have been growths, and not arbitrary creations; have been natural and legitimate products of that human nature which is everywhere, and also of the peculiar nature and situation of things in a given land and time, of the distinctive peculiarities of each people and age, of the radical character, the mental and moral qualities, the circumstances, the historic antecedents.

The institutions of one age are not always transferable to another age. Institutions which are good for one period of a people's growth may not be for another. When religious, moral, social, domestic, educational, and other institutions become fixed and arbitrary, without appropriate significance or use; when ecclesiastical and military institutions that were to be but temporal have

assumed to be eternal; then the husk has hurt the kernel. Institutions perhaps just and beneficent at one time have, when circumstances have altered, become unjust and oppressive; such has been the case with polygamy, concubinage, caste, and slavery.

The feudal system, that great military association of the conquerors of Europe, and which was extensively accepted throughout Europe, had as a social system great suitability to the wants of society before the twelfth century, and in consequence had great vitality and force. Its adoption was unopposed. It was but one remove from anarchy, but it was that remove; it gave a foothold to order. It was a rude enough conduct of society, but it was better than the chaos which had gone before. The disconnected, antagonistic atoms had now come under a power of order, were forced into union, into groups, and held there. It was a great gain that men had now learned to unite. When, as from the twelfth to the fifteenth century, feudalism became less and less suited to the wants of society it became less and less strong.

When the feudal institution began, it was much better than anything which had immediately preceded it. While also, at first, its good side was especially prominent, its idea was orderly, humanizing, and helpful to progress; it gave the lords additional energy and independence to resist despotism; it helped make masses of semi-barbarous men obedient to persons, and was a stage in bringing them under obedience to law. But after awhile the lords abused their authority and trust, to neglect the people and secure their own selfish ends; and so their lordship and ownership became an obstacle to progress, and a source of the most vexatious, unfeeling, and atrocious oppression. Here an institution which served well in one age was a curse in another.

A better state of things came in with the coming in of absolute monarchy, and in this absolute monarchy

of Christian Europe we have another illustration of an institution beneficial in one age and injurious in another. When monarchy began in France, it was a decided improvement upon the previous state of anarchy. Under Louis Le Bel, when every little province had its independent ruler, one often refusing to co-operate with his neighbors, often opposing and even fighting them, a number of those rulers were brought into some subjection to a king, and monarchy thus became a public protector. Under Philip Augustus the kingdom was strengthened, and by the splendor of his court, by his foreign wars and his civilizing efforts, there came a sense of nationality. Then came St. Louis, who respected rights, ruled equitably, and ever aimed at the public good. Now it may be said without hesitation, that during the epoch of these three kings monarchy was a blessing to the people; that in it principles of public interest prevailed over principles of absolute power. But the germ of evil was there, and at a certain point of time began to develop. And then the metamorphosis of legitimate into despotic monarchy began and continued, until in the reigns of Louis XIV., XV., and XVI. the work was consummated.

The institutions of one country are not always transferable to another. An institution may be called the style of doing a thing. And as the style of clothing and building in Asia differs from that of Europe, so may the various institutions of the one continent differ from those of the other. We should not measure the institutions in religion, morals, politics, and society in Asia by those in Europe, or such in Europe by those in America.

Much disappointment and misery would have been saved in the later history of the world if men had realized this fact, that institutions are not always transferable. Life should have its appropriate body, its appropriate forms, and a living people will, if free to act,

leave the useless to pass away or remain to serve in some other than its original way, as in the case of monarchy in England, or to serve some other than its original end, as in the case of republican forms in the Roman Empire. If the institution be kept up in its original way and for its original ends, this must be done by sheer force from without, and the end will be trouble.

We therefore gather that institutions live and flourish only to express some kind of life. Every institution is founded on some kind of life, and just in proportion as that ceases the institution ceases. It either is substantially changed while the form is retained, as was the case when the Roman Republic lived on in the Roman Empire, as also has been the case with many institutions in England; or the institution may be removed and something new put in its place, which has been the case in France in successive monarchies and republics.

Institutions elicit affection. They have been continued, defended, and developed by men who have loved them, men who have stood by them in difficult times. Consider the reverence for royalty in substance and in forms. Consider the wide and deep regard for the church. To some how sacred is it, how it appeals to imagination, sentiment, and affection! What an image of delight is it! How it calls out energy and endeavor! How it is shining with the glory of a grand and living ideal.

The description of institutions is a part of the work of social science. To interpret and illustrate many an institution—as, like marriage, it exists in every variety of form—to deal with its various usages, its antique or modern, wise or foolish, clear or curious points, requires a treatise by itself.

And now the question arises, How far do we come to do without institutions? The answer is, that certain institutions may be outgrown and certain others not. Government among a half-civilized people has to work in spheres in which it does not have to work when that peo-

ple become civilized; and in the same manner has to do in other spheres to a degree to which it does not have to do afterwards. The government in an earlier day may have to enter religion, business, and art, and in a later day may withdraw from them. Egypt or India have witnessed more or less of that all-embracing government. But the necessity for this may pass away, and, if so, the people will do better without it. Absolute monarchy in Russia may be outgrown. It will do less work in kind and amount as society grows in other respects. While institutions have more or less work to do, according to circumstances, and while there is an obvious tendency in society to outgrow certain given institutions, yet new institutions are founded, and so society, as a rule, retains the use of institutions.

And even if we want to get beyond institutions, beyond their limitation and confinement; if we want to get beyond creeds, beyond churches, beyond civil government; the only way is through these, is by the education which these give. Though institutions limit those under them, they make the only way to reach the universal in feeling, thought, and outgoing action. Through the definite and not through the indefinite, through the clearly defined and not through the ill-defined, is the way to expansion.

A GENERAL VIEW OF THE SPHERES OF SOCIETY.

We observe the spheres of society. Life goes forward in them with "universal and perennial power." Their origin is in individual man. That is the unit of society which has inherent and spontaneous power, and which, being part of society, is the source of all the power in society. The individual person, and he only, in society has inherent and spontaneous power. And he is the source of all domestic, all political, all religious life, all life in society. He is the real, the causative and form-

ative power. He alone has all those tendencies which society has. He too, and he alone, has certain qualities which make him superior to the family, the state, or society as a whole. He is the only *being*, the only moral being, the only person. If families, corporations, or states are spoken of as persons, it is as artificial persons. Men make society, its character, and history.

As the leaf is the archetype of the system of the vegetable creation, and an ideal vertebra is the archetype of the system of the animal creation, so is individual man the archetype of the system of the social creation. As the parts of the brain are in the form of the whole, so is each person in the form of the complicated whole of society. Man has certain radical desires and tendencies, physical and social, moral and religious. During the course of history they have neither increased in number nor decreased, though they have increased or decreased in energy and range in certain times and countries. In these desires in the persons of society are the driving wheels of society. Each radical desire of human nature is the source and power of a series of social phenomena; is the constant creative supply of a stream of historic life; is the spring of a great tendency belonging to civilization. Society starts and goes on much as a crystal does. It comes into its form at once, but receives accretions. It takes its main directions at once. All the spheres are apparently from the beginning. These spheres exhaust all human energy. The whole of these spheres is the whole of life; in progress they are the phases of progress, in civilization they are the phases of civilization. In analyzing society we must analyze it into these special parts; in analyzing history we must analyze it into these special directions. This division gives order and clearness to what might otherwise appear as a general entanglement, a confused and aimless struggle; gives form and unity to what would otherwise be vast masses of shapeless material.

These phases or forms of human and social life may, with their subdivisions, be somewhat variously made out and named, and have been, different students of the subject giving somewhat different classifications. The distribution should be made out from human nature as manifested in human life. It is sufficiently precise to say that the entire social life in its utmost comprehensiveness takes the following distinct directions. There are respectively the domestic, the civil, the material, the intellectual, the moral, and the religious spheres. These are the permanent directions which living society takes. Here is the rounded story of man's life; the complete circle of his spheres of activity. We may say of each sphere what we have now said of society in general. Each sphere is more or less conditioned by general and particular causes—those of the human constitution, those of time and space and the earth, those of a supernatural world.

Each sphere is real, concrete, and definite. Each sphere is particular and individual, is of its own kind, has its own type, its own spirit and way. Each is a room of its own shape and filling in the house of life.

Each sphere has its joy, its toil and sorrow and mystery, its splendor and might, its weakness, its struggle and war. In each sphere are found "the world, the flesh, and the devil." Into each may come the help of God.

Each sphere has its variety within itself of what is substantially similar. There are various kinds of government, various literatures, various styles of art.

Each sphere is universal. We may visit distant regions of the earth or historic time, the brightest land or the darkest, and we shall find each. Doubtless all the tendencies have existed always and everywhere, in the earliest times of real society as well as in these latest.

Each sphere has its continuity, its course and crises, its lineage, physical and spiritual.

Each sphere may grow from simple to complex and

from indefiniteness to definiteness in form and function. In each sphere there may be elaboration and specialization. Each has its ascents and descents. In a given land some spheres, owing to the chances of culture, may be in advance of others in development. Each division moves with varying rapidity, is now in the advance and now in the rear of the parallel divisions.

Each sphere has its laws, restraints, and liberties, its forms and institutions.

It is one part of the duty of social science to observe these spheres, their presence, their degree of life; to perceive to what degree they are conditioned and modified by each other and by other general influences. Take the political sphere: we need to study first the part which this sphere plays in the general economy of society, then the state in general, then this or that particular state. In these last two instances we need to study the beginning or the making, then the growth and improvement, and if decay, the decay. We may give a similar philosophic study to the intellectual sphere proper, that is, to philosophy, science, art, education. Then of industrial facts we want the industrial philosophy. Of every region in the realm of society we want as exhaustive and systematic a knowledge as possible. The quality, quantity and direction of the life in each sphere of society is a result of the quality and quantity of the persons, and a result of their social, physical, supernatural, and historic conditions. The life is helped or hindered by the past and present quality and condition of the people as regards this particular sphere, and indeed as regards every other sphere. There are internal vitality and growth and external favoring conditions, or there are internal exhaustion and external opposition. The life advances to higher stages or falls back into lower. There are growth and improvement or there is short or long stagnation, slow or rapid decay, or even total extinction. The life in a given sphere is thus the natural, the logical,

the chronological result of the qualities and condition of a people; is the crop which the seed, soil, culture, and climate will produce; is in the last analysis the result of the nature of things. Each sphere or subdivision of a sphere among a people, each direction—that of politics, art, philosophy, or religion—has in its historic whole or in any given period, as a rule, a course created by the people's history, natural character, and external surroundings, a course which direct accident does not mark out, but which these conditions mark out.

As the organic articulation of society,—political, industrial, religious,—depends on the constitution of the human mind, so the course of society as a whole or in any of the spheres depends on the nature of the human beings, on their historic and present condition. Here is the unity and completeness of history, the history of the whole or of any particular part. Here is the explanation of the great body of fact or of any particular grave characteristic, as the greatness, the littleness, the nothingness of a people's politics or art. The structures of man are reared on the earth, but not out of the dust. We are to learn the causes and influences which originally and continuously are producing, and note their results; this with a people at large or with their political or artistic or scientific or educational life. It is as though we had a principle and deductions from it. Here is the unity, the philosophy, the science, the fact of history. To determine by analysis the causes in quality and quantity as we do in chemistry, then to proceed to determine their work singly and together, is the problem of history. This is to apply reason to history in the best manner. This is to perceive and reproduce the philosophy of history. This is the way in which is best written a political history, a history of art, or the history of a people at large.

All the spheres are important. In most scientific theories of society one or another aspect has prevailed

—the political, as in Montesquieu; the social, as in Guizot; the physical, as in Buckle. But society is not political society, is not industrial society; each of these is only a part of it. Each sphere is more or less necessary to the completeness, the beauty, the utility of life. Each sphere is essential to perfect civilization. The due proportion and operation of all, result in a complete culture. We must study social phenomena all around. In the life of man we must look backward and forward; we must look right and left. Our knowledge, like the perfect city, "lieth four square, its length and breadth and depth and height being equal."

These spheres have no separate existence and life. In development or in germ they have been present in every land and time, limiting and influencing each other. No impenetrable ridge of mountain separates one broad populous land from the other. To fully explain the past or the present of a people's art or science we must turn to the people's political condition or to their whole life. It is only in connection with the other spheres that any given sphere entirely becomes what it becomes and entirely effects what it effects. Sometimes to get light on the trustworthiness, the contradictions, the lacunæ of the history of one sphere, study that of another or that of the whole life. To get light on the religious history of early or medieval Christian Europe study the political or the whole history. Society lives in all these spheres at once, intermingles them, ever sustains each and unites all. One sphere always supports another. Each sphere helps support the whole and is supported by it. In a house each part does not support the other. In a tree it is the same. But society having that kind of system called organic, the parts are mutually helpful; each part serves its own good and the good of the rest.

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